Historical Dictionary of Husserl’s Philosophy

John J. Drummond

Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements
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Editor’s Foreword

Few philosophers have had as broad and deep an impact on coming generations of philosophers as Edmund Husserl. Most notably, he was the founder and a major practitioner of phenomenology, which has left an indelible mark on European, American and world philosophy over the past century. He was also among those thinkers who turned inherited philosophy upside down as he rethought many ideas that were generally accepted and replaced them with others which have since become generally accepted by many, and fiercely rejected by others, both healthy things in the world of philosophy. Coming from mathematics, which is not that common among philosophers, he added a bit of rigor, which was sometimes lacking, and his ideas gradually impacted other fields, including psychology, ethics and aesthetics. Alas, while his significance can hardly be denied, Husserl is not the easiest philosopher for laymen and even scholars to understand, and his vocabulary and concepts can do with some explanation.

This—along with his significance—is a good reason for a handy guide like this Historical Dictionary of Husserl’s Philosophy. It does not “package” Husserl for the reader, who can then attempt to master its contents; rather, it helps readers to sort out what they have seen in Husserl’s own works or books on him by others. The brief chronology already offers insight into an often difficult trajectory, with many ups and down, the most serious of these being driven out of Germany by the Nazis. His career is traced again in the introduction, this time focusing on his major activities, writings, and thoughts, a summary which should be referred to periodically. But the most important section is the dictionary, with hundreds of entries on his major publications, other philosophers he interacted with, and above all the key concepts – many of them new to Husserl—which are necessary to gain more from reading him. Perhaps the second most important section is the bibliography, which leads those interested to a broad range of related works, his own and commentaries on his philosophy.

Few have dealt with Husserl and his philosophy as long or as extensively as the author of this volume, John J. Drummond. Already in 1975, his dissertation dealt with Husserl’s phenomenology of perception. Since then he has taught at several colleges and universities and is presently professor of philosophy at Fordham University. Alongside courses and lectures, he has written a large number of articles and a book of his own, Husserlian
Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object. He has also co-edited five collections on phenomenology, and he has served as the general editor of the book series Contributions to Phenomenology and serves on the editorial board of Husserl Studies and as a referee for other notable philosophical journals. This has all provided an exceptional foundation for writing a guide to Husserl which many students, and even professors, will want to keep handy and consult as necessary.

Jon Woronoff

Series Editor
Chronology: Life

1858  
8 April: Edmund Husserl is born in Prossnitz in Mähren (Prostijow, Moravia).

1876  
30 June: Receives diploma from the *K. K. Deutsche Gymnasium* in Olmütz (Olomouc).

1876–1878  
Studies astronomy at the University of Leipzig, although also takes courses in mathematics, physics, and philosophy.

1878–1881  
Studies mathematics (and some philosophy) at the University of Berlin.

1881–1882  
Continues studies in mathematics for two semesters at the University of Vienna.

1882  

1883  
23 January: Awarded the Doctorate in Philosophy (in mathematics), after which he returned to Berlin for a short time to study mathematics further.

1883–1884  
Completes a year of military service as a volunteer in the 2nd Regiment of the field artillery in Olmütz and later in a mess for soldiers stationed in Vienna.

1884  
24 April: Father Adolf dies.

1884–1886  
Studies philosophy with Franz Brentano at the University of Vienna.

1886  
26 April: Baptized in the Evangelical Church of Vienna with the name Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl.
1886–1887  Studies for his Habilitation with Carl Stump at the University of Halle.


1892  Nominated by the Philosophy Faculty for the position of ausserordentlich Professor, but to no effect.  29 April: Daughter Elisabeth is born.

1893  Review of “A. Voigt’s ‘elementare Logik’ und meine Darlegungen zur Logik des logischen Kalküls” (“A Voigt’s Elementary Logic and my Statements on the Logic of the Logical Calculus”) as well as a response to Mr. Voigt’s reply (“Concerning the Calculus of the Logic of Contents: Rejoinder to Mr. Husserl’s Article”) in Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie.  22 December: Son Gerhart is born.


1895  18 October: Son Wolfgang is born.


1897  Publication of “Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik aus den Jahren 1894” (“Report on German Writings in Logic from the Year 1894”) in Archiv für systematische Philosophie.
1900 Publication of *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik* (*Logical Investigations. Prolegomena to Pure Logic*). Delivers lecture titled “On a Psychological Grounding of Logic” to the Philosophical Society at Halle. Nominated a second time by the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Halle for a position as Professor Extraordinarius.


1902 First meeting with Johannes Daubert; this meeting resulted in contacts between Husserl and the students of Theodor Lipps in Munich and, eventually, the establishment of the Munich Circle.

1903–1904 Publication of “Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895–1899” (“Report on German Writings in Logic from the Years 1895–1899”) in five parts in *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*.

1904 Visits Lipps and his students in Munich.

1905 Visits Wilhelm Dilthey in Berlin. Nomination for position of Professor Ordinarius (tenured full professor) is opposed by the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Göttingen. Receives word that he has been listed by the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Breslau as a possible successor to Hermann von Ebbinghaus. 28 July: Nominated by the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Halle to be the successor to Aloys Riehl.

1906 28 June: Named Professor Ordinarius at the University of Göttingen by King Wilhelm of Prussia.


1909 Visited by Paul Natorp.

1910 25 January: Agrees to collaborate with Heinrich Rickert as editor of the new journal *Logos*. Publication of Husserl’s review of Anton Marty’s
Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeine Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie in Deutsche Literaturzeitung.

1911  Publication of “Philosophy als strenge Wissenschaft” (“Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”) in Logos. Correspondence with Dilthey concerning the Logos paper.

1912  Founded, along with Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pfänder, Adolf Reinach, and Max Scheler, the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung.


1915  Recommended by the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Freiburg as the successor to Rickert. 20 February: Younger son Wolfgang seriously injured and sent to a military hospital in Belgium. 17 March: Husserl visits Wolfgang in military hospital.

1916  Visited by Scheler in Freiburg. 5 January: The Ministry of Culture and Education appoints Husserl to the chair vacated by Rickert. 8 March: Son Wolfgang is killed in action at Verdun. 1 April: Husserl moves to Freiburg. October: Edith Stein begins work as Husserl’s assistant (until 1918).


1918  Publication of his obituary for Reinach in Kant-Studien. Foundation of the Freiburger Phänomenologische Gesellschaft. 14–16 January: Repeats his lectures on Fichte’s ideal of the human for members of the Philosophy Faculty and again from 6–9 November.

1920  Arnold Metzger becomes Husserl’s private assistant (until 1924). Publication of the second edition of the second part of the Logische Untersuchungen. 15 April: Completes his term as dean of the faculty.


1923  Publication of “Erneuerung. Ihr Problem und ihre Methode” (“Renewal. Its Problem and Its Method”) in Kaizo. Offered the chair previously held by Ernst Troeltsch in the Philosophy Faculty of Berlin, but persuaded to remain at Freiburg. Sends Martin Heidegger his handwritten copy of the Logische Untersuchungen as a gift upon the latter’s appointment to the Philosophy Faculty at Marburg. Ludwig Landgrebe becomes Husserl’s personal assistant (until 1930). January: Husserl sends four more articles to Kaizo in January. August: Publication of “Die Idee einer philosophischen Kultur. Ihr erstes Aufkeimen in der greischischen Philosophie” (“The Idea of a Philosophical Culture. Its Original Germination in Greek Philosophy”) in Japanisch-deutschen Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Technik. 8 September: Travels to Göttingen for the wedding of his son Gerhart.

1924  Publication of two more articles in Kaizo: “Die Methode der Wesensforschung” (“The Method of Essential Inquiry”) and “Erneuerung als individualethisches Problem” (“Renewal as an Ethical Problem for the Individual”). Visited for the first time by Dorion Cairns. 1 May: Delivers the lecture “Kant und die Idee der Transzendentale Philosophie” (“Kant and the
Idea of Transcendental Philosophy”) at the University of Freiburg in honor of Kant’s 200th birthday. **June:** Publication of Husserl’s lecture on Kant.

1925  
Publication of Husserl’s article “Über die Reden Gotamo Buddhos” (“On the Sayings of Gautama Buddha”).

1926  
Chosen to represent Germany on the International Committee at the Harvard International Philosophy Congress. **8 April:** Celebrates his 67th birthday in Todnauberg where Heidegger presents him with the dedication of *Sein und Zeit (Being and Time):* “Dedicated to Edmund Husserl in grateful admiration and friendship.”

1927  
Publication of “Die Phänomenologie und Rudolf Eucken” (“Phenomenology and Rudolf Eucken”). **October:** Heidegger visits Husserl in Freiburg in October to discuss the *Encyclopedia Brittanica* article.

1927–1928  
Continues work with Heidegger on the *Encyclopedia Brittanica* article. Heidegger publishes Husserl’s *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time)* in the edition prepared largely by Edith Stein. Travels to Berlin on the occasion of Stumpf’s 80th birthday. **8 February:** The Philosophy Faculty at Freiburg selects Heidegger as Husserl’s successor. **31 March:** Relieved of his official duties at the University, although he continues to teach. **22–29 April:** Delivers two public lectures and participates in a discussion on “Phänomenologie und Psychologie. Transzendentale Phänomenologie” (“Phenomenology and Psychology. Transcendental Phenomenology”) in Amsterdam. **30 April:** Delivers a lecture in Groningen on phenomenological psychology. **8 May:** Delivers the lecture “Phänomenologische Psychologie” (“Phenomenological Psychology”) to an overflow audience of faculty and students at Freiburg. **August:** Eugen Fink begins service as Husserl’s private assistant, although Landgrebe continues to be funded until 1930.

1929  
**23–25 February:** Delivers the “Paris Lectures”; these lectures form the basis of his *Méditations cartésiennes (Cartesian Meditations).* **8 April:** Honored on his 70th birthday by the Philosophy Faculty at Göttingen and where he is presented with a bust of himself by Arnold Rickert and with a *Festschrift* by Heidegger. **July:** Publication of *Formale und transzendentale Logik (Formal and Transcendental Logic)* in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung.*
1930 December: Publication of “Nachwort zu meinen Ideen zu reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie” ("Afterword to my Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy") in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung.

1931 Publication of Méditations cartésiennes (Cartesian Meditations). June: Delivers a lecture “Phänomenologie und Anthropologie” (“Phenomenology and Anthropology”) to the Kant Society in Frankfurt, Berlin (to an audience of 1,600 people) and in Halle.

1931–1932 Numerous conversations with Dorion Cairns, and often Eugen Fink as well, which are recorded in Cairns’s Conversations with Husserl and Fink.

1933 6 April: Suspended from the University of Freiburg by decree #A7642 of the Badisch Ministry of Culture. 8 April: Receives a medal of honor from the Paris-Académie on the occasion of its 100th birthday. 14 April: Prohibited from all university activities. 28 April: Teaching duties are reinstated by decree #A8500 of the Badisch Ministry of Culture. 20 July: Suspension is officially lifted by the Ministry of Culture in Karlsruhe. September: Resigns from the Deutsche Akademie. 10 November: Receives an offer of a chair in the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California, but declines the offer.

1934 Receives an invitation to the Prague Congress to write a paper on the task of philosophy, but he asks Jan Patočka to withdraw the paper since he believes the printed version contains too many errors.

1935 Negotiations with the Prague Philosophical Circle and the Masaryk Institute about the possibility of bringing Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts to Prague. Landgrebe arrives in Freiburg to inventory the manuscripts. May: Made an honorary member of the Prague Philosophy Circle. 7 May: Delivers a lecture to the Vienna Kultur bund titled “Die Philosophie in der Krisis der europäischen Menschheit” (“Philosophy in the Crisis of European Humanity”). 10 May: Lecture is repeated. 16 September: Refuses to repeat the Vienna Lecture in Prague’s Volksbildungshaus Urania for political reasons. 12–18 November: Delivers lectures in Prague to the Brentano Society, to a seminar given by Emil Utitz, to the Cercle linguistique, and to the Cercle philosophique. 14–15 November: Delivers a lecture titled “Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und Psychologie” (“The Crisis of European Sciences and Psychology”) to the Prague Philosophical Circle and the Philosophy Faculty and Kant Society in Prague.
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1936  15 January: Removed from the register of lecturers at the University of Freiburg. 25 January: The Reich Ministry for Science, Training, and National Education forces Husserl to withdraw from the philosophical organization established in Belgrade by Arthur Liebert. 15 July: Named a “Corresponding Fellow” of the British Academy. 15 December: Husserl sends the last corrections of the Krisis to Liebert, who had agreed to publish it in Philosophia (Belgrade).

1937  The Reich Ministry refuses Husserl permission to participate in the 9th International Congress for Philosophy in Paris.

1938  27 April: Husserl dies at the age of 79.

Note

Chronology: Courses

WS 1887/88  Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics.

SS 1888  Fundamental Problems of Psychology.


SS 1889  Logic.

WS 1889/90  Ethics.

SS 1890  Logic.


SS 1891  Fundamental Problems of Ethics.


SS 1892  Introduction to Philosophy. Seminar on [René] Descartes’s *Meditations on First Philosophy*.


SS 1893  Introduction to Philosophy. The Fundamental Problems of Ethics.


SS 1894  Introduction to Philosophy. Ethics and the Philosophy of Law.
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**WS 1894/95**  Psychology. On the Freedom of the Will.


**SS 1896**  Introduction to Philosophy. Logic. On the Freedom of the Will.

**WS 1896/97**  Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Seminar on Descartes’s *Meditations on First Philosophy*.

**SS 1897**  On the Freedom of the Will. Ethics and the Philosophy of Law. Seminar on a work by Schopenhauer to be selected.

**WS 1897/98**  Introduction to Philosophy. Seminar on [Immanuel] Kant’s *Prolegomena*.

**SS 1898**  On the Freedom of the Will. Kant and post-Kantian Philosophy. Seminar on Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.


**SS 1899**  Freedom of the Will. History of Philosophy. Seminar on David Hume’s *A Treatise of Human Nature*.

**WS 1899/1900**  Introduction to Philosophy. Kant and post-Kantian Philosophy. Philosophical Exercises in connection with Kant’s *Prolegomena*.

**SS 1900**  Freedom of the Will. History of Philosophy. Seminar on Spinoza’s *Ethics*.

**WS 1900/1**  Kant’s Philosophy. Seminar on Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.

**SS 1901**  Freedom of the Will. History of Philosophy.

SS 1902  General History of Philosophy. Fundamental Questions of Ethics. Seminar on Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.


WS 1905/6  Kant and post-Kantian Philosophy. Seminar on Kant’s Theory of Experience, according to the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Prolegomena*.

SS 1906  General History of Philosophy. Seminar on Kant’s Theory of Principles, according to the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*.
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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>WS 1906/7</td>
<td>Introduction to Logic and the Critique of Knowledge. Seminar on Selected Problems of Phenomenology and the Critique of Knowledge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1909</td>
<td>General History of Philosophy. Introduction to the Phenomenology of Knowledge. Philosophical Exercises in connection with Kant’s <em>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals</em> and his <em>Critique of Practical Reason</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS 1909/10</td>
<td>Kant and post-Kantian Philosophy. General History of Education. Seminar on Kant’s <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1910</td>
<td>General History of Philosophy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1911</td>
<td>General History of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Beginning of the 19th Century. Philosophical Exercises in connection with E. Mach’s <em>Analysis of Sensations</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS 1911/12</td>
<td>Kant and post-Kantian Philosophy. Outline of a General Theory of Consciousness, in Lectures and Exercises. Seminar on Kant’s <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>.</td>
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SS 1917  Introduction to Phenomenology. Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy. Seminar on Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic.

SS 1918 Introduction to Philosophy. Seminar on Fichte’s *Vocation of Man*.

WS 1918/19 History of Philosophy from its Beginners to the Beginning of the 1900s. Seminar on Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy.


WS 1919/20 Introduction to Philosophy. Seminar on Transcendental Aesthetics and Transcendental Idealism.

SS 1920 Introduction to Ethics. Seminar on Appearance and Sense.


SS 1921 History of Modern Philosophy. Seminar for Advanced Students on Hume’s *A Treatise of Human Nature*.


WS 1922/23 Introduction to Philosophy. Seminar for Advanced Students.

SS 1923 Selected Phenomenological Problems. Seminar for Advanced Students.

WS 1923/24 First Philosophy. Seminar for Advanced Students.

SS 1924 Fundamental Problems of Ethics. Seminar for Advanced Students.

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<th>Term</th>
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<tr>
<td>SS 1925</td>
<td>Introduction to Phenomenological Psychology. Seminar in the Analysis and Description of Pure, Mental Acts and Products.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WS 1925/26</td>
<td>Fundamental Problems of Logic. Seminar on Selected Logical Problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS 1926/27</td>
<td>Introduction to Phenomenology. Seminar for Advanced Students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS 1928/29</td>
<td>Phenomenology of Empathy in Lectures and Exercises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1929</td>
<td>Selected Phenomenological Problems.</td>
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Introduction

Although not the first to use the term, Edmund Husserl is generally regarded as the founding figure of the philosophical movement of “phenomenology,” by which he understands a descriptive science of the essential structures of experiences and of their objects precisely as these are experienced. Phenomenology has had a decisive influence on philosophy in the 20th century, especially in Europe. The movement known as “continental philosophy,” whether practiced in Europe or elsewhere, has its roots in phenomenology and in the post-Hegelian philosophies of Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Karl Marx. But those who enter into contemporary continental philosophy through the post-Hegelians use a phenomenological filter, namely, the phenomenological readings of the post-Hegelians made possible by Husserl and found most prominently in Martin Heidegger. Even where philosophy has become post-phenomenological, it takes its bearings to a great extent from the philosophy of Husserl.

Husserl rejects what he takes to be the skepticism of empirical philosophy as well as the constructivism of neo-Kantian philosophy. Against both, he insists that philosophical reflection return—in the words of his well-known slogan—zu den Sachen selbst, that is, “to the things themselves” exactly as they are given to us in experience. The constant theme throughout his phenomenological descriptions is the issue of how objective knowledge arises in and for an experiencing subject. These descriptions are in the service of an account of reason, which is understood by Husserl as a striving for “evidence,” for experiences in which our judgings are confirmed or disconfirmed by insight into the directly, clearly, and distinctly presented “things themselves.” These evidential experiences take different forms in knowing and the theoretical sciences, in valuing and the axiological sciences, and in willing and the practical sciences. But in all three domains, the aim of experiential life is to live the life of reason.

During his lifetime Husserl published relatively few of the studies in which he developed this phenomenological project. What he did publish was for the most part a series of so-called introductions to phenomenology that focused largely on methodological matters and sought to distinguish his phenomenology from other philosophical approaches. These programmatic works were, however, far from the total of Husserl’s output. At his death he left over 45,000 pages of unedited manuscripts written in a form of shorthand
known as *Gabelsbergerschrift*, manuscripts that not only extended his methodological reflections but, more importantly, carried out detailed phenomenological descriptions.

**Overview of Husserl’s Life**

Edmund Husserl was born to Abraham Adolf Husserl and Julie Husserl née Selinger on 8 April 1859 in Prossnitz in Mähren, which was then part of the Hapsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire but is now Prostějov in Moravia in the Czech Republic. Husserl’s parents belonged to a community of assimilated Jews who had long lived and worked in the area. Prossnitz, after the March Revolution of 1848, had a liberal city council that allowed Jews full participation in the economic life of the city, and Abraham Husserl became a successful clothier. He was apparently not a devout Jew, and he did not mix much with other Jews in the local population. Nor did he do much to integrate his children into the local Jewish community, allowing Edmund, for example, to attend public, rather than Jewish, schools. After Husserl had started his schooling in the local school in Prossnitz, his father sent him in 1868 to study at the *Leopoldstädter Realgymnasium* in Vienna. After completing the first year, Husserl in 1869 transferred closer to home, continuing his studies at the *Staatsgymnasium* in Olmütz (Olomouc, Czech Republic). He was, by all accounts, a poor and uninterested student, although he seems somehow to have developed along the way an interest in mathematics. Nevertheless, he performed well enough in his studies to receive his *Matura* (the Austrian certification that secondary schooling has been completed) in 1876.

Edmund was a middle child. His brother Heinrich was his elder by about two years, while his brother Emil was ten years younger. After the death of their father on 24 April 1884, Heinrich and Emil took over their father’s business, while Edmund pursued his own career goals in mathematics. He had progressed to university studies in astronomy at Leipzig from 1876 to 1878. It was in Leipzig that he first met and became friends with Tomáš Masaryk (1850–1937), who later served as the first president of Czechoslovakia and who introduced Husserl to the study of philosophy. From the summer of 1878 until 1881, Husserl studied mathematics in Berlin under the eminent mathematicians Karl Weierstrass (1815–1897) and Leopold Kronecker (1823–1891), attending at the same time the philosophy lectures of Friedrich Paulsen (1846–1908). Husserl completed his mathematical training in Vienna in 1881–1882, writing a dissertation titled *Beiträge zur Theorie der Variationsrechnung* (*Contributions to the Theory of the Calculus of Variations*) and receiving the Ph.D. in January of 1883.

While completing his degree in Vienna, Husserl had renewed his friendship with Masaryk, who encouraged Husserl both to read the New
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Testament and to attend the philosophy lectures of Franz Brentano (1838–1917). The former ultimately led Husserl to convert to Christianity; he was baptized in the Evangelical Church of Vienna on 26 April 1886. The latter had a profound effect on his philosophical development. Although Husserl returned to Berlin after completing his degree in order to study again with Weierstrass during the summer of 1883, he soon returned to Vienna where he completed a year of voluntary military service and again studied philosophy with Brentano from 1884 to 1886. At Brentano’s suggestion, Husserl then studied with Brentano’s former student Carl Stumpf (1849–1936) at the university at Halle. In 1887, Husserl submitted his Habilitationsschrift titled “Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen” (“On the Concept of Number. Psychological Analyses”). This work was decisive for Husserl’s career insofar as it turned him from strictly mathematical analyses to philosophical analyses of the methods and foundations of mathematics, a turn that was later to be extended into philosophical analyses of logic and, ultimately, of all experience.

After completing his Habilitation Husserl on 6 August 1887 married Malvine Charlotte Steinschneider, whom he knew from the Prossnitz Jewish community and who had herself converted to Christianity only a month before their marriage. Husserl also began teaching at Halle as a Privatdozent in 1887, where he taught until 1901. During the years at Halle, he and Malvine had three children: Elisabeth, born on 29 April 1892; Gerhart, born on 22 December 1893; and Wolfgang, born on 18 October 1985. Husserl’s career did not advance greatly while at Halle, but the publication of the Logische Untersuchungen in 1900–1901 led to an appointment as Professor Extraordinarius at Göttingen in 1901. He was promoted to Professor Ordinarius in 1906, and he remained in Göttingen until 1916 when he was appointed to the chair vacated by Heinrich Rickert at the University of Freiburg. He taught at Freiburg until his retirement in 1928.

The last years at Göttingen and the early years at Freiburg coincided with World War I, and these were years of great personal tragedy for Husserl and his family. His younger son Wolfgang was seriously injured in battle on 20 February 1915, and, after recuperation, he returned to the battlefield only to be killed at the Battle of Verdun on 8 March 1916. His elder son Gerhart also suffered a severe head wound. Husserl’s letters reveal his dismay and sadness at the loss of life in the war and the serious injuries suffered by so many, not only his sons but friends, acquaintances and students. He was greatly affected, for example, by the death in 1917 of his student Adolf Reinach (1883–1917), of whom he thought most highly as a teacher and phenomenologist. And, as if the losses of war were insufficient, Husserl’s mother Julie died in July 1917.
Husserl considered the Treaty of Versailles an extension of the war; he speaks, for example, of how the war “since 1918 has chosen, instead of military means of coercion, the ‘finer’ hardships of psychological torture and economic deprivation.” At Freiburg, he witnessed the ineffectiveness of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism. Although his post-retirement years were active with continued writing and speaking, after the rise of the Nazis to power he was no longer free to teach or lecture in Germany. Given that Husserl always considered himself a patriotic German, that he had received the Iron Cross for his lectures to active-duty soldiers during the war, that his daughter Elisabeth had volunteered in a field hospital in World War I, and that both his sons had served nobly in the German army, his treatment at the hands of the Nazis must have been especially galling. It began with the decree of 6 April 1933, which was countersigned by then University Rector Martin Heidegger and which prohibited non-Aryans from holding civil service positions, a decree from which Husserl himself was exempted by virtue of his sons’ service in the army. The decree was rescinded on 28 April, but neither Husserl’s exemption nor the rescission benefited Gerhart Husserl who lost his position on the law faculty at Kiel. In 1933–1934 Husserl’s surviving children emigrated to the United States, Gerhart accepting a position in the Washington School of Law, and Elisabeth departing with her husband, the art historian Jakob Rosenberg, who accepted a position at Harvard University. Husserl himself, however, refused to leave Germany, declining the offer of a position at the University of Southern California. The infamous Nürnberger Gesetze (Nuremberg laws) of 15 September 1935, laws that Husserl in a letter to his son Gerhart on 21 September described as a “bomb,” were the final blow. Husserl was stripped of his German citizenship and denied membership on German delegations to foreign conferences; his license to teach was withdrawn; and on 15 January 1936 he was officially removed from the roster of lecturers at the University of Freiburg.

What for Husserl had early in his career been a philosophical crisis regarding the proper grounding of knowledge revealed itself in the Freiburg years as a cultural crisis. Revealed is the “inner falsity, the meaninglessness” of European culture, a meaninglessness that masks the loss of faith in reason itself. In hindsight it can be said that there was always a moral urgency at the center of Husserl’s philosophy, a moral imperative to retrieve a proper sense of rationality and to develop a sense of self-responsibility in which each person decides for himself or herself in the light of evidence about what is true, about the proper attitudes one ought to have, and about the actions one ought to perform. The moral urgency in Husserl’s writings became ever more forceful in response to the abuses of rationality in the Nazi regime, the worst of which he did not live to see.
INTRODUCTION

It was in this historical context that the Franciscan priest Herman Leo van Breda visited Freiburg shortly after Husserl’s death. Discovering Husserl’s unedited manuscripts and fearful that the Nazis would destroy them, van Breda decided to arrange for their transport in diplomatic pouches to Leuven, Belgium, where the Husserl Archives were established. Van Breda also took Malvine Husserl to Belgium where she lived in a convent. As a result of the hospitality and the warmth of the sisters there, Malvine converted to Catholicism. After the war, she joined her children in the United States. She eventually returned to Freiburg where she died on 21 November 1950.

Husserl’s career is the story, as he often put it, of “a perpetual beginner.” We see this not only in the fact that his few published works are repeated attempts to introduce phenomenology to readers but also in his tendency to return over and over again to the same questions and the same issues in both his published works and the tens of thousand of pages of unpublished materials. In that regard, his career is the story as well of a philosopher of remarkable intellectual honesty who was ready always to revise his views in the light of continued reflections. Several ideas are central to these repeated reflections, and Husserl’s rethinking of these themes shall be briefly explored by examining three major periods in his career that manifest his perpetual beginning, three periods that correspond roughly to his tenures at three different institutions.

The Years at Halle (1887–1901)

Husserl served as a Privatdozent at Halle from 1887 until 1901. His writings during this period address issues in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. He wrote several essays reviewing developments in the logical theory of his day and the works of prominent logicians. His first significant publication during this period was the Philosophie der Arithmetik (Philosophy of Arithmetic), whose first four chapters are but a minor revision of his Habilitationsschrift. But Husserl now extends his project; he seeks to clarify the relations between mathematics and logic and to consider the possibility that a philosophical account of mathematics and logic could provide the foundation for all other theoretical sciences insofar as it could serve as a theory of science. To some extent, then, the Philosophy of Arithmetic first embodies and then sheds the decisive influence of Weierstrass. Like Weierstrass, Husserl sought a radical grounding for mathematics, but whereas Weierstrass thought this task a mathematical one, Husserl thought it philosophical. Unlike Weierstrass, Husserl did not seek the foundations of mathematics in an axiomatic approach, identifying those definitions and axioms from which the rest of the mathematical sciences could be derived. Instead Husserl sought to provide an account of those experiences that are
sufficiently secure to provide evidence for mathematical claims and to provide accounts of how other, more complex experiences are rooted—even when the rooting is not deductive in character—in these secure experiences. For philosophical guidance in achieving this task Husserl turned to the other decisive influence in his formation, Brentano and his “descriptive psychology.”

In the Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl attempts to describe those mental acts in which we are conscious of numbers, in particular, cardinal numbers. He divides his discussion into two parts: an account of the “authentic” or direct experience of the first few cardinal numbers (up to, approximately, 12), and an account of the “inauthentic” or symbolic representation of the larger cardinals. In these accounts, Husserl originally hoped to realize Weierstrass’s program by grounding mathematics in the cardinal numbers or, more precisely, by grounding mathematical experience in the experience of the cardinal numbers. Even in writing the book, however, Husserl changed his mind, for he states in the preface that the concept of the cardinal numbers is not the fundamental concept. Moreover, by the time of the publication of the work, Husserl was already dissatisfied with the analysis of the “inauthentic” presentation of the higher cardinal numbers.

What was dissatisfying in this analysis is that they were “psychologistic,” that is, they reduced the ideality of numbers and their relations to the reality of psychological acts and their relations, or, alternately, they reduced the transcendence of the logical content of the experiences to the immanence of their psychological contents. Because knowledge arises in and for subjects and because, as modern philosophers from the time of René Descartes (1596–1650) had argued, we cannot be certain that the external world we experience does in fact exist as we experience it, there is a temptation, which Descartes and the British empiricists most famously indulge, to reduce the object of knowledge to a psychological reality, that is, to identify it with an idea. But this makes the object of knowledge subjective, and it makes the laws that govern the contents of our experience psychological laws. This is the position known as “psychologism,” and it is one rejected by Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), and the most important of Brentano’s students (Alexius Meinong [1853–1920], Kasimir Twardowski [1866–1938], and Husserl), although, perhaps, not by Brentano himself.

Husserl, however, while rejecting psychologism, does not altogether reject the descriptive-psychological approach of the Philosophy of Arithmetic or its results. On certain points, indeed, he finds it “clear and instructive,” and later in his career he explicitly endorses this early account of the experience of the lower cardinals. Finally, he does not abandon the use of the term “presentation” (Vorstellung) in the light of Frege’s criticism of Husserl’s tendency to reduce everything to the subjective.
While many have thought that Frege’s review was decisive for Husserl’s turning away from psychologism, that view has now been shown inadequate. Internal exigencies at work in Husserl’s continued reflections on logic during the early years he spent at Halle and continued reflections on the work of Bolzano, Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong were already moving Husserl away from psychologism by the time Frege’s review appeared. For example, Husserl had already begun to distinguish a multitude of meanings for the term “presentation” that went far beyond Frege’s simpler, univocal understanding. Indeed, there is evidence that probably by 1891, but certainly by 1893 and 1894, Husserl clearly distinguished the “subjective” presentation—the psychological act presenting an object—from both the logical content of the presentation and the object presented in the presentation, a threefold distinction much more indebted to Bolzano and Twardowski than to Frege. There is a continuous path of development in Husserl’s unfavorable view of psychologism from 1891 to 1896, culminating in the lectures on logic at Halle in which he laid out the case against psychologism, lectures that form the basis for the “Prolegomena” to the *Logische Untersuchungen* (Logical Investigations).

The *Logical Investigations* is without doubt Husserl’s first major publication and the most important of his years at Halle. In this work, Husserl continues to reflect on the foundations of formal systems such as mathematics and logic. To the extent, however, that Husserl rejects psychologism, he must—as Frege never did—provide an account of the relation of the “objective” content of experience to mind. Husserl’s anti-psychologism in logic, in other words, is united with the recognition that insofar as logical laws govern the “ideal,” objective content of acts of thinking, the relation between these ideal contents and the acts in which they are thought must be elucidated. Husserl’s problematic in the *Logical Investigations*, then, is to account for the relation between meaning and mind while preserving the objectivity and ideality of meaning. He typically poses this problem as a problem in epistemology, specifically, the problem concerning the relationship between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of what is known. So, Husserl is committed to finding a new, non-psychologistic epistemology to account for the relations among acts, ideal contents, and objects.

Already clear to him, however, was that objectivity was present even when no object corresponding to the “objective” content of our experience existed. This points to the problem of what Bolzano had called “objectless presentations,” in which we have an “objective” presentational content but no object. Since overcoming the deficiencies of psychologism requires a distinction between the act of presenting and the content of the presentation, and since overcoming the difficulties associated with the problem of objectless
presentations requires a distinction between the ideal, logical content of the presentation and the object to which the presentation is directed—an object that need not be actually existent—there must be a three-term relation between the act that does the presenting, the ideal or logical content of the presentation, and the object presented, that is, the object to which the presentation is directed.

The *Logical Investigations*, then, can be thought to address three problems: psychologism; the relation of ideal or objective meanings to real, psychic acts; and the relation of ideal or objective meanings to objects (whether actual or not). Devoting the first part of the *Logical Investigations* (“Prolegomena to a Pure Logic”) to a detailed critique of psychologism—indeed, it is often considered the *locus classicus* of such a critique—Husserl devotes the second part of the *Investigations* to an account of how ideal meanings are related to real acts of experience and to the “objects” of such experiences, whether real or merely thought. Central to this account—indeed, central to Husserl’s phenomenology in general—is the notion of intentionality that had been revived by Brentano but developed in new directions by Husserl.

Under the influence of Brentano and because the notions of content and object revolve around that of act, Husserl first names this epistemology “descriptive psychology.” He soon recognized, however, that the expression “descriptive psychology” is misleading because it invites misunderstanding as naming an empirical science and, more importantly, because it focuses our attention solely on the subjective conditions of objective knowledge (Hua 18, 12–13 [47]). More specifically, descriptive psychology restricts the proper object of phenomenological description to what is really contained within the act. Hence, Husserl in the first edition of the *Investigations* identifies phenomenological contents with really inherent, psychological contents and distinguishes these from intentional contents (Hua 19/1, 411 [576]). Ideal, intentional contents, in other words, are not properly included within the scope of a phenomenological description, so Husserl must account for meaning without appealing to the object. Now this sounds suspiciously close to a psychologism that accounts for meaning by focusing on the act. In the discussion of expressive acts in the first investigation Husserl avoids this conclusion by making some real contents of the act—in particular, its quality and matter—the instantiation of an ideal essence, a meaning-species (cf. Hua 19/1, 105–6 [330]). The meaning itself remains objective and ideal, and the particular act’s relation to this ideal meaning is one of instantiation such that the expressive act intends an object by way of conferring this meaning on a sensible sign.

By virtue, then, of instantiating an ideal meaning-species, the expressive act intends an object whether or not that object is present to us or, indeed,
whether or not that object exists. This is precisely the power of language: it can direct our attention to an object or state of affairs apart from its presence or existence. Husserl calls those intentions that intend an object in its absence "empty intentions." But logic, as a theory of science, is also concerned ultimately with truth, and Husserl calls those intentions that, by contrast, involve the presence of the object to consciousness—and therefore involve some intuitive dimension—"full" intentions. When these full intentions realize the meaning emptily intended in, say, the expressive act, then the full intention is also called a "fulfilling" intention.

In brief, then, for the Husserl of the first edition of the Logical Investigations, psychologism is addressed by virtue of the fact that the psychological act instantiates an ideal meaning-species, and the problem of objectless presentations is addressed by virtue of the fact that intentions, especially expressive intentions, can refer to an object in the absence of the object. But logic’s concern with truth is served by virtue of the fact that empty intentions tend toward fulfilling intentions wherein an object or state of affairs emptily intended comes to be intuitively present.

However, as Husserl later in the Investigations turns to the discussion of intentionality in general and the intentional structures of the intuitive acts that fulfill the meaning of expressions, he recognizes that there are problems in his account of meaning. Since fulfilling acts present the objects emptily intended in expressive acts, the sense of the fulfilling act seems somehow rooted in the object itself rather than in an ideal meaning-species. It is the sense of the object, the significance it has for us in its actual presence, that confirms or disconfirms what we intend as its sense in the expressive act that confers meaning on a sensible sign. Only if this is true does it make sense to speak of the fulfillment or disappointment of an intention; only if this is true does it make sense to speak of the veridicality or non-veridicality, the truth or falsity, of our emptily intending acts. Hence, Husserl recognizes that an account of meaning cannot focus exclusively on the subjective conditions of objective knowledge.

After the publication of the Logical Investigations Husserl was in 1901 appointed Professor Extraordinarius at Göttingen, although this went against the wishes of the faculty there who thought his work lacking. The personal disappointment engendered by the reaction of the faculty as well as Husserl's own recognition that the Investigations needed reworking led him to a thoroughgoing epistemological critique of experience that eventually resulted in his mature transcendental phenomenology.
The Years at Göttingen (1901–1916)

If the years at Halle were marked by the appearance of the *Logical Investigations*, the years at Göttingen were marked by the appearance in 1913 of the first volume of Husserl’s *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (*Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*) and the more or less simultaneous publication of a second edition of the *Logical Investigations* that included some revisions of the *Prolegomena* and the first five investigations, but no revisions in the sixth. The *Investigations* were not radically revised probably because Husserl recognized that the scope of the revisions would require a new work. Nevertheless, the years from 1901 to 1913 mark for Husserl a profound rethinking of his philosophy. During this period Husserl radically rethought both his logical views and his view of what an epistemological critique of experience involved. He developed subtle analyses of consciousness, including our awareness of the temporal flow of experience and the discovery of what he called “absolute” consciousness, that is, the consciousness that is aware of the “inner” or “subjective” or “phenomenal” temporality of the flow of experience and its contents. Finally, during these years he formulated the first explicit statements of his new philosophical method.

There are three lines along which Husserl’s development in these years can be traced: the continued analysis of meaning (*Bedeutung*) and sense (*Sinn*); the notion of epistemological critique; and the analyses of the consciousness of inner time. If we return first to the question of meaning, we find that by 1908 Husserl had come to think that exploring the “objective” or “ontic” dimension of meaning led to a more properly “phenomenological” account of meaning. Indeed, by the time of *Ideas I* he comes to view this broader notion of “objective sense” even as underlying the meanings at work in linguistic expressions. In the years between the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*, in short, Husserl turns to the investigation of the correlation between the “subjective” and “ontic” dimensions of meaning through the analysis of what he came to call in *Ideas I* the “noetic” and “noematic” dimensions of the intentional correlation between an act and its object.

It is, however, difficult to discern what Husserl means by this “ontic” or “noematic” dimension of meaning, for in responding to the problem of objectless presentations in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl had drawn a distinction between the object that is intended and the object as it is intended or meant. The act, he had said, that confers meaning on a sensible sign emptyly intends an object as such-and-such, an intentional object. Intending an object as such-and-such, that is, an experience’s having an intentional
object, does not, of course, guarantee that there is such an object existent. The
object as meant, the intentional object—what Husserl now calls the noema—
stands before us as the object of the intending act even when there is no
existent object intended. What, then, is the relation between the object as
intended and the object itself?

Some interpreters of Husserl’s theory of intentionality as expressed in
Ideas I understand the noema to be an entity ontologically distinct from the
intended object. On pain of psychologism, this entity cannot really inhere in
the act. So, it must be an abstract, “ideal,” intensional (semantic) entity
distinct from both the act and the intended object. This abstract entity can in
turn be understood on the model of the Investigations as a type that is tokened
in different acts having the same determinate object, or it could be understood
as an abstract particular by means of which an object is intended. On both
interpretations, the noema serves as a mediator, but not an intermediary,
between the act and its intended object. This view of the noema and of
intentionality is, I believe, justifiable on neither textual nor philosophical
grounds. Husserl’s continuing reflections on intentionality, especially those
acts that can serve as fulfilling acts in which I grasp the object directly and
evidentially, made him aware of the philosophical difficulties in saying that
the act’s intentional relation to an object is mediated by an abstract entity.
That is the position of the Investigations and the one away from which he
moved.

Husserl in the second edition of the Investigations and in Ideas I revised
his view of the nature of the proper object of phenomenological descriptions.
More specifically, he revised his view of phenomenological contents to
include (rather than exclude) the intentional content of an experience. This
development joins the second line of development mentioned above, namely,
the epistemological critique of experience. For Husserl recognized that he
needed not only to revise the account of meaning found in the Investigations
but to develop a critique of experience that did not take the possibility of
cognition for granted in the way that our ordinary experiences, including
scientific experience as found in descriptive psychology, do. This line of
development led Husserl toward a kind of “Cartesianism,” a radical
questioning of knowledge that required each investigator, first, to start, as it
were, all over and for himself or herself and, second, to secure a truth that is
impervious to doubt. His goal was to develop a new philosophical science as
the radical critique of the possibility of experience. Since, however, any
science existing on the same plane as the natural and psychological sciences
already presupposes both the possibility and the general validity of cognitive
experiences, this new science must exist on a different plane; it demands an
attitude toward experience that no longer takes it for granted.
This requirement in turn led Husserl to develop the methodological technique of the phenomenological reduction, first detailed in five introductory lectures to a course on the perception of material things in space.\footnote{19} Reminiscent of the universal Cartesian doubt, it is nevertheless different therefrom. Whereas the distinguishing characteristic of Cartesian doubt is that it annuls the positing of an object’s existence or the validity of a judgment, the distinguishing characteristic of the phenomenological reduction is that it refuses to understand this annulment as the opposite of the positing of the existence of objects and the general validity of experience that characterizes our natural experience—a positing Husserl calls the “general thesis of the natural attitude” (Hua 3, §30). The phenomenological reduction, in other words, is not the negation of the general positing characteristic of our ordinary experience. The content is not negated, but our affirmation is withheld. In the performance of the phenomenological reduction, we attempt to call the universal positing characteristic of ordinary experience into question, to hold it reflectively before ourselves as a positing whose validity is to be examined. Our participation in the affirmation characteristic of ordinary experience is suspended, and the objectivities given in experience are not lost to our reflection but are instead considered only as presumed existents. They remain available for reflection just insofar as they are experienced; the index attaching to them, however, has changed, and their status as objects of experience has been modified so that they are now viewed exclusively in their being as objects of that experience in which they are posited. It is not, therefore, as it was for Descartes, the object that is disconnected in the performance of the reduction; it is the philosopher’s participation in the posittings that characterize the ordinary experiences of the natural attitude. The reduction is a change in attitude that leads our attention back to the subjective achievements in which the object as experienced is disclosed in a determinate manner and to the achievements in which we realize the evidence appropriate to confirming or disconfirming our natural experiences. These achievements have a certain kind of priority over the object that they disclose in a determinate manner, and the investigation of them reveals how it is that we come to experience the objects in those determinate manners; how our different experiences are related to one another; and, therefore, how the different kinds and levels of objectivity are related; and, finally, how our experience confirms or disconfirms in fulfilling intentions what was merely emptily intended or mistakenly intended.

The fact that I can be certain—even having performed the reduction—that an object appears to me in a determinate manner opens the door to a critique of knowledge focused on the intentional correlation between the act of experience (the experiencing) and the object just as experienced. This discussion of the reduction connects with the earlier discussion of meaning...
precisely insofar as the development in Husserl’s account of meaning reveals that the notion of meaning or sense properly arises only in a reflection on that correlation. In other words, we straightforwardly experience objects in their significance for us. In our straightforward experience the focus is on the object of experience with its significant properties and attributes. But we can adjust the manner in which we attend to the object, and when we do so we focus our attention not on the object as such but on its significance. This is not turning our attention to some different entity called a “sense” or “meaning”; it is simply refocusing our attention from the significant object to the significance of the object for us. This turning of attention is precisely what Husserl has thematized as the methodological device of the phenomenological reduction. The methodological point picks out what the substantive analyses of meaning reveal as a way of proceeding, that is, that we need to focus our attention on both the subjective and objective conditions of meaning by focusing not on actual subjects and objects, but on the essential features of the correlation between the noetic and noematic dimensions of our experiences. To turn our attention to this correlation is to perform the phenomenological reduction.

The revision of the theory of intentionality and the related disclosure of the methodological principle of the phenomenological reduction are two of the three major developments in Husserl’s thought during the Göttingen years. The third is the development of his views on the nature of the consciousness of inner time, a development that leads to the disclosure of what he calls “absolute consciousness.” The problem motivating these reflections is one of intentionality: how are we aware of temporal objects, specifically the temporal objects, that is, the experiences, that belong to the flow of experience itself. When speaking of immanent temporal objects in this context, Husserl has in mind not only the perceivings, rememberings, and so forth that are the experiences, but also the “real” (reell) contents that belong to them, such as sensation-contents.

To state the problem more specifically, a phenomenological description of the subjective conditions of experience must account not merely for the succession of consciousness but the consciousness of succession. This is impossible if we conceive experience as a succession of atomistic, temporal moments. Instead, we must recognize that consciousness at any given moment is aware of an experience that has temporal extension, that begins in the past, endures in the present, and is aimed at the future. To account for this sense of consciousness, Husserl distinguishes two “levels” in consciousness: the non-temporal absolute consciousness which makes possible the awareness of inner time by virtue of a compound intentionality directed at once to the “now,” the “just elapsed,” and the “yet to come”; and the flow of temporally ordered experiences themselves. In this way, Husserl accounts for the momentary
awareness of the flow of inner time as well as the unity of that flow of inner

time. He provides an account that at once accounts for the temporality of
experience and for our pre-reflective awareness of that temporally ordered
and unified experience, that is, for our pre-reflective self-awareness—a fact
that reveals how unfortunate is his use of the expression “temporal objects”
when referring to the noetic or immanent dimension of the intentional
correlation. The account of the consciousness of inner time and of absolute
consciousness is one of the most difficult in Husserl; indeed, he himself said
that for “absolute consciousness” we, properly speaking, “have no names.”

While the revisions in the theory of intentionality and the methodological
discussions centered around the phenomenological reduction find their way
into Ideas I, the reflections on the nature of inner time-consciousness and
absolute consciousness, which reached a mature form by 1911, do not. Given
the nature of the reflections on time-consciousness, this means that by the
time Husserl wrote Ideas I his actual phenomenological analyses had already
outstripped some of the methodological limitations we find in that work. In
particular, the implications of the reflections on time-consciousness point
toward a less static and more genetic account of the origin of sense or
meaning, an account in which the formation over time of experiences with
their intended objectivities comes to the fore. Although this development,
clearly foreshadowed in the years from 1907 to 1911, is not to be found in
Ideas I itself, it becomes a central aspect of Husserl’s work in the 1920s and
1930s.

The Years at Freiburg (1916–1938)

In 1916 Husserl was appointed the successor to Heinrich Rickert and
Professor Ordinarius at the Albert-Ludwigs Universität in Freiburg. Despite—
or perhaps because of—the tumult of World War I, Husserl continued to
develop his analyses of reason. The 1920s are marked first by a series of
courses on transcendental logic in which Husserl analyzes the emergence of
sense in our experience of objects. These analyses take the form of extensions
of the theory of time-consciousness, and in them Husserl describes the
intentionalities at work in the primary passive syntheses of near and distant
association and in the secondary passive syntheses of history, tradition, and
community. These analyses develop an approach known as “genetic
phenomenology,” the analysis of the genesis of sense in time and passive
syntheses. The point of these analyses is to disclose the underlying material
for the kinds of articulated judgments that occur in active syntheses. The
point, in other words, is to work out the underlying basis for the possibility of
a transcendental logic, a philosophy of logic that reveals the manner in which
the intentional performances of a transcendental subjectivity disclose the world in active judgings.

These analyses led ultimately to the publication of *Formale und transzendentale Logik* (Formal and Transcendental Logic) in 1929. *Formal and Transcendental Logic* brings Husserl’s career full circle, for he returns to the questions about the grounding of logical and mathematical sciences. In this work we can see that Husserl’s clarification of the nature of logic could not be fully accomplished until after he developed the notion of the phenomenological reduction. The identification of the *noema* as the correlate of experience arises in the reduction that leads our attention from the object back to the act that brings the object to disclosure. The phenomenological or transcendental reflection made possible by the reduction reveals the fact that our experiences disclose objects as having a sense. This transcendental turn also enables us to see more clearly how the sense—in a manner relevant for logic—arises in our experience.

Husserl distinguishes two different approaches in the tradition that makes up the science of logic. The first is the Aristotelian logic that examines the *apophansis*, the assertive judgment in which something is predicated of or in a subject. Emptying such judgments of their material content, Aristotle discloses the logical forms of judgments and develops an account of the formally valid possibilities for the combination of judgments in arguments. It is in his consideration of Aristotelian *apophansis* that Husserl discloses and clarifies the logical domain, the space of propositions.

Acts of judging are directed in the first place to those objects about which we judge and their determinations and relations. To be directed to the object and its determinations or relations is, in general, to be directed to a categorially formed complex. In judging in the natural attitude, in other words, our attention remains turned to the identical, objective state of affairs, and we are not aware of any logical object that we might call the judgmental content or the proposition. However, we can reflectively direct our attention to the judged as such, to the judged state of affairs precisely as supposed. We might do so, for example, in those cases where we come to doubt the truth of our own judgments or of those reported to us by a speaker. In either case, we neutralize our acceptance of the judgment and critically reflect upon it. The state of affairs is no longer something we posit for ourselves. Nor, however, do we deny or negate it. We instead simply consider the state of affairs as previously supposed in our judging or as expressed in someone’s report, and we seek confirmation or disconfirmation of this state of affairs as supposed by us or as affirmed by our interlocutor. The judgment, in other words, takes on for us a double character: what is judged—that is, the categorially formed state of affairs itself—and the judgment merely as such—the supposition as supposed, the proposition, the judgment in the logical sense (Hua 17, §48).
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The intended state of affairs and the proposition are properly distinguished, therefore, by means of a difference in the way we focus the meant object. In the straightforward focus on objects, we apprehend the categorial object or state of affairs as such; in the critical focus on the state of affairs as supposed, that is, on the supposition itself, we apprehend the judgment or proposition (Hua 17, §50), more precisely, the noematic sense of the intended state of affairs.

The logical domain first emerges, then, in a “critical turn” occasioned by a concern with the truth or falsity of judgments. The positing involved in our straightforward encounter of objects and states of affairs is neutralized. In such neutralization, however, we do not disclose a second entity—the proposition—that was always there but an unnoticed mediator in our intentional relation to the state of affairs. Nor does the original state of affairs disappear from view to be replaced by a new object called the “proposition.” In the critical neutralization of a judgment, we turn our attention to the objective sense of the state of affairs as intended in the judgment or reported in the sentence, and we consider this objective sense simply as a supposition or proposal in order to weigh its truth or falsity. Such critical or propositional reflection is continuous with our natural concern with the way things are. The natural concern with the truth of things is addressed in the interplay between the critical and natural attitudes, between the judgment as such and the state of affairs, between propositional reflection and the categorial intuition of states of affairs.

Although it is only phenomenological or transcendental reflection that allows us to see clearly what occurs in our apprehension of the logical domain, the critical or logical reflection that focuses on the sense or logical content of an experience is different from the phenomenological reflection that views the object as the correlate of an intending. In critically reflecting on the proposition, I do not, as I do in a phenomenological reflection, consider the proposition in relation to the experience in which I intend the state of affairs. Instead, I consider the proposition in relation to the state of affairs straightforwardly experienced. In critically adjusting our attitude, we remain attentive to the object intended in the original act, but we now focus it through a different lens. In this change of focus there occurs an “adjustment of the ontological,” an opening of a new presentational dimension. The state of affairs is now presented as supposed. When we turn our attention to the state of affairs as supposed, we engage in a certain reflection upon that state of affairs, upon the manner in which it is meant, and the adequacy of this meaning to the object’s reality. We are ultimately concerned to determine whether this meaning or supposition is true or false.

The second approach to logic that Husserl identifies and discusses is mathematical logic. Franciscus Vieta (1540–1603) developed a method of
formalization appropriate to algebra that allows one to speak of form as applicable to “‘any objectivity whatever,’ ‘anything whatever,’ with a most empty universality, a universality that leaves every material determination indeterminately arbitrary” (Hua 17, 91 [87, translation modified]). It is in the notion of a *mathesis universalis* developed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) that Husserl first finds a systematic attempt to integrate the formal *apophansis* of Aristotle with the formal mathematical analysis set in motion by Vieta. For Leibniz, logic and mathematics were to form a single science (cf. Hua 18, 222 [218]).

According to Husserl, Leibniz saw the possibility of combining the formalized scholastic logic with other formal disciplines devoted to the forms that governed, for example, quantity or spatial relations or magnitude. Leibniz distinguished between a narrower and a broader sense of *mathesis universalis*. In the narrower sense, it is the algebra of our ordinary understanding, the formal science of quantities. But since the formalization at work in algebra already makes conceivable a purely formal mathematical analysis that abstracts from the materially determinate mathematical disciplines such as geometry, mechanics, and acoustics, we arrive at a broader concept emptied of all material content, even that of quantity. When applied to the forms of judgment, this formal analysis yields a syllogistic algebra (as in Augustus De Morgan [1806–1871] and George Boole [1815–1864]). But, according to Leibniz, this formal analysis of judgment ought to be combinable with all other formal analyses. Hence, the broader *mathesis universalis* would identify the forms of combination applicable in any science, whether quantitative or qualitative (Hua 17, 91 [87]). Only thereby would it achieve the formality allowing it to serve as the theory-form for any science, whatever the material region to which that science is directed. But Leibniz does not give an account of how this unity is to be achieved. It is in the light of this broader conception of a *mathesis universalis* that Husserl interprets the new mathematical logic— the mathematics of sums and sets and relations— as formal ontology. Formal ontology as the formal theory of objects, in other words, is characterized first by its contrast with formal apophantic logic.

The latter is a formal theory of science, a unified theory that would govern any theoretically explanatory, nomological, and deductive science. The initial task of a formal apophantic logic is to identify precisely those forms essential to such an undertaking. These forms, according to Husserl, first of all those that belong to judgments, their structure, and their combinations. Husserl calls these forms “meaning-categories” (*Bedeutungskategorien*) (Hua 17, 92 [88]). Hence, formal apophantic logic would develop our understanding of such notions as judgment or proposition, subject, predicate, syllogism, and so forth. In addition, however, and on the other hand, we find a correlative set of forms— “objective categories” (*gegenständlichen Kategorien*) (Hua
17, 92 [88])—that includes “object, state of affairs, unity, plurality, number, relation, connection, and so forth” (Hua 17, 92 [88, translation modified]) but also “any set and any set-relationship whatever, any combinations, ordered sets, quantities, and so forth, with their appertinent formal, essential relations and connections” (Hua 17, 94 [90; translation modified]).

Husserl claims in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* that the *Investigations* pointed to the distinction between these two groups of categories and between the laws appropriate for each group. *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, however, surpasses the *Logical Investigations* in clarifying not merely the difference between but the unity of apophantics and formal ontology. Although in the first part of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, formal apophantics and formal ontology are contrasted as derived from two different approaches to logic, they are also viewed as inseparably united (Hua 17, 83 [79]). The ground of their unity, as we have seen, is the intentional relation between acts and their objects, and it is in the context of the notion of intentional fulfillment that the genuine unity of formal logic and formal ontology finally reveals itself. In the second part of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, meaning-forms and object-forms are examined in relation to the work they do in the truthful disclosure of objects. Formal ontology results when we articulate systematically the formal structures and relations experienced in our straightforward encounter with objects as well as the operations that can be performed involving these forms and relations. Formal logic arises when we consider these same formal structures, relations, and the combinations produced by logical operations as meanings, as objective states of affairs merely as supposed. The meaning-forms are teleologically ordered toward fulfillment in our recognition of object-forms. If our suppositions are confirmed in fulfilling experiences, then we recognize the identity that obtains between the meaning-forms and object-forms. The identity-in-correlation of the logical and the ontological, therefore, is properly and fully realized only at what Husserl calls the third level of logic, the logic of truth (Hua 17, §§13–15).

During the years at Freiburg, however, Husserl did not ignore the analyses of experience beyond logical reason that he had taken up after the publication of the *Logical Investigations*. Indeed, Husserl presented important series of lectures on phenomenology in London (1922) and, shortly after retirement, in Amsterdam (1928) and Paris (1929). The *Méditations cartésiennes* (Cartesian Meditations), which is based on the Paris lectures and which was published in French in 1931, presents, much like *Ideas I*, albeit more briefly, an overview of Husserl’s transcendental philosophy. During the 1920s Husserl also undertook extensive investigations regarding phenomenological psychology and first philosophy.
While the two major publications deriving from the 1920s—*Cartesian Meditations* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*—incorporate the results of Husserl’s reflections on time-consciousness and passive synthesis, they remain focused on the nature of theoretical knowledge and the objectivity appropriate to it. They point to the need for regressive inquiries into the constitution of sense, inquiries that reveal the layering of sense over time and its development in intersubjective communities of inquirers. However, they continue to neglect in large part the historicality of the experiences themselves. Husserl addresses this question of the historicality of experience most explicitly in his last work, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie* (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology), published in 1936, as well as in the texts collected and published posthumously in *Analysen zur passiven Synthese* (1918–1926) (included in the translation *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*) and *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Experience and Judgment).

The *Crisis* emphasizes how scientific experience, especially in the natural sciences, is formed on the basis of an immediately experienced world comprising descriptive, affective, functional, evaluative, and motivational moments as well as within the context of living traditions that shape our apprehension of this immediate experienced world. In the context of this discussion, Husserl identifies the important notion of the life-world, but his account of the life-world is ambiguous. It means at different times: an abstractly conceived world on which higher meanings of the sort belonging to science, philosophy, and culture in general are grounded; and the concrete world that is already pre-given and taken for granted in our experience, a world that already includes the sedimented deposits of the history of science, philosophy, and culture. The first sense captures Husserl’s idea that different levels of experience are built on more fundamental levels, and this abstract notion of the life-world is the meaning-fundament on which higher levels of sense are built. The second sense captures the idea that experience of the world is already historically formed in secondary passivities before someone comes to think actively about that world. This world is already rich in emotional dimensions, functional and practical dimensions, theoretical dimensions, as well as cultural dimensions. New experiences—new ways of making sense of the world—both depart from this world and contribute to it. Although the *Crisis* describes the historicality proper to all experience, this does not negate Husserl’s view that the ideal meanings constituted in experience can be trans-temporal in character, and in certain cases, such as logic and mathematics, are always trans-temporal in character.

The concrete historicality of experience also plays an important role in Husserl’s ethical reflections. Husserl’s earliest ethical reflections are organ-
ized around two fundamental ideas: values are constituted in feelings or emotional experiences that are grounded in objectifying acts, that is, in perceptions or judgments or the memories and imaginings based thereon; and there is a need for a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice, both analogous to formal logic, that will counter ethical empiricism and skepticism, which are analogous in the moral sphere to psychologism in the logical sphere. In this manner, Husserl thought, he could establish universal moral norms. These two themes are in some tension, for it is difficult to argue that value judgments rooted in emotional experiences will have the kind of universality and normativity that theoretical judgments might have or that the rules for organizing value judgments will be as evident as those of logic. After the Great War, however, Husserl focuses on the first theme and speaks of vocations, that is, commitments to certain goods that order and give moral meaning to life, and of absolute values grounded in love. Such language makes the enunciation of universal moral principles even more difficult, for such absolute values, say, the love of a family member, might override what we take to be a universal principle, say, turning criminals over to the authorities. Nevertheless, Husserl never abandoned his commitment to rationality in ethics. But his notion of reason was an expanded one; it is not limited to theory. Reason also has axiological and practical forms. Reason in all its forms is teleologically ordered toward the evidential fulfillment of empty intentions. Unfortunately, Husserl never worked out the details of his notions of axiological and practical reason in a way that could unite his concern for rationality in ethics and his view that judgments regarding the value of things are rooted in the emotions. He never, in other words, gave a clear description of the kinds of fulfilling experiences suited to judgments rooted in feelings and emotions.

It is, however, this commitment to reason and to fulfilling evidences that characterizes the moral urgency at the center of all of Husserl’s reflections. All of us are born into moral communities, and each must decide for himself or herself about what is truly good and about what emotions and actions are appropriate for different circumstances. And if one’s vocation is a theoretical or philosophical one, then, according to Husserl, the search for truth regarding the transcendental conditions for truthfully encountering a world with intertwined cognitive, affective, axiological, practical, and cultural dimensions must be the unwavering goal of one’s reflections.

Husserl’s Heritage

As indicated at the outset, Husserl is a central and crucial figure in the development of what has come to be known as “continental” philosophy. Husserl’s views have been appropriated by some, rejected by others, and in
many cases, as might be expected, individual authors have built upon aspects of Husserl’s work while setting aside others.

Husserl’s legacy is, unsurprisingly, realized first through his students and assistants. Upon the publication of his *Logische Untersuchungen*, for example, while he was still engaged in what he called “descriptive psychology” and before he made his turn to transcendental philosophy, he attracted the attention of a group of students working in Munich with the psychologist Theodor Lipps (1851–1914). Chief among them was Johannes Daubert (1877–1947), who visited Husserl in 1902 and who, persuaded by Husserl’s refutation of psychologism that included Lipps’s work as a target, introduced Husserl to the other students at Munich. This group of students collectively came to be known as the Munich “School” or “Circle.” They began to gravitate toward Husserl’s work, and beyond Daubert, the group included Reinach, Moritz Geiger (1880–1937), Alexander Pfänder (1870–1941), and later Max Scheler (1874–1928). Daubert, who was by all accounts brilliant, wrote nothing, but he set the tone for all the Munich School members who rejected Husserl’s turn to transcendental idealism. The Munich School was committed to a form of metaphysical realism and a Platonism regarding ideal objects that finds its roots in the first edition of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, but which Husserl arguably abandoned after 1907. Pfänder wrote an important work on the will; Geiger did significant work in aesthetics; and Reinach did very important work on the theory of law and of speech acts. This is a group of philosophers whose importance is largely underestimated, but in recent years there has been a renaissance of interest in them as well as in Brentano and Husserl by “analytic” philosophers interested in theories of consciousness, intentionality, and meaning.

A number of members of the Munich School—Reinach, for example—moved in 1905 to Göttingen to work more closely with Husserl. Two years later they formed, on the model of the Munich School, another group known as the Göttingen Philosophical Society. Key members of the Society in addition to Reinach, were Theodor Conrad (1881–1969), Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966), Fritz Kaufmann (1891–1958), Jean Héring (1890–1966), Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889–1977), Winthrop Bell (1884–1965), Alexandre Koyré (1892–1964), Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), and, perhaps most importantly, Edith Stein (1891–1942). Stein became Husserl’s first assistant at Freiburg and wrote a significant phenomenological treatise on empathy. She later became interested in bringing together phenomenological and Thomistic thought. She converted to Catholicism and entered the Discalced Carmelites, but left Germany after the Nazis came to power. She was subsequently deported from the Netherlands in a roundup of Catholic Jews after the Dutch bishops had publicly condemned the deportation of Jews, and was killed at Auschwitz on 9 August 1942.
Stein was influential in editing Husserl’s manuscripts on the consciousness of inner time and in bringing the second volume of Husserl’s Ideas Concerning a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy to publication. She was but the first of several of Husserl’s assistants who made important contributions in preparing works for publication and in editing his manuscripts. Ludwig Landgrebe gathered the material from lectures on trans­den­tal logic in the 1920s, and published it as Experience and Judgment. Many of the same texts appear in the critical edition of Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis. Eugen Fink was instrumental in working on the Cartesian Meditations and also on Husserl’s last work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Husserl’s other important assistant during the Freiburg years was Heidegger.

Husserl and Heidegger first met when Husserl arrived in Freiburg in 1916, and they began to have important discussions on a variety of philosophical issues. After Heidegger returned from military service, he became Husserl’s assistant from 1919 until his appointment at Marburg in 1923. How the two influenced one another may never be fully known. Husserl, for example, had written working papers on the emotions and on moods before the appearance of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) in 1927, and it is plausible that he shared these with Heidegger. But is also plausible that Heidegger’s treatment of these themes—so central to his own work—led Husserl to view them as more central than he otherwise might have and to acknowledge them more fully in his later philosophy. Even more significant, perhaps, is the likelihood that Heidegger’s emphasis on concrete experiences of the world, rather than what Heidegger saw as Husserl’s too exclusive focus on theoretical reason, led Husserl to much more detailed investigations of concrete experience and of history.

What is easier to know is the story of the deterioration of their relationship, a story that centers on their failed collaboration on an article regarding phenomenology for the 14th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Husserl asked Heidegger to help revise his first draft of this article, and in response to Heidegger’s suggestions, Husserl with Heidegger’s help set about writing a second draft of the article. The tensions between their two versions of phenomenology were too difficult and too extensive to overcome. The crucial differences between Husserl and Heidegger centered around the question of the distinctions and relation among Husserl’s transcendental and psychological ego and Heidegger’s Dasein, the question of the relation between phenomenology and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, and Heidegger’s introduction of existential categories and the question of whether his phenomenology is a form of anthropology. Indeed, the differences between Husserl and Heidegger—at least the “phenomenological” Heidegger of the 1920s—can in a certain sense be summarized in terms of a dispute about the
proper categories to use in explicating the nature of subjectivity. The later Heidegger arguably turns farther away from the Husserlian investigation of the nature of subjectivity to the investigation of the “event” in which Being discloses itself. While a dative of manifestation remains present for the later Heidegger, this subject is no longer the individual *Dasein* but an intersubjectivity formed and shaped by language and history.

Husserl’s influence on subsequent thinkers beyond those of the Munich and Göttingen Circles is often filtered through the philosophy of Heidegger. In particular, Heidegger’s concern with both the existential and hermeneutic dimensions of experience plays a greater role in subsequent phenomenologists than it was known by them to play in Husserl himself. The first generation of phenomenologists had access only to Husserl’s few published works and small bits of his manuscripts. Heidegger himself, we have seen, most likely discussed issues regarding intentionality, subjectivity, emotions, moods, and instincts with Husserl during the 1920s, but these texts in which Husserl worked on these issues were not published until after Husserl’s death. Similarly, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) was familiar with the texts that eventually made up *Ideas II*, texts that Husserl worked on from 1912 to 1928. Merleau-Ponty, however, was probably unfamiliar with the lecture notes for the “Thing-lecture” of 1907 on the perception of material things in space, a more detailed treatment of some of the themes in *Ideas II* that interested and influenced him. These kinds of existential and historical themes emerged in Husserl’s publications only late in his career or posthumously. The continuing publication of Husserl’s manuscripts have made the investigation of his own thought more rich and more complex, and they have also complicated our understanding of the similarities and differences between Husserl and his successors.

We can see the hermeneutic and existential influences derived from the work of both Husserl and Heidegger in the philosophical work of thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), and Paul Ricoeur (1903–2005). Husserl’s influence—again often filtered through Heidegger—is evident more negatively in the work of thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) and Jacques Derrida (1930–2004). Although greatly indebted to the work of Husserl and Heidegger, with both of whom he studied at Freiburg, Levinas rejects what he takes to be Husserl’s primary focus on theoretical cognition and Heidegger’s focus on ontology. He espouses instead the view that first philosophy is not ontology but ethics and that ethics must be grounded in a non-Husserlian understanding of our encounter with the Other. Derrida, in a similar manner, rejects what he takes to be Husserlian and Heideggerian commitments to the metaphysics of presence and to related, but problematic, views of identity and truth. Finally, the work of Theodor Adorno (1903–1969) also begins in a reaction to
Husserl, specifically in a critique of Husserl’s rationalistic epistemology. Adorno’s subsequent work plays a major role in the development of critical theory in the 20th century.

Nevertheless, Husserl’s work was so extensive and wide-ranging that he continues to exert an influence on contemporary philosophy. Even post-modernism, which arose in the negative reaction to Husserl but overstated the “modernism” of his positions, must continue to take his views into account in formulating their own. In large measure, the post-moderns are attempting to achieve what Husserl himself sought, an account of the structures of our lived experience. In this context, Husserlian positions continue to provide a basis from which to criticize post-modern views, especially when and insofar as they lead to purely relativistic, historicist, or skeptical views. Moreover, as previously suggested, analytic philosophers have come to appreciate the problems central to Husserl’s own reflections, problems such as intentionality, consciousness, the self, and moral psychology. Increasingly, analytic philosophers are turning to Brentano, Husserl, and the early phenomenologists for guidance in thinking about these issues, a fact that has led to a resurgence of interest in Husserl’s philosophy. To this extent, Husserl’s philosophy is valued not only for its historical interest, but for the manner in which and the cogency with which it can speak to issues shaping contemporary philosophical discourse.

NOTES

1. Privatdozent is a rank in the German university system. A Privatdozent (a private teacher or tutor) holds a teaching position but without tenure and little in the way of security. Privatdozenten are paid by annual grants from the government or by private resources available to students.

2. The position of Professor Extraordinarius (ausserordentlicher Professor) in the German university system is comparable to a non-tenured and non-tenurable assistant professor in the United States. The Professor Extraordinarius is, in other words, not part of the regular or “ordinary” faculty.


5. Ibid.


8. The story of Van Breda’s discovery and transport of these manuscripts and of the founding of the Archives is told in H. L. Van Breda, “Le sauvetage de l’héritage husserlien et la fondation des Archives Husserl,” in *Husserl et la pensée moderne*, ed. H. L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959) and summarized in Robert Sokolowski, “The Husserl Archives and the Edition of Husserl’s Works,” *The New Scholasticism* 38 (1964): 473–82. The Archives undertook the immense task of transcribing the shorthand manuscripts and editing them for publication. The resultant work continues to be published in the series *Husserliana*, the details of which can be found in the Bibliography at the end of this volume. References to Husserliana volumes after their full citation will be abbreviated “Hua,” and the pagination of English translation will follow in square brackets.


cf. also Hua 19/1, 13–14 (48).


Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966); *Activen Synthesen: Aus der Vorlesung “Transzen-
R. Breeur, Husserliana 31 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000); *Analyses

22. I owe this expression to Robert Sokolowski.

23. Franciscus Vieta is the Latinized name under which François Viète wrote.
The Dictionary

– A –

A POSTERIORI. The a posteriori is defined by contrast with the a priori. Whereas the a priori is marked by its necessity and universality and its applicability to both possible and actual objects, the a posteriori lacks necessity and universality and is applicable only to actual objects. Hence, Husserl’s notion of the a posteriori captures the traditional sense of “posterior to” or “dependent upon” experience.

A PRIORI. There are three aspects to the a priori: it is not bound to any actual existent but precedes everything actual insofar as it pertains to all possible objects in general or to all possible objects of a given type or to all possible objects manifesting a given property; it is discoverable and knowable only against the background of a multiplicity of objects; and it carries the marks of necessity and universality. There are, however and as it were, different species of the a priori. They are differentiated on the basis of the differences between the different kinds of conceptualization capable of apprehending the a priori, that is, on the basis of the differences between pure essential insight, idealization, and formalization.

The first distinction to be made is that between the a priori apprehended in formalization and holding true for all objects whatsoever and the a priori apprehended in those kinds of conceptualization ordered toward the delimited objectivities of species, genus, and region, that is, the a priori apprehended in pure essential insight and idealization. This is the distinction between the formal a priori and the contingent or material a priori. The formal and material a priori are essentially different because the formal a priori, unlike the material a priori, has no determinate material core limiting its applicability to objects. However, they are essentially continuous because the formal completes the movement toward greater generality present in the movement from individual to species to genus to region.

The second distinction to be drawn is that between the material a priori and what Husserl calls “an a priori bound to the empirical.” The latter differs from the pure, material a priori in that the a priori bound to the empirical departs from the contents realized in empirical generalizations.
and intuits these contents as presumptively necessary for all existing objects of that type. The a priori bound to the empirical has not tested its general insight by *eidetic variation*. This kind of generality with its presumptive necessity is not the same as the pure a priori necessity that extends to all possible objects of a species, genus, or region.

The third distinction to be drawn is that between the objective a priori and a transcendental a priori. The objective a priori includes those formal and material a priori necessities under which objects, including both material and mental objectivities, are subsumed. The objective a priori of the region of the mental yields a pure *psychology*. However, according to Husserl, all attempts to develop this pure psychology into a consistent, a priori science encounter serious problems. If the a priori of the mental region is taken to enable an understanding of how subjects in the world come to know the *world*, a problem arises as soon as we recognize that the mental is a region within an already experienced world. There must, then, be a prior account of consciousness which investigates how the world is already and anonymously pre-given to the theoretical consciousness that undertakes the psychological study. This account is provided by *phenomenology*, and it is prior to any psychology. Consequently, in addition to and prior to the objective a priori of the mental region, there must be an a priori of *transcendental consciousness*. The *intentional* character of transcendental consciousness entails that its priori includes not only the a priori of subjective, rational life but also the a priori of objects precisely insofar as they are objects of experience. The transcendental a priori, in other words, is the two-sided a priori of consciousness-of-the-world-as-experienced-world.

The major distinction is between the transcendental a priori and the objective a priori. The transcendental a priori can be distinguished into that part which discloses the purely formal structures of all conscious experiences and of all objects as experienced and that part which discloses the a priori structures of different kinds of experience and their objects. The objective a priori is further distinguished into the formal a priori and the material or contingent a priori. Finally, the material a priori is distinguished into the *exact essence* apprehended in idealizations; the pure *essence* apprehended in essential insight; and the a priori type bound to the empirical. *See also A POSTERIORI; ABSTRACTION; ANALYTIC A PRIORI LAW; APODICTICITY; EIDETIC INTUITION, FOUNDATION; MATERIAL A PRIORI; MOMENT; SYNTHETIC A PRIORI LAW.*

**ABSENCE.** Absence is the correlative of *presence*, and it must be recognized that both terms are used relatively. *Intentionality*, insofar as it is
characterized as “directedness to,” can be directed to objectivities whether they are present or absent. A concrete intention directed to an absent (abwesend) object is an empty intention; a concrete intention directed to a present (anwesend, gegenwärtig) object is a filled intention and, in certain cases, a fulfilling intention. However, even filled intentions are a complex of empty and filled intentional moments.

Linguistic expressions can serve as examples of the presentation of an absent object. The expression, for example, a name, can bring the absent object to mind; it refers to the object, but the object is not bodily present in any way. Perception, on the other hand, is an example of a filled intention that presents the object in its bodily presence. Memory and imagination occupy an intermediate position; they present the absent object, but do so only by virtue of an underlying perceptual basis. If a speaker refers to “Paul” in the course of a discussion, the listener can memorialily present Paul; he can “see” Paul, although Paul is absent. Or the listener can look at a picture of Paul. Paul is “present” in the picture, although actually absent, and the listener can fulfill the empty intention of Paul involved in the nominal expression. Memory, imagination, and pictures, then, can make present or re-present (vergegenwärtigen) the absent object named in the expression. They involve a partial fulfillment of the intention, whereas the perception (in the case of names) is the genuinely fulfilling experience.

But, even more importantly, filled and fulfilling experiences—perceptions and the memories or images grounded therein—are mediated by absence. The perceiver, for example, cannot see all the sides of the perceived object; in viewing the front, the rear of the object is hidden; it is “absent” from view (unsichtbar, verborgen). The same is true for touch, and in appropriate ways for the other senses as well. Hence, our awareness of objects always involves and is mediated by a certain kind of absence.

ABSOLUTE (absolut). Absoluteness is related to completeness. There are different contexts in which Husserl uses the term “absolute.” In epistemological contexts, Husserl speaks of “absolute evidence” and “absolute knowledge.” Absolute evidence is that evidence that grasps an object completely and indubitably. In ontological contexts, “absolute” refers to a whole that is not a moment of a more encompassing whole. In phenomenological contexts, “absolute” refers to that consciousness which is self-contained. It is not and cannot be contained in any other whole, and it is the whole that really (reell) and intentionally includes everything as a moment. That is, absolute consciousness includes all conscious experience with its intentional correlates. See also ABSOLUTE CONCRETUM.
ABSOLUTE CONCRETUM. An absolute concretum is a whole that is not itself an abstract part or moment of any other whole. See also ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS; PIECE; RELATIVE CONCRETUM.

ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS. Absolute consciousness is complete and self-contained. It “includes” all of consciousness by virtue of intending it through the structure of the living present (primal impression, retention, protention). Moreover, by virtue of its intentional directedness toward the world, it “includes” the world as its intentional correlate. Absolute consciousness, therefore, is the ultimate absolute concretum, and the analysis of absolute consciousness is the most fundamental level of phenomenological analysis. See also ABSOLUTE.

ABSOLUTE EVIDENCE. An evidence that grasps an object completely; in such evidence we attain absolute knowledge. Husserl later in his career distinguished two different kinds of “absolute” evidence, namely, adequate evidence and apodictic evidence. Only adequate evidence is absolute in the sense of complete, and Husserl eventually recognized that the attainment of such evidence is impossible. Hence, adequate or absolute knowledge is only an ideal that can be approached, but not realized, although Husserl continued to think that it served as the telos of cognition. Apodictic evidence, on the other hand, is indubitable, but can be incomplete. See also ADEQUACY; APODICTICITY.

ABSTRACT CONTENTS. Abstract contents, also called non-independent contents, are those contents that can exist only in or attached to concrete contents or independent contents, which, by contrast, can exist in and for themselves. See also ABSTRACTUM; MOMENT; PIECE; REAL CONTENTS; WHOLE.

ABSTRACT PART. See ABSTRACTUM; MOMENT.

ABSTRACTION. Abstraction is the act through which an abstract content is distinguished from the other contents belonging to a concretum and is made the object of an intuition directed to it. It is, in other words, the ideating or generalizing act in which the subject becomes aware of a universal. This awareness of universals relates general names to specific unities (species) and thereby serves as the fulfilling intention for the empty intention of such general names, although this awareness can have varying degrees of clarity. Abstraction must be distinguished from attention, in which the subject attends to an abstract content or an abstract part of an object, but in its particularity rather than its universality. See
also FORMALIZATION; GENERALIZATION; IDEALIZATION; IDEATING ABSTRACTION.

**ABSTRACTUM.** An *abstractum* is an object in relation to which there is some whole of which it is a *moment* or non-independent *part*. Abstracta can be either particular (for example, the green of the grass) or essential (for example, the species ‘green’). While moments can neither exist nor be presented apart from their necessary supplements, they can be distinguished from them and thoughtfully considered by themselves. The *abstractum* is the moment so considered. *See also CONCRETUM; PIECE.*

**ACHIEVEMENT (Leistung).** The term “achievement” can be understood both verbally, that is, as naming the process of achieving something, and nominally, that is, as naming the product of that process. The primary meaning of “achievement” for Husserl is verbal rather than nominal. Hence, an achievement is, in particular, an *intentional* achieving that constitutes or discloses an *object*. For the most part, Husserl speaks of achievement in the context of discussions of the *active syntheses* productive of categorial objects. Both the synthesizing activity and the *categorial object* are denoted by the term “achievement.” The achieving is an intentional performance, the presenting or making-present of an *intentional object*, that is, the object as disclosed, as having this particular *significance*. *See also CONSTITUTION.*

**ACT.** An act, broadly conceived, is an *intentional* (or psychic) experience containing both *real (reell) contents*—that is, containing a particular *act-quality*, a determinate *act-matter*, and, at least in some cases, *presenting* or *representing contents*—and *intentional contents*. It is important to note that the extension of the term “acts” is not limited to those in which there is an explicit activity of thinking. It includes those experiences in which what Husserl characterizes as *passive synthesis* is dominant, but such passive syntheses are never concretely found apart from some *active synthesis* or *attention* such that what is passively presented undergoes an apprehension. *See also HYLETIC DATA.*

**ACT-CHARACTER.** *See ACT-QUALITY.*

**ACT-MATTER.** The matter of an *act* is that *moment* in the act that determines the particular manner in which the object is presented. The matter of the act thereby determines a *presentation* as *this* presentation of the object. The act-matter is, in other words, that part of the *real (reell) content* of the act by means of which the act is directed in a determinate
manner to an object. Acts with different act-qualities can have the same matter. For example, I can see the door as brown, I can remember the door as brown, I can judge that the door is brown, I can wish that the door be brown, and so forth. In each case, the matter of the act is ‘door/ brown.’

The doctrine of act-matter is articulated in the Logical Investigations. In Husserl’s later philosophy, commencing with the Ideas of 1913, the notion of act-matter is reinterpreted as noematic sense.

**ACT-QUALITY.** The quality of an act is that moment in the act that determines the act as a particular kind of act, for example, perceiving, remembering, judging, wishing, willing, and so forth. See also ACT-MATTER.

**ACTIVE SYNTHESIS.** Active syntheses are those in which the ego functions as productively constitutive, that is, as achieving a disclosure of the object by way of subjective processes that are specifically achievements of the ego. Husserl’s favored example of active synthesis is the act of judging that discloses a state of affairs. Also included among active syntheses, however, would be acts of practical reasoning, acts of counting or collecting, acts of multiplying or dividing, acts in which I become aware of universals, acts combining judgments in arguments or theories, and so forth. Central to the idea of active synthesis is that the ego works with “materials” already given beforehand. For example, in the case of judging, the perceived object with its properties is the “material” articulated and synthesized in the judgment. In the judgmental articulation of such a perceived object with its properties, a new object—the articulated state of affairs—is constituted. Hence, active synthesis involves a “product” (Erzeugnis), but this product should not be understood in the sense of a construction out of materials that are really inherent (reell) in the act itself. Instead, the ego takes pre-given, ideal or ir-real (irreell) senses and attends to them in such a way as to fashion a new sense at a higher and more complex level. The judging that constitutes the state of affairs that, for example, the table is brown is founded on the perceiving that apprehends the table as brown, and the judgmental or propositional sense is founded on the perceptual sense of the object. See also CONSTITUTION; IR-REAL CONTENTS; PASSIVE GENESIS; PASSIVE SYNTHESIS; PROPOSITION.

**ACTUALITY.** 1. An actuality (Aktualität, Wirklichkeit) is an existent, concrete, individual object or action; 2. An actuality (Aktualität) is what is evidentially present in a temporally present perception; 3. An actuality
(Aktualität) is the realization of a potentiality; 4. Actuality is the quality of being an actuality. See also EVIDENCE.

ADEQUACY (Adäquation). Adequacy is a property of evidence, and one of the types of absolute evidence that Husserl identifies. An evidence is adequate when it is complete, that is, when the evidencing act that fulfills an empty intention grasps the object in its entirety. Husserl always denied that adequate evidence was available for transcendent objects. Although he believed early in his career that an experience could be adequately grasped in phenomenological reflection, he abandoned that position as a result of his reflections on inner time-consciousness. See also APODICTICITY.

ADEQUATION (adequatio). Adequation is the fittingness of one thing to another. Ordinarily used in the correspondence theory of truth to indicate the adequacy of our ideas to the things themselves, Husserl transforms this notion of adequacy into that of “covering” or “congruence” (Deckung). In the experience of fulfillment, one experiences the fulfilling sense as laying itself over or as covering the emptily intended sense in a manner analogous to that in which one figure congruent with another can through a series of rigid transformations be laid over that other figure so that the two figures are coincident. Hence, the experience of fulfillment and of truth involves experiencing a coincidence or identity between the emptily intended sense and the fulfilling sense. See also EMPTY INTENTION.

ADUMBRATION (Abschattung). An object is perceived in a certain spatial perspective or under a certain aspect or with a certain shading. The perspective, aspect, or shading is an adumbration, a partial disclosure of the object. The perceived object, then, is an identity presented in a manifold of adumbrations. Husserl’s use of the term “adumbration” is, however, somewhat ambiguous. He uses the term to refer both to the presented perspective, aspect, or shading and to the sensible event that “adumbrates” the object. With respect to the latter usage, Husserl refers more specifically to the hyletic data, the presenting sensations that are animated or interpreted by the perceptual apprehension in perceiving the object. See also APPEARANCE.

AFFECTION. Affection is the original stimulation of consciousness in its passivity. Affection is not to be understood in causal terms. It is consistent with an intentional account of consciousness insofar as there is no genuine affection without consciousness’s turning-to the affecting object. As the
original stimulation of consciousness, affection stimulates the associative processes of passive synthesis. See also AFFINITY: ASSOCIATION.

**AFFINITY.** Affinity is the similarity of intentional contents by virtue of which different experiences are brought into an associational relationship. The affinity of the content of a previous experience with what is affectively present in primal impression intentionally motivates the recollection of those past experiences into the living present, thereby reproducing their affective force in constituting the subject’s present understanding of the object. See also AFFECTION; ASSOCIATION; PASSIVE SYNTHESIS.

**ANALOGIZING APPRESENTATION.** Analogizing appresentation is a moment involved in empathy and our encounter of other subjects. In particular, it involves a subject’s recognition of the other subject as another animate organism like itself. In encountering the bodily movements, the expressive gestures and bodily changes, and the speech of another, the subject at the same time appresents the consciousness of the other animate organism. What makes this appresentation unique is that it cannot be transformed by activities of the experiencing agent into a presentation of what had previously been appresented. See also APPERCEPTION; PAIRING.

**ANALYTIC A PRIORI LAW.** An analytic a priori law is an unconditionally universal proposition free from all material content and from any explicit or implicit assertion of individual existence. The distinction between analytic a priori laws and synthetic a priori laws is based on the fundamental distinction between purely formal categories and material regions. Analytic a priori laws are grounded purely in formal categories and are unaffected by material concepts. See also ANALYTICALLY NECESSARY PROPOSITION.

**ANALYTICALLY NECESSARY PROPOSITION.** An analytic a priori law stands opposed to its specifications. An analytic law is specified by introducing material concepts or positings of individual existence into the purely formal relationship articulated in the law. The specifications of an analytic law always yield analytically necessary propositions. Analytically necessary propositions, then, are those whose truth is completely independent of the particular content of their objects. They are capable of a complete formalization and can be regarded as special cases or empirical applications of the formal, analytic laws whose validity is apparent in their formal statement. In an analytic proposition it must be possible, without altering the proposition’s logical form, to replace all material that has
content with an empty something, a formal category, and to eliminate all assertions of existence. So, for example, if we consider the analytically necessary proposition “This house includes its roof, its walls, its floors, and its other parts,” we can formalize that proposition replacing all its material components with the purely formal ones of “whole” and “part.” In this manner we arrive at the purely formal, analytically necessary, a priori law: “Any whole includes its parts.”

There can be a relative concreta whose name includes as part of its meaning a reference to other relative concreta apart from which the relative concreta cannot be understood. The propositions articulating such relationships are also analytically necessary propositions. For example, the proposition “There cannot be a parent without children” expresses an analytic necessity. Terms such as “parent” and “child” have, as part of their meaning a necessary reference to another object. In such propositions there is no connection established between two essences; the notion of ‘child’ is included in that of ‘parent,’ and vice versa. The relation of parent to child, therefore, is analogous to that of whole to part.

The terms “color” and “extension,” on the other hand, do not include a reference to one another as part of their meaning. Nevertheless, by virtue of its essence color is necessarily and universally, that is, lawfully, related to extension. Given, however, that “color” does not as part of its meaning include a reference to something else, the necessity of the principle “A color cannot exist without some extension that it covers” is not analytic. See also SYNTHETIC A PRIORI LAW.

ANTHROPOLOGISM. Anthropologism is that instance of specific relativism that claims that truth is relative to the human species, that is, that what is true is what seems or is taken to be true by human beings by virtue of their specific make-up. Truth has its source not in the individual human, as in individual relativism, but in the empirical constitution of the species. See also PSYCHOLOGISM.

ANTHROPOLOGY. Anthropology is the descriptive science that studies the human species.

APODICTICITY (Apodiktizität). Apodicticity is a property of evidence, and one of the types of absolute evidence that Husserl identifies. An apodictic evidence is indubitable. Apodicticity must be distinguished from both infallibility and incorrigibility. To say that evidence is apodictic does not mean that it is impossible for us to be mistaken or that it is impossible that our insight will be subject to various forms of correction. It means only
that we have no good reason to doubt the correctness of our insight. See also ADEQUACY.

**APOPHANSIS.** The Aristotelian term for “assertive statement” or “judgment.” Husserl uses this term to denote a domain for study, namely, the logical domain, the domain of the propositions expressed in declarative sentences in which something is predicated in or of a subject understood as the thing about which the judgment is made. He contrasts this domain with the ontological domain, that of things and states of affairs, and also with the subjective domain, that of the acts of judging in which judgments are articulated. The apophantic domain is disclosed for the first time in an act of reflection (as opposed to the straightforward intending of the state of affairs about which I judge). The motive for such reflection is that the truth of an assertion is called into question, and I turn my attention from the things spoken about to the assertion simply as an assertion in order to confirm or disconfirm the judgment. The apophantic domain arises, therefore, only insofar as we have an operative interest in truth. See also APOPHANTIC LOGIC; FORMAL LOGIC; PURE LOGIC.

**APOPHANTIC LOGIC.** Apophantic logic is the tradition of logic that derives from Aristotle and the medieval logicians. It is contrasted with mathematical logic. Apophantic logic examines the apophansis, the assertive judgment in which something is predicated of or in a subject. It identifies the pure, formal structures of judgments by emptying them of their material content. Apophantic logic further discloses the possibilities for combining judgments in formally valid arguments. See also FORMAL LOGIC; PURE ANALYTICS; PURE LOGIC.

**APPEARANCE (Erscheinung).** Husserl’s use of the term “appearance” is systematically ambiguous. It can refer either to the appearing of an object, that is, the experience in which the object appears, or to what appears, that is, the object as it appears. The latter, noematic sense refers to those sides, perspectives, aspects, and shadings of the object that momentarily manifest themselves in the successive phases of a perception. The former, noetic sense, while referring in a broad way to the act in which the object appears, more precisely refers to the complex of presenting or representing contents by virtue of which the object is presented as having certain sensible features. In some texts, Husserl identifies the sensory complex as an event in sensibility and the immediate sensible presence of the objective aspect itself. In other texts, however, Husserl separates the noematic sense of “appearance” from the sensory complex, especially when he speaks,
more broadly, of appearances that present more than the sensible determinations of an object. See also ADUMBRATION; HYLETIC DATA.

APPERCEIVE. See APPERCEPTION; APPRESENTATION.

APPERCEPTION (Apperzeption). 1. Apperception is the “perception” that accompanies direct perception (Perzeption). There are two aspects to apperception. The first is the act’s interpretive apprehension of the presenting or representing contents really inhering in the act. The second refers to the fact—at least within Husserl’s developed theory of inner time-consciousness after about 1907–1909—that within the momentary phase of a perception (Wahrnehmung), only primal impression animates hyletic data, that is, only primal impression directly grasps the genuinely appearing side or aspect of the object. However, the perceiver is also perceptually aware of the just seen and still to be perceived sides or aspects of the object as well as other objects spatially or thematically related to the perceived object. The awareness of the not directly perceived sides and of thematically related objects forms the horizon of what is directly perceived. This awareness is made possible by the two other moments of the momentary phase, namely, retention and protention. The second aspect of apperception, then, is the perceptual awareness, the “perceiving,” of the not directly perceived sides or aspects of the object as well as the spatial and thematic background of what is perceived.

2. “Apperception” is also used in a wider sense beyond the analysis of perceptual experiences to designate those moments of an experience that grasp other aspects of the same object as well as related objects in the horizon of the experienced object.

3. “Apperception” can also refer to what is apperceived. Whereas the directly perceived side or aspect (a “perception” in the sense of a percept) is perceived, the not directly perceived sides or aspects—the just perceived and yet to be perceived sides and aspects (the “apperception” in the sense of an “appercept”)—are apperceived. See also APPRESENTATION; INTUITION; PRESENTATION (Gegenwärtigung); RE-PRESENTATION (Vergegenwärtigung).

APPREHENSION (Auffasung). An apprehension is that which gives form to the presenting or representing contents (hyletic data) belonging to an act. In general, Husserl abandoned the scheme that viewed acts as the unity of an apprehension and contents of apprehension with the exception of the moment of primal impression within the momentary phase of consciousness, which Husserl also calls the living present. More
generally, the term “apprehension” is another term for “intention,” the experiential grasp of an object in a determinate manner.

APPRESENT. See APPERCEPTION; APPRESENTATION

APPRESENTATION. 1. Appresentation is the “presentation” that accompanies a presentation. Within the momentary phase of an experience, only the moment of primal impressional directly presents its object or, more precisely, a particular aspect of the object. However, one is also aware in the same experience of other aspects of the directly presented object and of other, related objects as the horizon of what is directly presented. This horizontal, appresentational awareness is made possible by two other moments of the momentary phase, namely, retention and protention. Appresentation, then, is the experiencing, the “re-presenting,” or “making present” of the not directly presented.

2. “Appresentation” can also refer to what is appresented. Whereas the directly experienced aspect is presented, the not directly presented aspects are appresented. See also APPERCEPTION; INTUITION; PERCEPTION (Perzeption); PERCEPTION (Wahrnehmung).

ARON, RAYMOND (1905–1983). Raymond Aron was trained as a philosopher of history. His Introduction to the Philosophy of History (Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire, 1933) was undertaken from a phenomenological perspective. Aron introduced Jean-Paul Sartre, his fellow student at the École Normale Supérieure, to Husserl’s phenomenology. After serving in the French air force and the Free French forces during World War II, Aron devoted his energies largely to social and political commentary, writing first for Le Figaro and then L’Express.

ASSERTION. See APOPHANSIS.

ASSOCIATION. Association is the synthetic and structured unification of the intentional content of a multiplicity of experiences or experiential phases by virtue of which an identical objectivity is given. As such, association is a matter of intentionality and is the principle by which passive synthesis proceeds. Husserl characterizes his account of association as an extension of the theory of inner time-consciousness. He distinguishes the “near-association” that occurs within the living present, especially in retention, from the “far-association” that recalls past experiences into the living present in a manner that reactivates their affective force on the subject.

In experiencing an object, the subject is affected by prominences in the sensory field, but this affecting prominence is not yet the appearance of an
ATTITUDE

As the experience unfolds temporally, appearances that manifest a qualitative similarity with the presently affecting appearance are retained in consciousness on the basis of their affinity with the present appearance such that they continue to exercise an affective force on the subject and to inform the subject’s present sense of the experienced object. On a more distant plane, experiences of the same or similar objects are awakened and re-collected into the present such that their affective force is restored, and these too contribute to the subject’s present understanding of the object. The retained and re-collected experiences ground determinate anticipations about how the experience will continue to unfold.

These associative connections arise passively, that is, without any explicit relating of similar appearances on the part of the subject. Moreover, the recollection (Wiedererrinnerung) involved in association must be distinguished from memory (Erinnerung). The latter is directed to the object as temporally past, whereas association re-calleds prior experiences to shape an experience that is directed to the object as temporally present. The same is true analogously for the difference between associative anticipation of how the present object will unfold in a continued experience and the expectation of an object that is directed to the future. See also PRIMAL IMPRESSION; PROTENTION; RETENTION.

ATTENTION.

Attention is the act of directing one’s conscious regard to an abstract content, that is, a moment of an object. It is distinguished from the presentation that grasps the object as a whole, say, the perception of a material thing in space. Attention grasps not the perceived thing as such, but, for example, its color. Attention, which apprehends the moment in its particularity, must be distinguished from abstraction, which is a higher-order act that grasps the abstract content as a universal object. More generally, attention is the direction of one’s consciousness to something—a part or an object—that stands out in and against a wider context. The part stands out in and against the context of the concrete object of which it is a part, while the object stands out in and against the context of other objects, and so forth.

ATTITUDE.

An attitude for Husserl is a fixed style that a willing life adopts toward the world, a style that manifests the interests that this life habitually seeks to satisfy and the ends it seeks to achieve. An attitude governs our stance toward the world, and it thereby determines certain features of our encounter with the world and the achievements, including the cultural achievements, of a life lived in that attitude.

Several attitudes play important roles in Husserl’s philosophy. The most fundamental is the natural primordial attitude in which the particular,
culture-creating experiences of everyday life occur, experiences which are
directed to particular objects and which aim at a variety of ends (cognitive,
practical, moral, political, aesthetic, religious, and so on). The second is the
religious-mythical or universal practical attitude, in which our attention
is reoriented from the objects within the world to the world itself. This
reorientation is practical in character and continues to serve the ends which
inform the experiences undertaken in the natural primordial attitude. The
practically oriented thematicizing of the world as a whole manifests itself in
the religious-mythical attitude and is expressed in myths. The myths which
express the fundamental religious beliefs of a culture, for example, the
beliefs of the ancient Greeks, address a people’s fundamental questions and
concerns about the divine powers which account for the origin, nature, and
driving forces of the physical and social universe in which individuals live.
Although Husserl stresses religious myths, non-religious myths or legends
which express the beliefs, say, of the American people in self-reliance as
a social force, can serve the same function with respect to the social
universe.

The third attitude of which Husserl speaks is the “theoretical” attitude.
Like the religious-mythical attitude, the theoretical attitude, which includes
a commitment to logic and criticism, involves a universalizing reorienta-
tion of attention. In the theoretical attitude, however, the attending to the
world is disconnected from practical concerns—both particular or
universal—through the intervention of *wunder* or wonder. Given
wonder’s distance from practical concerns, there arises an exclusively
cognitive interest in a knowledge for its own sake of the workings of the
world. In orienting one’s attention to the universal and abstracting from the
practical one adopts the theoretical attitude that makes possible the rise of
scientific theory.

The fourth attitude Husserl identifies is the phenomenological
attitude, the properly philosophical attitude. Other attitudes, for example,
the aesthetic attitude, are possible, but they play a less important role in
Husserl’s discussion. The first three attitudes discussed above are all
variants of what Husserl in a more general sense calls the “natural
attitude.” The distinction between this general notion of the natural
attitude and the phenomenological attitude is the central distinction in
Husserl’s discussion of attitudes.

**AUTHENTICITY (Eigentlichkeit).** Authenticity for Husserl has both
descriptive and normative dimensions. On the one hand, the term is used
to describe the experiencing agent when that agent is rational in the full
sense, that is, when the agent in an evidential experience “decides” for
himself or herself what is true, or when the agent has the right attitudes and


emotions in regard to things, events, and persons, or when the agent decides about what is truly good in the light of evidence. The contrast is with merely accepting passively what others claim to be the true or the good. On the other hand, this description points toward the norm, a good, toward which all experiencing agents strive insofar as they are concerned to disclose truthfully what is and should be the case. Husserl's authenticity, then, is not to be understood in a fully volitional sense, for it is not only a matter of choosing or willing well. It is also a matter of knowing well and—insofar as volition presupposes the grasp of the value of things, actions, and persons—of feeling well, valuing well, and acting well. See also AUTONOMY; ETHICS; EVIDENCE; REASON.

AUTONOMY. Autonomy is for Husserl related to the notion of authenticity. The autonomous agent is one who "decides" for himself or herself what is true, or valuable, or good, or a worthwhile activity, and so forth. Hence, for Husserl the notion of autonomy is not limited to the will or practical reason. Any evidential experience, that is, an experience in which I have evidence for a claim or a supposition, is a form of "decision" insofar as I certify for myself that the claim or supposition is true or false. Similarly, in the axiological sphere, any judgment about the value of a thing, event, action, or person must be grounded in both a cognitive evidencing of the valuable features of the object and an emotional legitimation of the object's worth. See also EVALUATION; VOLITION.

AWAKENING. The affection that occurs in the impresional moment of the living present awakens retained intentional contents having an affinity to those in the impresional moment. Awakening makes these contents available, as it were, for recollection in the living present, thereby informing one's present sense of the object by past experiences. Awakening reverses the tendency of what is retained to affect consciousness less and less. See also ASSOCIATION; PRIMAL IMPRESSION; RETENTION.

AXIOLOGY. Axiology is the study of value. Insofar as values exist as the correlate of acts of valuing, for Husserl axiology as a phenomenological or philosophical study would involve descriptions identifying the essential structures of the valuing experience and both its particular correlate, the thing as valued, and its abstract correlate, the value itself. See also FORMAL AXIOLOGY.
BECKER, OSKAR (1889–1964). Oskar Becker studied physics, chemistry, mathematics, and philosophy, earning his doctorate at Leipzig in 1914 and habilitating at Freiburg in 1922. In 1931, he accepted a position at the University of Bonn that he held until his retirement. At Freiburg, Becker made the acquaintance of Husserl and Martin Heidegger, working for a brief time with Husserl in editing the Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung). In the sixth volume of that journal Becker published his major phenomenological work, titled “Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen.” He also published several volumes on the history of ancient mathematics and mathematical logic.

BEING. While the natural attitude unquestioningly assumes the existence of the world to which our intentional experience is directed, the phenomenological attitude “brackets” this natural belief, that is, the phenomenologist suspends his or her participation in this belief. Hence, one might think that the phenomenological philosopher is not concerned with the question of being. However, the phenomenologist is concerned to identify the categories that properly govern our experience of objects, and is therefore concerned with ontological questions in a broad sense. Moreover, the phenomenologist is concerned to describe the features of experience that underlie the positing of the existence or the being of a thing. For Husserl, then, the being of a thing is the correlate of a true judgment, since the fulfilling judgment is that experience in which we no longer simply take the thing as such-and-such, but evidentially judge that it is such-and-such. The judgment discloses a higher-level object, the categorial object or state of affairs that is the correlate of the act of judging. Hence, the categorial object in which the being of the object is constituted is an ideal object. This is why Husserl claims that being is ideal. It is ideal in the sense that the being of the thing is disclosed only in an activity of consciousness and is not passively given to consciousness. See also ACTUALITY; CATEGORY; CONSTITUTION; EVIDENCE; FULFILLING INTENTION; FULFILLMENT; HERMENEUTIC-AS; TRUTH.

BELIEF. Belief is the fundamental modality of an act, and the thetic characteristic that is its noematic correlate is simple certainty. As such, belief posits the existence of the objects to which it is directed and of the world that both encompasses the totality of these objects and provides the
horizon within which and against which they are found. Belief can undergo modalization, thereby producing other belief-characters, such as doubt or negation, each of which has its correlative thetic characteristic.

BERGER, GASTON (1896–1960). Gaston Berger published influential interpretations of Husserl, most notably, in 1941, *Le Cogito dans la philosophie de Husserl*. He also published original phenomenological investigations such as *Recherches sur les conditions de la connaissance* (1942) in which he argued for the equiprimordiality of one’s own transcendental ego and that of others. His works did much to advance phenomenology in France and to shape the form that early French phenomenology took.

BINSWANGER, LUDWIG (1881–1966). Ludwig Binswanger, a psychopathologist and psychiatrist, became interested in Husserl’s phenomenology in the 1920s because he saw in it a more suitable basis for a non-naturalistic, existential approach to a theory of mind. Later he turned to Martin Heidegger in order to develop a phenomenological anthropology that could underlie psychiatric treatment. His major work was *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, published in 1943.

BIOLOGISM. Biologism is a form of psychologistic relativism that claims that the logical laws governing truth and the understanding of truth are biological laws. See also PSYCHOLOGISM.

BODILY GIVENNESS (leibhaftige Gegenbenheit). Bodily givenness is best thought of not literally, but figuratively to denote “in the flesh.” The expression is tied to Husserl’s theory of intuition and is meant to indicate that the intuited object is present to consciousness in an original and direct way. Perception is the primary example of bodily givenness, wherein the perceived object is directly encountered in its physicality. Insofar as all intuition is a direct evidencing of the sort we find in perception, the notion of bodily givenness serves as a fruitful metaphor for the notion of intuition. Moreover, our intuitions are all mediately grounded in the kind of “bodily” presentations proper to perception. See also EVIDENCE.

BODY (*Körper*). Husserl distinguishes between a body considered from an exclusively physical or naturalistic point of view as a material reality enmeshed in a nexus of physical and biological causality and a body (*Leib*) considered from a personalistic point of view as an animate organism. He uses the term *Körper* when speaking of body in the first sense. This sense of body encompasses both inanimate, physical things and animate
organisms considered purely with regard to those characteristics belonging to them independent of their animation.

**BODY (Leib).** Husserl uses the term *Leib* to denote the body of an animate organism. On this understanding, the body is that which is involved in our consciousness of the world as the perceptual organ of the experiencing subject. The body in this sense is that in which are localized the sensible events (the presenting contents or sensation-contents) by means of which the sensible determinations of objects are presented to consciousness, and that in which are localized the sensible events (*kinaesthetic sensations*) by means of which the experiencing subject is aware of its own activities as perceptual organ. Husserl uses the notion of kinaesthetic sensations broadly—"somaesthetic sensations" better captures Husserl’s meaning—to denote the experiencing subject’s awareness not only of muscular movement but of the body’s attitude. Husserl uses "*kinaesthesia*" also to denote the capabilities for movement that are localized in the body. By this Husserl means the capacity for the kinds of movements of which we are aware in our kinaesthetic sensing and which contribute to our perceptual awareness of material objects.

With respect to the perceptual experience of material objects in space, the body, insofar as it is the perceptual organ of the experiencing subject is first experienced as an “absolute here,” the orientation point for the non-theoretical encounter of space. The notion of objective space as three-dimensional and as a system of places no longer tied to a single body necessarily requires the capability for the body to move in such a way that the “there” of the object encountered in perception can become the “here” where the experiencing subject stands. See also BODY (Körper); HYLETIC DATA.

**BOLZANO, BERNARD (1781–1848).** Karl Weierstrass introduced Husserl to the mathematical writings of Bolzano, and Franz Brentano introduced Husserl to Bolzano’s great philosophical work *Wissenschaftslehre. Versuch einer ausführlichen und großenteils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter* (4 vols., Sulzbach, 1837). Bolzano’s important discussion of the problem of "objectless presentations" influenced Husserl’s thinking about the nature of intentionality, the ideal objectivity of meaning and of logic, and the possibility of a pure logic. Husserl admired the clarity and mathematical precision of Bolzano’s writing and viewed his work as rivaling Gottfried Leibniz’s in importance. See also PRESENTATION.
BOOLE, GEORGE (1815–1864). George Boole’s great contribution to the history of logic was the absorption of syllogistic logic into formal mathematics, thereby producing a syllogistic algebra. Husserl understood this development as crucial to the ultimate unification of logic, mathematics, and formal ontology in a mathesis universalis. Central to the proper understanding of this development, however, is that one not understand logic as extensional, that is, as concerned only with the referents of terms, for that would yield a reduction of logic to formal ontology. Only an intensional logic with its recognition of a distinction between meaning and reference, with a recognition, in other words, of the apophantic domain can permit an understanding of the relation between meanings and objects such that a genuine unification—as opposed to reduction—of a formal apophantic analysis and a formal ontology is possible. See also APOPHANSIS.

BRACKETING. Husserl employs the metaphor of “bracketing” to explain his notion of the phenomenological reduction. The reduction involves leading our attention back to a constituting transcendental subjectivity. In order to do this, Husserl claims, we must suspend our participation in the general thesis characteristic of the natural attitude, a thesis that simply posits the existence of the world and the objects to which our conscious attention is directed. Husserl characterizes this suspension as a “bracketing” of the question of the existence of the world and its objects. This metaphor might be grounded in Husserl’s mathematical background and the notion of absolute number. Absolute two, for example, is represented as [2], a symbol that represents ‘two’ apart from its positive or negative index. Similarly, the phenomenologist considers the consciousness of objects without an index, that is, apart from the affirmation or denial of the objects as existing. See also CONSTITUTION.

BRENTANO, FRANZ CLEMENS (1838–1917). After completing his doctorate in mathematics at the University of Vienna in 1882, Husserl undertook the study of philosophy under the direction of Brentano. From a phenomenological perspective, Brentano was best known for his recovery of the empirical tradition and development of what he called “descriptive psychology” (most notably in Psychologie von empirischen Standpunkt and his lectures from 1887–1891, posthumously published as Deskriptive Psychologie). Brentano claimed that the psychic could be distinguished from the physical by virtue of the fact that the psychic bore the mark of intentionality. Brentano explicated this feature of the psychic by reviving the medieval notion of the “intentional inexistence” of the object of our psychic acts, that is, the doctrine that the object of our
experience intentionally “exists-in” the mind as that to which the mind is directed. Husserl developed the theory of intentionality that he inherited from Brentano, although, along with a number of Brentano’s other students, he rejected as psychologistic the Brentanian notion of immanent “inexistence.”

CAIRNS, DORION (1901–1973). Dorion Cairns was in close contact with Husserl in Freiburg during the years 1924–1926 and 1931–1932. He is an important translator of Husserl’s later works Cartesian Meditations and Formal and Transcendental Logic. In an attempt—not fully successful—to standardize translations of Husserl he published the Guide for Translating Husserl (1973). Cairns, along with Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz were, by virtue of their teaching at the New School for Social Research in New York City, instrumental in introducing Husserl’s work to the United States.

CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS (Cartesianische Meditationen). In late February of 1929, Husserl delivered two lectures at the Sorbonne. These lectures, known collectively as the “Paris Lectures” and published in German in the first volume of Husserliana, were expanded and developed by Husserl and became the Cartesian Meditations. This manuscript was translated into French by Gabrielle Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas and published in 1931 with the title Méditations cartésiennes. Introduction à la phénoménologie. This work, along with Levinas’s own La théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology), published in 1930, greatly affected the reception of Husserl in the French-speaking world.

Husserl planned to publish a German-language version of the Meditations, but he quickly put this plan aside, thinking that it needed further elaboration. His attention, however, turned to other things, specifically to working on the themes that would come to the fore in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, and he left further revisions to Eugen Fink. Even this project, however, was never brought to completion, and the German version of the Meditations was never published.

Inspired by his presence in Paris, Husserl in the Lectures and the Meditations paid homage to the spirit, but not the letter, of René Descartes’s philosophy. In particular, Husserl was concerned, like Descartes,
to find an apodictic starting point and field of research for philosophical reflection. Second, Husserl was concerned to stress the fundamental role of subjectivity in knowledge, and third, he was concerned to ground philosophy as a rigorous, albeit not deductive, science. This last point indicates a crucial difference between Descartes’s rationalism and Husserl’s phenomenology, for Husserl was concerned neither to derive the world from subjectivity nor to develop philosophy as an explanatory science. Phenomenology for Husserl was rather a descriptive science of the experience of the world and the world just as experienced.

The Cartesian Meditations follow to a certain degree the path of Descartes’s own Meditations on First Philosophy. Husserl begins by reflecting on the need for each and every philosopher at some point to call knowledge into question so as to confirm in evidence his or her philosophical beliefs, that is, to take responsibility for one’s philosophical convictions. Descartes had provided the methodology of doubt, but Husserl rejects Cartesian doubt in favor of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. The first meditation is devoted to performing the reduction and adopting the phenomenological attitude.

The second meditation examines the field of transcendental consciousness revealed by the performance of the reduction. Here Husserl analyzes the structure of intentional consciousness, although instead of using the language of noesis and noema as is found in Ideas, he uses the more Cartesian language of cogito and cogitatum. In this meditation Husserl also speaks of the synthetic achievements of transcendental consciousness in bringing objects to presence.

The third meditation explores the notions of reason, evidence, and truth in our experience of the world, and the fourth turns to the question of how the transcendental ego itself is disclosed. Here Husserl alludes to the difficult problems of inner time-consciousness and, once again, to synthesis—both passive syntheses and active syntheses and, in particular, the role of association in our experience. He also speaks of the ego as the identical substrate of experience and of habitualities.

In the fifth meditation, Husserl develops his view of the experience of other subjects. He takes up the question of intersubjectivity in the context of asking how it is that a fully objective, scientific or theoretical apprehension of the world is possible, and he speaks of the necessity for an intersubjective constitution and apprehension of the world. It is in this context that he develops his views of pairing, analogizing appresentation, and empathy, as well as his doctrine of the monad. See also EXPLANATION; THEORETICAL SCIENCE.
CATEGORIAL ACT. An act in which a categorial intention constitutes a categorial object. Husserl regularly uses the examples of judging and collecting or counting. Acts of judging constitute the judgment, in the double sense of the state of affairs judged and the propositional meaning; acts of collecting or counting constitute collections or sets or numbers. Categorial acts, therefore, bring together in an upper-level formation objects or parts encountered in lower-level experiences, and they explicitly recognize the formative moment. In so doing, categorial acts move beyond the level of perception and involve a thinking that posits the unity among the perceptible moments. Categorial acts can be either empty, as in framing a judgment apart from a direct encounter of the object, or full, in which case the act is a categorial intuition. The same categorial object can be intended in an empty signification, which expresses the judgment, and in a fulfilling intuition. See also CONSTITUTION; EMPTY INTENTION; EXPRESSION; FULFILLING INTENTION; FULL INTENTION.

CATEGORIAL FORM. A categorial form is the formal moment, that is, the moment of form, that unites the distinct parts or objects in a categorial object.

CATEGORIAL INTENTION. See CATEGORIAL ACT.

CATEGORIAL INTUITION. A categorial intuition is the fulfilling act for an empty, signitive intention of a categorial object. Categorial intuition directly presents the unity of whole and part, of the members of a group, of the terms of a relation, and so forth. Categorial intuition is a modification of perception, insofar as the subject sees, for example, not merely “the red door” but “that the door is red.” The formal or categorial moment of the categorial object is not the correlate of a perceptual moment in the fulfilling act insofar as the categorial intuition is not directed simply to the concrete object or to any of its abstract perceptible qualities. Instead, categorial intuitions, as do all categorial acts, involve a moment of thinking that moves beyond its perceptual foundations. Categorial intuition is a “thoughtful perception” that does not merely add thoughtfulness to perception but unifies what is directly encountered in and of an object that is at once perceived (or remembered or imagined) and thoughtfully articulated. See also CATEGORIAL FORM; EMPTY INTENTION; FORM; FULFILLING INTENTION; FULFILLING SENSE; FULFILLMENT.
CATEGORIAL OBJECT. A categorial object is one infused with form or structure. Examples of categorial objects are states of affairs, groups, relations, numbers, or any object in which parts have been articulated. The articulated whole, in which the parts are both distinguished and joined together, is the categorial object. The categorial object can be intended in an empty signitive intention or in a categorial intuition, and the categorial object is the identity given in this manifold of absent and present modes.

Early in his career—up through the Logical Investigations—Husserl understood the distinction between non-categorial and categorial objects and that between pre-predicative and predicative experiences as correlates, but he came to recognize that even pre-predicative experience has a kind of categoriality proper to it. This pre-predicative categoriality is not yet fully articulated, but it nevertheless adds a moment of form to what is experienced. The adumbrational character of perception means that the object is experienced as something or other; perception is categorially structured in an anticipatory manner by the hermeneutic-as.

CATEGORIAL OBJECTIVITY. See CATEGORIAL OBJECT.

CATEGORY. A category is a moment of form that unites or “forms” objects or their parts into categorial objects. Insofar as the category introduces articulation into the categorial object, it also underlies discourse for it allows for the possibility of expressing in a syntactically formed expression the categorial object rather than merely naming the underlying object.

CAUSAL PROPERTIES. Husserl distinguishes between what he calls the “phantom” and the material thing in the full sense. The latter is characterized by its possession of causal properties, that is, properties that, while sensible, are grasped either as the effects of the causal agency of other objects or properties that produce effects in other objects.

CLARITY. In addition to distinguishing two kinds of “perfect” or absolute evidence, Husserl distinguishes two levels of evidence, namely, distinctness and clarity. Clarity is the kind of evidence that belongs to the third level of logic that Husserl calls the logic of truth. A clear judgment is one in which the state of affairs that the judge seeks to articulate becomes directly given in an act of evidence, thereby satisfying the striving toward truth implicit in the act of judging.

Husserl further distinguishes the clarity of anticipation from the clarity of having something itself. The clarity of anticipation is the evidence that belongs to an act of judging that makes the meant state of affairs intuitive.
in the sense that it prefigures that state of affairs. What is given in the clarity of anticipation is not the predicatively formed state of affairs itself but merely a prefiguration, an intuitional anticipation, which must yet be confirmed in a **categorial intuition**. The clarity in the having of something itself is evident judging in the full sense, the actual intuitive possession in the judging activity of the meant state of affairs. See also **VAGUENESS**.

**COGITATIONES.** The particular experiences, both active and passive, in which an individual *ego cogito* is conscious of the world. The **phenomenological reduction** reveals the correlation of **consciousness** and the **world** as the proper field for philosophical reflection. Husserl sometimes characterizes the relation between consciousness and world as the correlation of the *cogito* with its *cogitatum*, but this correlation is possible only by virtue of the presence of *cognitiones*. See also **ACTIVE SYNTHESIS**; **PASSIVE SYNTHESIS**.

**COGITATUM.** The *cogitatum* is the object to which **consciousness** is directed in an experience; it is the cognized object as present in the experiences (the *cognitiones*) belonging to the *ego cogito*. See also **INTENTIONAL OBJECT**.

**COGITIO.** Husserl uses the Cartesian language of the *cogito* in his discussions of the **phenomenological reduction** for two purposes, both of which echo Cartesian motifs: (1) to emphasize the turn to **subjectivity** that is proper to the reduction, and (2) to emphasize that the *ego* or *cogito* is given to phenomenological reflection in an **evidence** that is **apodictic**. The notion of the *cogito* also alludes to the Kantian **transcendental ego** or unity of apperception—the “I think”—that accompanies all **representations** (*Vorstellungen*). See also **COGITATIONES**, **COGITATUM**.

**COINCIDENCE.** See **CONGRUENCE**.

**COMMUNITY.** Husserl distinguishes natural communities, for example, the family, from voluntary communities, that is, those that arise from the free choices of the members of the community. Husserl’s view of the nature of communities is an idealized one, taking as its model the voluntary community of theoretical mathematicians. Husserl characterizes a community as a “**personality of a higher order.**” This language is intended to reflect both the fact that a community is nothing apart from the individuals composing it and the fact that the community cannot be reduced to the mere collection of individuals it comprises. Nor are the
achievements of a community reducible to the separate achievements of individuals. A community has experiences and activities proper to itself.

The community is fully achieved in communicative, reciprocally interactive experiences in which one experiences others as companions, colleagues, and co-workers whose functionally interpenetrating wills form a single will encompassing a shared understanding of the world. Central, in other words, to Husserl’s notion of community are the views that the community has its own striving and willing life, analogous to that of an individual person, and that the individual within the community is a representative (Träger) and functionary of the communal will. Each member of the community assumes his or her own role and function in the larger community, recognizing the fulfillment of that role and function as his or her contribution to the striving of the community as a whole. There is, in brief, both a subordination of individual wills to the end sought by the communicative communion of individuals making up a particular community and a coordination of individual wills such that each person’s individual actions contribute to the realization of that shared end. It is precisely in this subordination and coordination of wills that the community with a single will to be realized in the separate, but interpenetrating activities of its members is formed.

CONCEPT. A concept, or universal idea, is an essence as experienced.

CONCRETE WHOLE. See CONCRETUM.

CONCRETUM. A concretum is an object that exists independently as an individual object. The independently existing object may be an object in its own right or it may be a piece or independent part that has been separated from the whole of which it is a piece. Concreta can be either particular (the tree outside my window or the severed leg of a table) or essential (the species ‘human’). See also ABSOLUTE CONCRETUM; MOMENT; RELATIVE CONCRETUM.

CONGRUENCE (Deckung). Husserl uses the term “Deckung” (covering, coincidence, congruence) to characterize the relation between an empty intention and a fulfilling intention. The geometrical image of congruence is a useful one: the intentional content of the fulfilling intention (for example, the \textit{categorial intuition} of a \textit{state of affairs}) is “laid over” the intentional content of the empty intention (for example, an \textit{act} expressing a \textit{judgment} in a declarative sentence) in much the same way that one geometrical figure is through a series of rigid transformations laid over another figure such that the two figures coincide. To the extent that the
intentional content of the empty intention coincides with that of the fulfilling intention, the judgment is true. See also EXPRESSION; TRUTH.

CONRAD-MARTIUS, HEDWIG (1888–1966). Hedwig Martius, along with her husband Theodor Conrad, was a member of the circle of students that began in 1905 to form around Husserl in Göttingen. This group eventually formed themselves around 1910 as the Göttinger philosophische Gesellschaft of which Conrad-Martius served as chairwoman. Conrad-Martius developed an ontologically oriented phenomenology whose concern was not the analysis of transcendental subjectivity but a science of essences. See also EIDETIC PHENOMENOLOGY; EIDETIC REDUCTION.

CONSCIOUSNESS. Husserl in the Logical Investigations identifies three meanings for the term “consciousness”: 1. consciousness is the empirical ego, the unified interweaving of psychic experiences in a unified stream of experience. This sense of consciousness is psychological in character and refers to the totality of the ego’s real (reelle) contents; 2. consciousness is the inner awareness of one’s own psychic experiences; 3. consciousness is another term for “mental” or “psychic” acts, that is, for intentional experiences of all sorts. In the Investigations the last sense is Husserl’s preferred sense, although it is clear throughout Husserl’s works that this last sense is inseparable from the other two meanings, for in being intentionally directed to an object, one is aware of oneself (as a unified ego) experiencing an object. Moreover, in Husserl’s later works, the first sense loses its psychological character, for the notion of a unified ego can be separated from the sense of an empirical ego and be considered purely phenomenologically as a “phenomenological ego” or “transcendental ego,” that is, as a possible ego with its unified stream of experience disclosive of the world. The broadened first sense of “consciousness” is developed in Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness; the second is developed in his account of self-awareness; and the third is developed in his account of intentionality.

CONSTITUTION. Constitution can be properly understood only within the framework of the phenomenological reduction, that is, within the philosophical attitude. Insofar as the reduction focuses the reflecting philosopher’s attention on the correlation of consciousness and the world, the philosopher must give an account of how objects appear to consciousness and of the subjective achievements or syntheses that are at work in bringing these objects to appearance in just the way that they appear. This subjective achievement of bringing objects to appearance in a determinate manner is what Husserl refers to as the “constitution” of the object. It is to
be distinguished from the Kantian and neo-Kantian notions of constitution which are “constructive” insofar as the achievement of consciousness is to form an object out of unformed materials by the application of a priori categories. The Husserlian notion of constitution, on the other hand, is “disclosive.” To constitute an object is to disclose it as such-and-such—to give it “sense,” to make sense of it—in those synthetic achievements that bring forth the sense of the object and that are the necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the emergence of this sense.

Husserl also refers to the constitution of the self in inner time-consciousness. In constituting objects the self also constitutes itself; it builds itself up and discloses its own being as a synthetic unity of acts or experiences. See also ACTIVE SYNTHESIS; PASSIVE SYNTHESIS; SYNTHESIS.

CONTINGENT A PRIORI. See MATERIAL A PRIORI.

CONTINGENT ESSENCE. An essence or eidos that is characterized by material a priority. See also EXACT ESSENCE; FORMAL A PRIORI; MORPHOLOGICAL ESSENCE.

COUNTERSENSE (Widersinn). A countersense arises when a combination of meanings involves a material incompatibility, that is, when the combination of meanings is such that it is certain that no object corresponding to the combined meaning can exist. An example is the expression “round square.” See also NONSENSE; PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.

COVERING. See CONGRUENCE.

CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie). Husserl’s last great work is an incomplete one. Its theme is clear enough; Husserl around 1934 began to reflect on the crisis of reason that he found evident everywhere around him—in the sciences and in politics. There were some landmarks in these reflections. In May 1935, Husserl delivered the “Vienna Lecture” titled “Philosophy in the Crisis of European Mankind” (“Die Philosophie in der Krisis der europäischen Menschheit”). In it Husserl discusses the roots of the European scientific tradition and of the notion of reason it embodies, and he analyzes how this tradition has lost its way in the modern world. This became the theme of the larger work customarily known simply as the Crisis, in which the Vienna lecture also appears as a supplementary text.
Since Husserl was not allowed at this time to speak or to publish in Germany, arrangements were made to publish the *Crisis* in installments in the Yugoslavian journal *Philosophia*. What now makes up the first two parts of the *Crisis* were published there in 1936. Husserl did not complete the third part. Eugen Fink prepared a typescript of the part Husserl did write and an outline for the remainder of the third part and for two additional parts. But no conclusion for the third part and no additional parts have been found among Husserl’s texts.

The *Crisis* is distinguished from Husserl’s other published works, first, in that it traces the historical development of the idea of reason in Western philosophy from the Greeks to the moderns. While Husserl had done something similar in lecture courses, his other publications stress the ideal, atemporal character of scientific propositions and theories. Here, however, Husserl stresses the notions of historical development and the receipt of tradition that passively informs our current understandings of the world. He emphasizes the manner in which these inheritances can be accepted without critique or reflection and can thereby distort, in the forgetfulness of their origin, the true significance of these achievements. The first part of the work appears, therefore, as a kind of history of philosophy, but one which investigates the way in which the guiding idea of philosophy, its telos, has been more or less realized in its historical incarnations.

The *Crisis* is distinctive, second, in the manner in which it traces our scientific beliefs back to the life-world on which these beliefs are grounded. Husserl describes the manner in which the scientific tradition abstracts from our lived experience of the world—the emotional and practical aspects of our existence—in order to disclose a physical world—a sense of nature that is not bound to a particular culture with its social practices and institutions. Husserl, in other words, traces the world of nature as science apprehends it back to its origins in the life-world, and he identifies the subjective achievements that bring about scientific understanding. He also points out that this life-world is itself the product of subjective achievements, thereby stressing once more the fundamental role of transcendental subjectivity in disclosing the world of experience.

The last sections of the text explore the relation between transcendental phenomenology and psychology. In particular, Husserl seeks to address what he calls the “paradox of subjectivity,” that we are both (psychological) subjects in the world and (transcendental) subjects for the world. Husserl demonstrates that some of the difficulties encountered by the psychological sciences have their roots in the dualism of modern philosophy, but this section of the text breaks off before Husserl has
completely worked out a position regarding the proper relationship between phenomenology and psychology.

CULTURE (Kultur). A culture is the historically unified, spiritual product of the purposeful, constituting life of an intersubjective community, a product that is found, for example, in works of art, science, and so forth. The term “culture” in this sense therefore carries connotations of the English term “civilization.” Cultural objects, say, a particular work of art, are ideal objects insofar as they arise only through the actively constituting life of this community’s members. As ideal, cultural objects have an omni-temporality distinct from the temporality of the physical instances, for example, performances or prints, of that object. See also CONSTITUTION; INTERSUBJECTIVITY.

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DAUBERT, JOHANNES (1877–1947). Johannes Daubert, at first a student of Theodor Lipps, visited Husserl in 1902 for a long discussion of the Logical Investigations. Upon returning to Munich, Daubert led the transformation of what was formerly a club of Lipps’s students (the Akademisch-Psychologischer Verein) that discussed Lipps’s descriptive psychology into what came to be known as the Munich Circle. Husserl visited the club in 1904 and thereafter began a steady stream of students from Munich to Göttingen to study with Husserl.

Daubert himself was thought to be brilliant, but he published little. He, like many members of the Munich Circle, rejected Husserl’s later transcendental idealism. Daubert, in particular, interprets the phenomenological reduction and the disclosure of the noema as a separation of consciousness and sense from the object, as a retreat from the autonomous reality of the experienced world in favor of a dependent world of consciousness and its ideal world of senses, and as a reduction of the real world to an ideal world. Daubert understands Husserl’s claim that acts intending non-existent objects have a noematic correlate to be a falsification of the very cognition on which Husserl claims to reflect. According to Daubert, normal cognition is always engaged with real objects and is nothing apart from them. This direct engagement with objects is an immediate awareness to which intentional consciousness with its noema is secondary. In immediate awareness itself, there is no noema. Intentional consciousness arises when an interpretive moment, a taking-the-object-as, supplements our immediate awareness. But the
noema-sense is dependent upon the object of immediate awareness and can never be separated from an object. It is impossible for Daubert that there exist a noema without an object from which it is derived.

DE BEAUVIOR, SIMONE (1908–1986). Simone de Beauvoir’s most important phenomenological contribution is in the field of ethics. Her *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (*Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté*, 1947) developed Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenological ontology in the direction of ethics. She argued that the situational character of freedom meant that there were no absolute and no external ethical rules. All ethical behavior is a value-creative response of the radically free and undetermined individual to the circumstances in which he or she is called upon to act. De Beauvoir is also one of the founding mothers of feminism; her *The Second Sex* (*Le deuxième sexe*, 1949) is a landmark of feminist writing. This book, however, is not a phenomenological work. Rather, it recalls the social and economic history of woman in order to argue for a new, non-essentialist, feminist outlook.

DE MORGAN, AUGUSTUS (1806–1871). Augustus De Morgan was an important figure in mathematics and logic, best known in mathematics for his contributions to mathematical induction and his definition of the limit, and in logic for the quantification of the predicate and the development of the logical principles known as De Morgan’s Theorems. Husserl considered him, along with George Boole, to be one of the pioneers in the development of a syllogistic algebra and the unification of apophantic logic and formal mathematics. However, Husserl believed that De Morgan’s advances—as he also believed of Boole’s—were simply technical advances in the development of mathematical deduction and that De Morgan did not properly ground the unity of logic and mathematics.

DECONSTRUCTION (Abbau). See DESTRUCTION.

DEMONSTRATION. Husserl distinguishes two senses of the term “demonstration.” The first sense denotes that form of demonstration (*Hinweis*) involved in indication, that is, a sense of “showing” that is not insightful. The indicative sign, for example, associatively recalls—and thereby “demonstrates” or “shows”—the indicated, but the indicated is not present to intuition. The second sense denotes the form of demonstration (*Beweis*) proper to proof, that is, a “showing” that is insightful. Hence, a demonstration is a proof wherein the premises “show” the truth of the conclusion that follows from them. The premises motivate an inference in which the truth of the conclusion is insightfully grasped. See also EXPRESSION.
DEPENEDNT PART. See MOMENT.

DESCARTES, RENÉ (1596–1650). Commonly thought the initiator of modern philosophy, Descartes attempted to ground philosophy anew. A pioneer in the newly emergent analytic geometry, who also discovered the law of refraction in optics, René Descartes sought to establish a philosophical system exhibiting the same kind and degree of rigor as the mathematical sciences. Indeed, in one sense, he sought more, for he was unsatisfied with axiomatic starting points unless the axioms could be known with absolute certitude. In short, Descartes sought to build a philosophical system grounded in an indubitable starting point and in which each step in the formation of the system was guaranteed by the clarity and distinctness of the logic of its derivation. Employing a method of radical doubt, in which he refrained from the systematic use of any knowledge of which he was not certain, Descartes discovered his starting point in the turn to the subject, in the indubitable grasp of the truth that as long as he was thinking, it was undeniable that he existed as a thinking thing. This insight was expressed in the famous “cogito, sum.” On this basis, Descartes claimed to prove the existence of God, whose benevolence guaranteed that the proper use of the faculties of intuition and deduction would infallibly yield truth.

Husserl took a certain measure of inspiration from Descartes. In particular, Husserl too thought that a reform of philosophy was necessary, and that this reform must ground philosophy on an apodictic foundation. Most important for Husserl, therefore, was the Cartesian principle that every philosopher must for himself or herself ground philosophical knowledge on indubitable principles; every philosopher must achieve evidential insights into the basic foundations of knowledge in order to secure philosophical knowledge. This principle states Husserl’s view that the life of reason is a life of self-responsibility or authenticity that is achieved in evidence. Second, this grounding of philosophical and scientific knowledge necessarily involves, according to Husserl, a turn to subjectivity, the disclosure of the ego as constitutive of the world—the sense of the world—in experience. Third, Husserl credited Descartes with adopting an implicit theory of intentionality in his doctrine of the esse objectivum of ideas, but, according to Husserl, Descartes did not clearly recognize what he had found. In short, Descartes, on Husserl’s view, restored the objectivity of knowledge and reason against the skepticism of his own day and at the same time pointed to, but did not realize, the transcendental motifs that would overcome the modern rationalism Descartes inaugurated.
Husserl is inspired by the spirit—not the content—of Descartes’s thought, and his philosophy must be clearly distinguished from Cartesianism. Husserl rejects, for example, Cartesian doubt as a purely negative movement, replacing it with the transcendental-phenomenological reduction and thereby preserving the experienced world as available for reflection in the very act of reflecting upon an intentional transcendental subjectivity. Husserl rejects the view that the subjectivity revealed in the reduction is a substantial, worldly or psychological ego, insisting on the fact that this is a transcendental subjectivity. Husserl also rejects the substantial distinction between body and mind that is central to Descartes's philosophy. What unites Husserl to Descartes is only the search for an apodictic ground of knowledge along with the recognition that no account of knowledge, and indeed, of the world, is possible without reference to the subjectivity that constitutes the world. Husserl himself perhaps sums up best his relation to Descartes when he says in the introductory paragraph of the Cartesian Meditations: “one might almost call transcendental phenomenology a neo-Cartesianism, even though it is obliged—and precisely by its radical development of Cartesian motifs—to reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy.”

DESCRIPTION. Description is contrasted with explanation. Description is not concerned with the identification of causes or the causal relations among objects. It is concerned instead to identify the parts and their interconnections proper to its subject matter. More specifically, for description to be scientific, it must identify the moments and essential connections proper to its subject matter. See also DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE; ESSENCE; THEORETICAL SCIENCE.

DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY. “Descriptive psychology” is an expression Husserl takes over from Franz Brentano. It is contrasted with causal-genetic psychology. The latter, a theoretical science, seeks both to identify the physical causes of psychic experiences and to determine the laws governing the succession of psychic experiences. Descriptive psychology, on the other hand, non-reductively describes psychic states as disclosed in our reflective experience of them—that is, it describes them apart from any causal or physicalist assumptions. Husserl, however, in the years between the first and second editions of the Logical Investigations came to reject the notion of descriptive psychology. He thought the expression a misleading characterization of his new phenomenology because phenomenology, after the development of the phenomenological reduction, explores the correlation of consciousness and the world
whereas descriptive psychology either abstracts the region of the psychic from the world or, to the extent that it describes intentional experience, continues to assume that the acts it investigates are real, worldly occurrences. It continues, in other words, to participate in the natural attitude’s positing of the world.

DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE. A descriptive science is one that is unified by virtue of the fact that its content relates to an individual object or empirical species. As such its principle of unity is external to the science itself, and it is thereby contrasted with theoretical science. Descriptive sciences, however, are not to be understood as merely descriptive in a way that would undercut their nature as science. They concern essences and essential relations, and they remain unities of evident judgments and arguments organized into bodies of knowledge. See also EVIDENCE.

DESTRUCTION (Abbau). Destruction is to be understood not as an annihilation but as a de-struction, an un-building. The term has methodological significance. Husserl’s doctrine of founding moments suggests that there are moments of sense that are foundational to other moments. To de-struct the object is to disclose these foundational layers of sense. This can be done in both static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology.

DETERMINABLE X. The innermost moment of the noema. In Husserl’s earlier, static writings, the determinable X is a purely formal notion that accounts for the identity of the object presented in multiple noemata. In Husserl’s later, genetic writings, which emphasize the temporality of experience, the determinable X is not merely a formal notion but a teleological one. As an experience unfolds in time, the object is more and more precisely determined, and the full determination of the object relative to the subject’s interest in the object is the telos of the experience.

DILTHEY, WILHELM (1833–1911). Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy is well known for its distinction between the sciences of nature (Naturwissenschaften) and the sciences of spirit (Geisteswissenschaften, sometimes translated as “human sciences” or “social sciences” or “cultural sciences”), for its development of a Lebensphilosophie that stressed the idea of a life-nexus over that of causality, and for a typology of Weltanschauungen or worldviews. Husserl’s essay “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” contains a spirited attack against all forms of relativism, including historicism, and this was widely thought to be aimed at Dilthey’s historicism. In correspondence with Dilthey, however, Husserl
claimed that their differences were few, and it is clearly the case that Dilthey’s discussions of the formation of a self in a historical culture motivated Husserl’s subsequent reflections on history and culture and, perhaps, his development of the notion of secondary passivity.

DISAPPOINTMENT. Disappointment is the opposite of fulfillment. When an intuitive experience of an object is disharmonious or non-congruent with the empty intention of that same object, the original intention is disappointed. This is the experience of the non-veridicality or falsity of the original intention and motivates us to abandon or correct our original intention, our original understanding of the object. See also CONGRUENCE; DISTINCTION; TRUTH.

DISTINCTION. In addition to its ordinary meaning, Husserl uses the term “distinction” to refer to those experiences in which our intending an object is disappointed, that is, our intention fails in one way or another to be veridical or true. Distinction, then, is a synthetic act that brings together an act that (emptily) intends an object in one determinate manner with an intuitive act that grasps the intended object in a different determinate manner. The object, in other words, is intuitively experienced as not the same as, as distinct from, the object of the intending act. See also DISAPPOINTMENT; FULFILLMENT; IDENTIFICATION; SYNTHESIS.

DISTINCTNESS. Distinctness is the kind of evidence that belongs to the second level of logic that Husserl calls the logic of consistency or the logic of non-contradiction. A distinct judgment is one in which the judger actively distinguishes the parts of the judgment, for example, the attribute from the whole of which it is predicated or the two terms of a relation, and actively synthesizes the parts in the unified judgment. The distinct judgment, then, is one that is made present to the judger as a judgment or proposition through the judger’s own activity. It is contrasted with the passively accepted judgment that is simply taken over from others and not articulated for oneself. The notion of distinctness can be extended to other domains where active articulation is required. For example, speech can be indistinct when the parts of words are not expressly formed and thereby not distinguished from one another. See also CLARITY; PURE LOGIC; VAGUENESS.
EGO. The ego or “I” is the identity that is at the center of all conscious life, both active and passive. Hence, it is the intentional center of all affects, all acts, and all actions. Husserl sometimes characterizes the ego as a “pole of identity,” but the metaphor of pole can be misleading since it suggests a purely formal, unchanging identity of the sort found in Immanuel Kant’s formal unity of apperception. The ego functions in all the experiences belonging to a single stream of consciousness, including those that are primarily passive in character, for example, affections and perceptions. In so functioning, it always varies itself, accumulating new experiences, developing new habitualities, and so forth. In this manner, the ego constitutes itself in the course of its experiences. Moreover, the ego is an embodied ego with both a bodily orientation toward the world and its objects and a spatial location within that world.

The ego, then, constitutes itself over time as an identity within different manifolds. It is the identity in repeated instances of pre-reflective self-awareness, although it is not yet thematized and named as the “I.” It is the thematized and recognized identity disclosed in multiple acts of memory and of reflection and, indeed, reflections of different sorts (for example, psychological reflection and phenomenological reflection). It is the identity in the psychological and the transcendental. There are, that is, neither two egos—a psychological ego and a transcendental ego—nor two subjects—a psychological subject and a transcendental subject. There is one ego, one subject, grasped in two different apprehensions characterized by two different attitudes, the natural attitude and the phenomenological attitude. The ego is the identity in the bodily movements—the kinaesthetic activity—instrumental in disclosing the world as spatial and material.

Fundamental to the notion of the ego—and underlying pre-reflective and pre-egological self-awareness, as well as the possibility of reflective grasps of the ego and the encounter with objects—is absolute consciousness or the living present. See also COGITO; EGOLOGY; HABITUALITY; KINAESTHESIS; SELF; SELF-AWARENESS.

EGOLOGY. Egology is the scientific study of the ego and its experiences. In Husserl’s case, the science appropriate for the study of the ego is phenomenology. Since phenomenology recognizes the intentionality of experience, a concrete, phenomenological egology would include the study not only of the ego and its experiences, but of the world as experienced by an ego.
EIDETIC INTUITION. Eidetic intuition is the intuition of an eidos or essence. See also ESSENTIAL INSIGHT.

EIDETIC PHENOMENOLOGY. An eidetic science is one that apprehends the a priori essences of things. The apprehension of an essence involves a reduction (a leading-back) from facts to essence, a reduction that Husserl calls the “eidetic reduction.” The method by which the eidetic reduction is achieved is eidetic variation. Phenomenology, which Husserl views as an eidetic science, grasps the a priori essences of our experiences of the world (just as experienced). Whereas an eidetic science does not require the phenomenological reduction, phenomenology as an eidetic science does require the phenomenological reduction because it is only by means of that reduction that one properly focuses attention on the intentional correlation of consciousness and world.

While all phenomenology is eidetic, the term “eidetic phenomenology” is sometimes associated especially with those early students of Husserl in the Munich Circle and the Göttingen Philosophical Society who are also called realistic phenomenologists. Although they insist on the intentional-ity of experience, characteristic of their thinking is the rejection of the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental turn. Hence, they do not “bracket” or put out of play the positing of the world that belongs to the natural attitude, and their phenomenology focuses on disclosing the essences of the “real,” actually existent world.

EIDETIC REDUCTION. The eidetic reduction is a methodological device that leads one’s attention back from a multiplicity of particulars to an a priori essence. The method by which the reduction is achieved is eidetic variation. See also EIDETIC INTUITION.

EIDETIC VARIATION. The method of eidetic variation calls for the imaginative and systematic variation of examples of the type under study. Husserl also refers to this method as “imaginative variation” or “free phantasy.” In systematically varying the idea of a tree, for example, we recognize that there are features, such as the capacity for self-nutrition, without which we could no longer take something to be a tree. We thereby come to an awareness of the necessary moments of the thing, that is, of its essential features, which in their definite relations form the essence of the independently existing object, an essence that Husserl identifies as a concretum. Similarly, in systematically varying the idea of green, we recognize that there are certain lightenings and darkenings of shade which would prevent us from continuing to call the color “green.” In this recognition, we apprehend the essence of a non-independent moment, an
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essence that Husserl identifies as an *abstractum*. In the course of such variations, we discover what features belong necessarily to any possible object of the kind under consideration or to any possible object qualified by the property or attribute under consideration. *See also* EIDETIC PHENOMENOLOGY; EIDETIC REDUCTION; IMAGINATION.

EIDOS. Husserl uses the Latinization of the Greek word ἑιδός to denote an essence.

EMBODIMENT. The state of consciousness’s being-in-a-body (*Leib*). The importance of the notion of embodiment is that it points both toward the limits imposed upon knowledge by virtue of a consciousness being “localized” in a body in a particular time and place and toward the active role that the motile body, as the organ of sense, plays in the constitution of objects and the world. *See also* KINAESTHESIS; SENSATION.

EMOTION. An emotion is a specific feeling-act. As such, it involves a presentational moment, bodily feelings, and both a general and specific affective moment. Its intentionality is derived from an underlying presentation or, as Husserl calls it, objectifying act. This should not be understood to mean that there is a temporal priority of the objectification over the emotion; it means only that the emotion necessarily contains a moment that presents the object with certain descriptive properties. The affective moment is a response to these descriptive properties and is itself grounded in feeling-sensations, and in particular, feelings of pleasure and pain. Insofar as the pleasure or pain is referred not simply to the subject experiencing the sensation but, by means of the underlying presentation, to an object, a valuation or value apperception (*Wertnehmung*) of the object arises, and insofar as the affective aspect of the object or state of affairs intended is disclosed, an emotional experience arises. The subject likes or dislikes an object; the subject loves (or hates) a person; joy (or sadness) is taken in an event, and so forth. *See also* EVALUATION; MOOD.

EMPATHY (*Einfühlung*). Empathy is the type of experience central to our encounter with other persons. Empathy is grounded in what Husserl calls “pairing,” and “analogizing apperception.” In experiencing the Other I recognize the Other to be a perceiving, thinking, feeling, willing, and acting agent—in brief, a conscious agent—like myself, while at the same time I recognize that I cannot encounter the Other’s consciousness directly. I can only appresent that consciousness as one that governs the other’s directly encountered bodily activities in a manner similar to that
in which I govern my own bodily activities. This is an appresentation that can never, as can the appresentation of the unseen sides of a seen object, be transformed into a presentation.

This irreducible appresentation of an Other’s consciousness is empathy, the experience of “feeling-in” the Other such that in encountering the Other’s lived body (Leib), I encounter her as perceiving (with the appropriate feelings and bodily activities), as experiencing feelings and emotions (for example, in seeing the Other blush, I experience her as embarrassed or ashamed, or in seeing the Other clench fists, I experience her as angry), as speaking (and thereby expressing, say, judgments achieved in acts of judging), and so forth. The fact that the Other’s consciousness is and can only be appresented means that I do not encounter the Other’s experiential life directly. I do not live in the Other’s experiences or identify myself with the Other; the Other is irreducibly other. Instead, I experience the Other’s consciousness only in encountering her lived body, its states, and activities.

Empathy must be distinguished from sympathy. To experience sympathy is to feel along with the other. In hearing, for example, that a friend’s parent has died, I experience grief along with my friend, even though I might never have known the parent. In empathy, I recognize my friend as grieving; in sympathy, I share my friend’s grief. See also APPERCEPTION.

**EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGISM.** Empirical psychologism is that version of psychology that reduces the ideal, a priori laws of logic to the a posteriori, empirical generalizations of psychology. See also TRANSCENDENTAL PSYCHOLOGISM.

**EMPIRICAL SUBJECT.** The empirical subject is the psychological subject. It is not ontologically distinct from the transcendental subject, and the activities and achievements of the transcendental subject are realized and manifested in the empirical subject’s activities and achievements. The empirical subject, as opposed to the transcendental subject, is apprehended in a psychological reflection as the subject-in-the-world, who is ensnared in the causal nexus that characterizes the world. The transcendental subject, on the other hand, is grasped in a phenomenological reflection as the subject-of or subject-for the world. See also EGO; PSYCHOLOGICAL EGO; TRANSCENDENTAL EGO.

**EMPTY INTENTION.** An empty intention is one that re-presents or makes present an object that is absent to consciousness. Empty intentions are contrasted with full intentions. Full intentions either present an object
intuitively by containing sensuous contents that directly present a side or aspect of the object, or they present an object that, while not intuitively present, is presented with the aid of contents that are re-presented by virtue of the living present’s retention of previously experienced (erlebt) sensuous contents. Empty intentions, on the other hand, make an object present without an intuitive basis for the presentation. That is, the object is presented in a way that involves no sensuous basis. Most importantly, empty intentions present an object signitively in language, wherein the sensuous basis of the presentation is not sensuous contents presenting the determinations of the object but a sensible sign (a written or spoken word) whose signification or meaning refers to the absent object. See also HYLETIC DATA; INTUITION; SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION; SIGNITIVE INTENTION.

ENCOUNTER (erfahren, Erfahrung). The English term “encounter” is sometimes used to translate the German terms erleben and Erfahrung. While Erfahrung and Erlebnis can both be translated by the English term “experience” and erfahren and erleben can both be translated by “to experience,” the German words have nuances not present in the single English term. Erlebnis and erleben capture the sense of experience as “lived” or “lived through” (hence, the French expérience vécu), as “subjective,” that is, as properly belonging to the subject. Erfahrung and erfahren, on the other hand, capture the directedness of our experiences, the fact that experience has an object, that it is of something. The English term “encounter,” too, captures this sense, as well as the idea that our experience has both active and passive dimensions, since in encountering an object, we undergo something, are affected by it. This points to the unity of the two German expressions. In most cases of undergoing something, that is, in being affected by an object, I live through this undergoing such that I “take” the object in a certain way. This also points to an everyday sense of Erfahrung in German, namely, the “wisdom” that is accumulated over the course of a continued encounter with things and that we attribute to an “experienced” person. See also JUDGMENT; PERCEPTION (Wahrnehmung); VALUE APPERCEPTION (Wertnehmung).

EPOCHÉ. The epoché is a methodological device that suspends one’s participation in the belief characteristic of the natural attitude, the belief, namely, that the world and its objects exist. This suspension has its correlate in what Husserl calls the “bracketing” of the object, the removal of the existential index from the experienced object. The epoché involves, then, a neutralization of one’s belief in the existence of the world or of
an object. This neutralization might be employed in the shift from belief to doubt, or in the shift from the natural to the critical attitude that characterizes scientific or theoretical experiences, or in the shift to a more narrowly characterized “logical” or “mathematical” attitude whose concern is solely with the deductive relations existing among different propositions or among objects considered purely formally, or in the shift to aesthetic awareness, or, finally, in the shift to the phenomenological attitude. The epoché, then, is in general the suspension of belief, and as such, it is a moment in the phenomenological or transcendental reduction in which one’s attention is led back to the constituting acts of consciousness with their object simply as given and without regard to the existence or non-existence of those objects. The term epoché, however, when the suspension is universal, is sometimes used simply to refer to the phenomenological reduction itself. See also CONSTITUTION.

ESSENCE. Essence is an ontological category that refers to the necessary and universal, that is, the a priori, structures that make a thing an instance of the kind of thing it is. Husserl also refers to an essence as an eidos. Essences can be morphological essences or exact essences. See also EIDETIC REDUCTION; EIDETIC VARIATION; ESSENTIAL INSIGHT.

ESSENTIAL INSIGHT. Intuitions of pure essences are directed toward particular types of objects and their defining characteristics, whether this occur at the level of species, genus, or region. In essential insight there is a determined material content in the universal which renders it inapplicable to any object whatsoever but definitive of and applicable to a particular kind of object or to an object having a particular property or attribute. Because of the presence of this materially determinate core, Husserl claims that essential insight (as well as idealization) yields a material a priori or, alternately, a contingent a priori. The propositions enunciating such insights express synthetic a priori laws. Even in the case of the material a priori, formal a priori conditions hold; the material region, genus, or species, in other words, must satisfy all the requirements of the formal a priori binding all objects. But there is added to these conditions a material core which as a contingent matter of fact, that is, as dependent upon a material core gathered from experience, limits the variations that can be performed and thereby limits, again as a contingent matter of fact, the discoverable a priori truths governing objects possessing that material core.

Since the discovery of the a priori of physical bodies (Körper) or of animate bodies (Leiber) is limited by the formal a priori of objects in
general, all physical things and all living things alike must be individual objects entering into relations with other objects. But in addition to possessing the formal properties of objects, physical bodies and animate organisms must possess a materially determinate core of properties belonging only to a subset of all things. Physical bodies, for example, must be spatially individuated, possess sensible qualities (of some, not yet determinate type), and have causal relations with other material things. Animate organisms, however, possess a more fully determined material core. In addition to the properties belonging to all objects and to all material things, living things must manifest a particular kind of causality whereby they cause changes in themselves, for example, the changes wrought by exercises of the nutritive or locomotive powers.

ESSENTIAL INTUITION. See ESSENTIAL INSIGHT.

ESSENTIALLY SUBJECTIVE EXPRESSIONS. See OCCASIONAL EXPRESSIONS.

ETHICS. While Husserl in his lifetime published only very little in the field of ethics, his philosophy has a moral urgency manifested most clearly in his notion of authenticity as self-determination and self-responsibility. Moreover, he devoted several lecture courses to and wrote several unpublished essays on related issues in formal axiology, formal theory of practice (formal praxiology), ethical renewal, the notion of community, and an ethics of love. Husserl’s ethical views changed after World War I, after, that is, the death of one son and injury to another in that war. His early ethics tries to fashion a middle ground between intellectualist formalism in ethics—a view that would deny the feelings a role in our moral life—and mere emotivism or sentimentalism—a view that would deny reason a role in our moral life.

Husserl argues that there can be no act of willing apart from an evaluative act and that the evaluative act, while founded upon an objectifying act, necessarily includes a moment of feeling. Nevertheless, the act of willing is subject to rational constraints, but not the formal logic of non-contradiction at work in the theoretical sciences. The idea is that certain volitions, while not formally contradictory, would nevertheless be irrational (for example, willing an end but no means to that end). Moreover, evaluations and volitions must have their appropriate evidence or “truth.”

Husserl’s later ethics develops more fully the notions of the self-determining, self-responsible, autonomous and authentic agent. Such self-determination requires commitments to personal values, to a sense of
integrity, and to vocational goods that are realized over a lifetime and in a community of individuals, each of whom is (or ought to be) striving toward a similar self-realization. See also AUTONOMY; EVALUATION; VALUE APPERCEPTION; VOLITION.

**EVALUATION.** Evaluation is the valuing of an object. Valuing an object is an act in which one grasps the value attributes of an object in a feeling or emotion. The valuing act is founded on an objectifying act, and correlative, the value attribute is founded on the descriptive properties of the object, that is, those properties that could be given in a straightforwardly perceptual act (Wahrnehmung). To grasp the value attribute of an object is to feel the worth (Wertnehmen) of the descriptive properties, either simply as pleasing or displeasing, or as useful or inutile, or as aesthetically commendable or not, or morally choiceworthy or praiseworthy or blameworthy, and so forth. The taking of the thing as valuable can be expressly articulated in a value judgment and expressed in an axiological claim. See also AXIOLOGY; PERCEPTION (Wahrnehmung); VALUE APPERCEPTION (Wertnehmung).

**EVIDENCE.** Evidence is the experience of the agreement between what is meant—the emply intended or intending sense—and what is given—the fulfilling sense. In the case of judgment, for example, evidence is the act in which I am aware of the agreement (the congruence) between the sense of an assertion and the given state of affairs. This formulation should not be read to suggest that the empty intending of the sense is temporally prior to the experience of what is given in a fulfilling intention, although that is possible. It is possible to articulate a state of affairs while it is given; the evidence is the act experiencing the fact that the articulation grasps the thing as given. See also APOPHANSIS; EMPTY INTENTION; PRINCIPLE OF PRINCIPLES.

**EXACT ESSENCE.** An exact essence is one that can be given a mathematical or purely formal expression. Exact essences, therefore, are apprehended in idealizing or formalizing abstractions. In the case of idealized essences, there is a limit toward which the series of individuals instantiating the essence are ordered. In the case of formalized essences, there is a logical or mathematical formulation that applies unambiguously to all objects. Exact essences precisely delimit their instantiations. See also EXACT EXPRESSION; EXACTNESS; FORMALIZATION; IDEALIZATION; MORPHOLOGICAL ESSENCE.
EXACT EXPRESSION. Exact expressions are those having a single meaning identical in all their applications. Such expressions refer to exact essences clearly and distinctly conceived. The grasp of such essences involves processes of idealization or formalization. See also CLARITY; DISTINCTNESS; EXACTNESS; VAGUE EXPRESSIONS; VAGUENESS.

EXACTNESS. Exactness is opposed to vagueness and is predicated of mathematical formulations that express the essences of idealizable or formalizable features of objects. See also FORMALIZATION; IDEALIZATION.

EXPERIENCE (erleben, Erlebnis; erfahren, Erfahrung). The English noun “experience” translates the two German nouns Erlebnis and Erfahrung, and the English verb “to experience” translates the German verbs erleben and erfahren. When translating Erlebnis, “experience” refers to something lived through. When translating Erfahrung, “experience” refers to encountering or undergoing (something), and this captures the intentionality of conscious experience. Most experiences for Husserl have both of these dimensions: they are lived through directedness to objects. Even when the act is not fully objectifying, there will still be an intentional directedness that characterizes the lived through experience, for example, an awareness of my own bodily states or moods or of a generalized condition in which subject and object are not yet as fully distinguished as they are in cognition (as in, “It’s hot today”). See also ENCOUNTER (erfahren, Erfahrung); OBJECTIFYING ACT.

EXPLANATION. Explanations respond to “why” questions by identifying the causal mechanisms at work in producing the effect in question. An explanatory science is a logically organized set of causal principles and explanations. Explanatory sciences are theoretical sciences as distinguished from descriptive sciences.

EXPRESSION. An expression is a meaningful sign. Husserl distinguishes four moments in expressions: the physical sign (the written marks on paper or the audible complex of sounds) that carries meaning; the act indicated by physical sign, whose act-quality is expressive and that confers meaning on the sign; the meaning of the sign, what the sign expresses; and the relation (reference) of the sign to something objective (the referent of the expression). See also EXPRESSIVE ACT; INDICATION; SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION; SIGNITIVE INTENTION.
EXPRESSIVE ACT. An expressive act is an act that confers meaning on a sensible sign and thereby directs attention to the referent of the sign. See also EXPRESSION; SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION; SIGNITIVE INTENTION.

FACTICITY. “Facticity” is a Heideggerian term, but there is a sense in which Husserl also recognizes the facticity of experience. In Husserl’s case, there is an irreducible element of the particular and the contingent that belongs (essentially) to one’s experience of the world, and is referred to by some commentators as the “factual” element of experience or the “facticity” of an individual’s experience. See also PASSIVE GENESIS; PASSIVE SYNTHESIS.

FARBER, MARVIN (1901–1980). Marvin Farber—along with Dorion Cairns, Aron Gurwitsch, and Alfred Schutz at the New School for Social Research in New York City—was influential in introducing Husserl’s phenomenology to the United States; indeed, he was perhaps the most influential person in so doing insofar as he was the first. Farber, along with Cairns, was one of the few American students to study with Husserl in Freiburg. He completed his dissertation at Harvard University, and he had a long career teaching primarily at the University of Buffalo. His work titled The Foundation of Phenomenology presented—not without criticism—Husserl’s early philosophy, more specifically his Philosophy of Arithmetic and Logical Investigations to English readers. Farber’s exposition did not extend into Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Farber, as did many of Husserl’s students, rejected the transcendental turn as a turn into idealism. Farber instead argued for a naturalistic phenomenology that could serve as a basis for a rigorously scientific philosophy. He was instrumental in establishing the International Phenomenological Society and founding the journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, which is published by the Society and whose title echoes that of Husserl’s Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung). See also NATURALISM.

FEELING. Husserl distinguishes two kinds of feelings: feeling-acts and feeling-sensations. The latter are those sensory affects that do not bear the mark of intentionality, for example, the sensible pain one feels after
breaking a bone or when one has a headache or a toothache. The feeling-sensations of pain are referred neither to the bone nor the head nor the tooth as an object of awareness. Nor are they referred to what broke the bone or caused the headache or toothache as their object. The pain is referred to the person (including the bodily parts of that person) who experiences it as its subject, rather than its object. While the pain is related to what causes it, this is a real, rather than an intentional, relation. Feelings-acts, on the other hand, which involve feeling-sensations as moments, are intentional; they are referred to something as their object. So, for example, liking and disliking are the liking and disliking of something; joy and sadness are joy and sadness in something, and so forth. See also EMOTION; MOOD.

FEELING-ACT. See FEELING.

FEELING-SENSATION. See FEELING.

FIGURAL MOMENT. A sensible characteristic that attaches to an aggregate, for example, a flock of geese flying overhead or a triangle of dots. The perception of the aggregate is not the collecting of a multiplicity of perceptions of individual geese. Nor is the aggregate judged to be a collection. It is immediately given as a flock or a triangle, immediately perceived as a flock or triangle. The sensible characteristic that is the figural moment pertains not to the individual elements of the aggregate, but to the organization of those elements. The group formed by the figural moment is perceived not as a mere plurality, but as an organized group. The figural moment, then, serves as the basis for the perceptual intention of an unarticulated collection. The group figurally formed is not an explicitly articulated categorial object that is a collection or a set. It is not explicitly constituted as a collection in an act of collecting or judging.

FINK, EUGEN (1905–1975). Eugen Fink in 1928 became Husserl’s last private assistant at Freiburg, and he was an important figure in helping to secure Husserl’s extensive Nachlass from the Nazis and in transcribing these manuscripts. After the manuscripts were transferred to Leuven, Belgium in 1938, Fink, in 1939, traveled to Leuven to continue work on the manuscripts. He was returned to Germany by German authorities after the invasion of Belgium. After the war he was appointed (in 1945) to a professorship at Freiburg.

While serving as Husserl’s assistant, Fink organized Husserl’s latest manuscripts, and he is perhaps best known for his response, on behalf of Husserl, to criticisms by the Neo-Kantians. This response, titled “Die
FORM

FORM. Form is that which unifies elements (matter) into a complex whole. Husserl discusses forms at the perceptual level (figural moments) and at the judgmental level (categorial form). Categorial forms are found not only in the cognitive or theoretical domain, but also in the axiological and practical. When pure forms are abstracted from objects, the forms themselves become objects for the formal sciences. See also APOPHATIC LOGIC; FORMAL LOGIC; FORMAL MATHEMATICS; FORMAL ONTOLOGY; FORMALIZATION; LOGIC; MATHEMATICAL LOGIC; PURE LOGIC.

FORMAL A PRIORI. The formal a priori is apprehended through formalization and holds true for all objects. The systematic development of a set of a priori truths regarding any object whatsoever yields the purely formal, a priori science of objects as such, which Husserl calls “formal ontology.” See also FORMAL LOGIC; FORMAL MATHEMATICS; MATERIAL A PRIORI; PURE LOGIC.

phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik” (“The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism”), appeared in Kantstudien in 1933 and was explicitly endorsed by Husserl as containing “no sentence which I [Husserl] could not completely accept as my own or openly acknowledge as my own conviction.” How literally to take such an endorsement is a matter of some controversy, especially since Fink’s positions seem in certain places to go beyond anything Husserl himself said either in his publications or Nachlass. But Fink at that time—a dark time in Husserl’s life—was one of Husserl’s few remaining philosophical allies, and this fact undoubtedly contributed to Husserl’s embrace of Fink’s article. Fink also composed a set of writings intended as a commentary on Husserl’s Cartesiansche Meditationen and meant to underlie Husserl’s revisions of the Meditationen and to extend the train of thought found in them. These writings have come to be known as the Sixth Cartesian Meditation.

Fink’s own dissertation (Vergegenwärtigung und Bild) was a phenomenological study of imagination carried out in a Husserlian spirit. However, Fink’s work gradually began to extend Husserl’s phenomenology in both Heideggerian and Hegelian directions. Indeed, Fink’s later work, after his appointment at Freiburg in 1945, went in new, metaphysical directions quite different from anything Husserl himself espoused. In particular, Fink embraced an “ontological method” that he viewed as more fundamental than the phenomenological method Husserl championed.
FORMAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC (Formale und transcendental Logik). In many ways Husserl’s most elegant work, this essay in the philosophy of logic was published in 1929 after a decade in which Husserl’s courses and research had frequently devoted themselves to the development of what Husserl called “transcendental logic.” In these courses Husserl tried to work out the subjective achievements in which objects come to presence in passive syntheses and are actively articulated in active synthesis, that is, in judgments. He further shows how the proposition in its specifically logical character is constituted. This transcendental logic, therefore, is the attempt to disclose how the categories that govern objects and judgments arises in our experience.

As indicated by the title, the work is divided into two parts. The treatment of formal logic explores two traditions in philosophical logic, the apophantic logic derived from Aristotle and the mathematical logic that begins with Francisca Vieta’s syllogistic algebra and culminates in Gottfried Leibniz’s version of a mathesis universalis. Husserl distinguishes three levels of logic (pure logical grammar, the logic of consistency, and the logic of truth). He interprets the mathematical tradition as a formal ontology and explores the way in which a proper understanding of the logic of truth reveals the fundamental unity of the apophantic logic and formal ontology.

The second part of the book turns toward transcendental logic. Husserl begins by summarizing the arguments against psychologism. As was the case in the Logical Investigations, Husserl shows that the domain of the logical, with its objectivity and ideality, cannot be grounded in the psychological sciences. Instead, he claims, the grounding of logic must be found in a phenomenological science that can account for the disclosure of objects, states of affairs, and propositions. Transcendental logic, therefore, is, in a sense, the transcendental phenomenology of the apophantic and mathematical domains. Husserl warns here against a new danger, that of a transcendental psychologism that would understand transcendental consciousness as constructive, rather than disclosive, of the world and that would thereby reduce objective categories to those of transcendental subjectivity.

FORMAL APOPHANTICS. See APOPHANTIC LOGIC; FORMAL LOGIC; PURE LOGIC.

FORMAL AXIOLOGY. In developing his ethical theory, Husserl identified two formal sciences—formal axiology and the formal theory of practice—that he thought analogous to formal logic. Just as formal logic concerns itself with the formal possibilities for the combination of
FORMAL GRAMMAR

meanings, formal axiology concerns itself with the formal possibilities for the combination of axiological meanings. To take Husserl’s analogy seriously would lead to the expectation that there are levels in formal axiology analogous to those in formal logic. The first “grammatical” level would have to do, then, with the possible forms of value judgments wherein value attributes are “predicated” of objects and wherein axiological meanings are brought into conjunctive, disjunctive, and hypothetical relationships. At the second level, these individual axiological judgments would be ordered into consistent unities. Since, the consistency of a judgment with other judgments is not the same as its truth, the correctness of an evaluative judgment and of the actions executed on its basis do not lie exclusively in the consistency of a practical conclusion with its premises. The premises and thereby the conclusion must also be evident. See also EVIDENCE.

FORMAL GRAMMAR. See PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.

FORMAL LOGIC. Formal logic is the science that studies meaning-categories and argument-forms. Husserl in Formale und transzendentale Logik (Formal and Transcendental Logic), his most mature logical treatise, distinguishes two different approaches in the tradition that makes up the science of logic. The first is the Aristotelian logic that examines the apophansis, the assertive judgment in which something is predicated of or in a subject. Emptying such judgments of their material content, Aristotle discloses the forms that belong to judgments, their structure, and their combinations. Apophantic logic is rooted, therefore, in the concept of the judgment-form.

The second approach to logic is via Franciscus Vieta’s development of the mathematical formalization appropriate to algebra. This allows one to speak of form as that which is applicable to anything whatsoever apart from all material determination, and it yields a formal theory of objects that Husserl calls formal ontology. When applied to the specific domain of judgment, this formal analysis yields a syllogistic algebra (as in Augustus De Morgan and George Boole).

Formal logic is a formal theory of science, a unified theory that would govern any theoretically explanatory, nomological, and deductive science. Hence, formal apophantic logic would develop the understanding of such notions as judgment or proposition, subject, predicate, syllogism, and so forth. In addition, however, and on the other hand, we find a correlative set of forms—“object-categories” (Gegenstandskategorien)—that includes notions such as object, state of affairs, relation, unity, plurality, and number, and so forth, as well as sets and set-relationships. Husserl’s
claim in the *Logical Investigations* is that these meaning-categories and object-categories, as well as the laws appropriate to each, are correlates. The treatment of formal logic in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* surpasses that in the *Logical Investigations* in clarifying not so much the difference, that is, the correlation, between apophatics and mathematical logic understood as the formal theory of objects, but their unity, their identity-in-correlation.

Husserl also distinguishes three levels of logic: pure logical grammar, which governs the formation of well-formed propositions and wherein propositional meanings are brought into conjunctive, disjunctive, and hypothetical relationships; the logic of consistency or non-contradiction, which governs the formation of arguments; and the logic of truth, which concerns the soundness of arguments as secured by the fulfilling intention that is the evidence for the truth of the premises. It is in relation to this third level of logic that the unity of formal logic and formal ontology is secured. Formal ontology results when we articulate systematically the formal structures and relations experienced in our straightforward encounter with objects as well as the operations that can be performed involving these forms and relations. Formal logic arises when we consider these same formal structures, relations, and the combinations produced by logical operations as supposed, as meanings. The meaning-forms are teleologically ordered in the logic of truth toward fulfillment in our recognition of object-forms. If our suppositions are confirmed in fulfilling experiences, then we recognize the identity that obtains between the meaning-forms and object-forms. See also CONGRUENCE; PURE LOGIC.

**FORMAL MATHEMATICS.** Formal mathematics forms a unity with formal logic. Husserl’s development of Gottfried Leibniz’s notion of mathesis universalis recognized the identity of formal, apophantic logic with mathematical logic. Nevertheless, formal mathematics is distinguished from formal logic insofar as formal mathematics is concerned only with consistency, whereas formal logic also ultimately includes an interest in truth. Hence, formal mathematics operates at the second level of logic—the logic of consistency or non-contradiction—and it does not have the constraints that the ultimate concern with truth imposes on formal logic. The mathematician, in other words, can employ a mathematical imagination in the construction of new mathematical objects without the concern for the actual existence of these objects. The evidence required for the presentation of such mathematical objects is distinctness, and the mathematician is not concerned with the further question of clarity in which the object is given as actually existent.
FORMAL ONTOLOGY. Formal ontology is the formal science of objects. It arose, in Husserl’s view, out of mathematical logic, specifically Franciscus Vieta’s development, on the basis of his understanding of algebraic formalization, of a notion of form as applicable to any objectivity at all, anything whatsoever. On this view the notion of form involves a thoroughly empty universality that leaves every material determination indeterminately arbitrary. Gottfried Leibniz, according to Husserl, developed his notion of mathesis universalis from this idea. Leibniz attempted to unite systematically the logical tradition derived from Aristotelian apophantic logic with the formal mathematical analysis set in motion by Vieta; he attempted, not fully successfully in Husserl’s view, to combine formalized scholastic logic with other formal disciplines devoted to the forms that governed, for example, quantity or spatial relations or magnitude.

For Leibniz, then, logic and mathematics were to form a single science. Leibniz distinguished between a narrower and a broader sense of mathesis universalis. In the narrower sense, it is the algebra of our ordinary understanding, the formal science of quantities. But since the formalization at work in algebra already makes conceivable a purely formal mathematical analysis that abstracts from the materially determinate mathematical disciplines such as geometry, mechanics, and acoustics, we arrive at a broader concept emptied of all material content, even that of quantity. Applied to propositions, this mathematical analysis yields the syllogistic algebra of Augustus De Morgan and George Boole. Since this formal analysis of judgment ought to be combinable with all other formal analyses, there is, however, a broader notion of mathesis universalis that identifies the forms of combination applicable in any science, whether quantitative or qualitative. This mathesis universalis achieves a formality allowing it to serve as the theory-form for any science, whatever the material region to which that science is directed.

It is in the light of this broader conception of mathesis universalis that Husserl interprets the new mathematical logic—the mathematics of sums and sets and relations—as formal ontology. Formal ontology as the formal theory of objects, in other words, is characterized in the first instance by its contrast with formal apophantic logic. Formal ontology investigates a set of forms—correlative to those we find in apophantic logic—that Husserl calls “object-categories” (Gegenstandskategorien). These categories include object, state of affairs, unity, plurality, number, relation, set, ordered set, combination, connection, and the like. More fundamentally, however, formal ontology is characterized by its unity with formal apophantic logic, since meaning-categories and object-categories
are the same forms considered differently in the natural and critical attitudes.

**FORMAL PRAXIOLOGY.** See FORMAL THEORY OF PRACTICE.

**FORMAL THEORY OF PRACTICE** (*formale Praktik*). The formal science governing the sphere of practical reason and volition. It comprises a complex of principles and laws that abstract from the “matter” of the maxims and principles that motivate action. Just as logic as a theory of science plays a governing role with respect to cognition, the formal theory of practice is a formal “logical” science that plays a governing role with respect to practical reason and volition. This is Husserl’s version of a deontic logic, that is, a logic that governs “ought”-statements. Adherence to its laws yields “logically” well-formed practical judgments and consistency in our moral beliefs and practice; the laws of practical consistency are laws, Husserl believes, of rational motivation. When a well-formed practical proposition claims that we must perform some action, say, in order to achieve some good, the necessity here is not purely logical, and it is certainly not natural or physical. The law asserts that a rational person, given a desire for that particular good, ought to perform that action; it asserts, in other words, that not to perform that action, given the desire for that good, is irrational. As was the case with the logic, we must go beyond mere formal consistency in the practical order to evident judgment, that is, to something like a practical logic of truth. See also EVIDENCE.

**FORMALIZATION.** Formalization is that species of abstraction that occurs when the similar property seized upon is a property of any conceivable object whatsoever. Hence, the universals identified are such as to belong to all genera and species of objects and to every possible individual existent. Formalization can occur either directly from our experience and imaginative variation of objects, from the generalizations achieved by empirical or pure, essential abstraction, or by way of arithmeticizing the exact essences realized in idealizations. Formalizing abstractions isolate the a priori features belonging to any object whatsoever. See also EIDETIC VARIATION.

**FOUNDATION.** Husserl’s notion of foundation is related to his notions of whole and moment. One moment is founded on another if there is an essential law stating that one moment, for example, visual color, cannot exist or be presented apart from another moment, say, visual extension. More generally, any moment A requires foundation by (or is founded
upon) another moment \( B \) if \( A \) cannot exist as such except in a more comprehensive unity that associates it with \( B \). In recognizing a part as a moment, in other words, we grasp an essential necessity—the necessary connection between this moment and the other moments necessarily supplementing it in the formation of a whole—and this essential necessity rests on an objective, ideal law. We recognize that it is universally and necessarily the case according to the very sense of the objects involved that a moment of this type be presented with moments of other specific types in the formation of wholes of certain species. In the terms of our example, it is in conformity with a non-empirical, universal, and unconditionally valid lawfulness that the existence of a content belonging to the pure species ‘color’ presupposes and unites itself with the existence of contents of the pure species ‘extension.’ The color-content is related to the extension-content as one moment to an associated moment and is related to the colored thing it forms with extension as a moment to the whole. Color, in brief, can in general exist only when combined with extension in general in a colored, extended thing.

These laws relating moments receive a formal statement through this notion of foundation. Again in terms of our example, we can say that if the kinds \( A \) (color) and \( B \) (extension) stand in the indicated relation, and if \( A_1 \) (this red) and \( B_1 \) (this triangular shape) are instances of the pure kinds \( A \) and \( B \), and if \( A_1 \) (this red) and \( B_1 \) (this triangular shape) are actualized in a single whole, then \( A_1 \) (this red) is founded upon \( B_1 \) (this triangular shape) and vice-versa. Moreover, it is exclusively founded on \( B_1 \) if \( A_1 \)’s need for supplementation is satisfied by \( B_1 \) alone. Both \( A_1 \) and \( B_1 \) in particular and \( A \) and \( B \) in specie stand in foundational relationships. To say that \( A_1 \) or \( A \) is founded upon a certain moment plainly means the same as saying that \( A_1 \) or \( A \) requires supplementation by some other part and is, therefore, a non-independent part relative to the whole \( W \) that it forms with \( B_1 \) or \( B \). It is the same as saying that \( A_1 \) or \( A \) is a moment of \( W \).

Moments are foundationally related in different ways to one another and to the wholes whose moments they are. Moments may be related to one another either reciprocally or one-sidedly and either mediately or immediately. Color and extension, for example, are reciprocally related, for each is founded upon and requires supplementation by the other. They are also immediately related to one another insofar as color fills extension and extension delimits color. Brightness and extension, by contrast, are mediately related insofar as their relation requires the presence of color as an intermediary. Brightness is a moment of color, and by virtue of this relation to color, is related to extension, but only mediately, only by virtue of its connection with color and color’s connection with extension. One-sided foundational relations occur when one moment requires another as
its supplement, but the second does not require the first. A **judgment** requires a **founding moment** in which I judge, to which the object about which I judge is presented; the perception, however, does not require the judgment. Similarly, the functional properties of a tool depend on the presence of certain physical properties and features in the tool, but those physical properties do not depend on the functional ones. See also **FOUNDATIONALISM**.

**FOUNDATIONALISM.** Foundationalism is a philosophical position that claims that there are bedrock or fundamental truths that underlie the justification of all other truths. These truths concern the **world** and all other truths about the world are logically derived from them, or they concern the nature of cognition and it is by reference to them that all other **knowledge** is justified. Once these truths are known, in other words, it is possible to determine the **truth** or falsity of all **beliefs**.

There are, broadly speaking, three variants of the foundationalist doctrine: an “empiricistic” version that claims the bedrock truths are the incorrigible reports of immediate sensory **experiences** to which all other truths are logically reducible; a “rationalistic” version in which some non-empirical knowledge, of which we are infallibly or indubitably certain, provides a “**foundation**” for erecting a scientific system by means of deduction; and a “transcendental” version that claims to know necessary and universal structures of cognition and determines the validity of different forms of cognition. On this last view, philosophy is foundationalist because it is a body of truths about other kinds of knowledge or truth.

Husserl is frequently thought to be a foundationalist in the second or third sense (or both), but this view has been challenged. While Husserl is committed to the possibility of a complete, formal system of **logic**, he does not think that we can discover materially determinate truths from which we can deduce all other truths, and so he is not a “rationalistic” foundationalist. Husserl does think that we can determine the legitimacy of a particular experience as, say, a form of scientific thinking—thereby distinguishing it from pseudo-science—and this inclines him toward a “transcendental” foundationalism. But knowing these philosophical truths is insufficient to allow us to decide between competing genuine positions or to determine the truth or falsity of particular propositions. These decisions must be made within the **natural attitude**. And while Husserl is committed to a notion of **apodicticity**, he distinguishes this apodicticity (in practice) from both infallibility and incorrigibility. Finally, while Husserl is clearly committed to a notion of foundations, these foundations are not such as to justify other experiences that are built upon them.
FOUNDED MOMENT. A founded moment is one for which another moment provides a foundation in the formation of a whole. See also FOUNDING MOMENT.

FOUNDING. See FOUNDATION; FOUNDED MOMENT; FOUNDING MOMENT.

FOUNDING MOMENT. A founding moment is one that provides a foundation for some other moment with which it is necessarily associated and for the whole that it forms with its associated moments. See also FOUNDED MOMENT.

FREE PHANTASY. See EIDETIC VARIATION.

FREGE, GOTTLOB (1848–1925). Gottlob Frege, a mathematician and philosopher of logic and mathematics, was a contemporary of Husserl. Although they never met, they shared an interest in problems regarding the foundations of logic and mathematics. They were close readers of one another’s works and correspondents from 1891 to 1906. Both were renowned opponents of psychologism in logic, and both developed understandings of sense (Sinn) and reference in elucidating non-psychologistic positions regarding logic. While Frege’s critical review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic is often credited with having turned Husserl away from psychologism, there is much evidence that Husserl had already begun this turn before the appearance of Frege’s review.

FRUSTRATION. See DISAPPOINTMENT; DISTINCTION.

FULFILLING INTENTION (erfüllende Intention). A fulfilling intention is a full intention whose fulfilling sense fulfills an emptily intended sense by virtue of the act’s possessing intuitive content.

FULFILLING SENSE (erfüllender Sinn). The fulfilling sense is the meaning of a meaning-fulfillment or fulfilling intention. Husserl uses this term in the Logical Investigations in relation to expressions and to the acts that recognize the unity of meaning between the expressive meaning-intention and the intuitively filled meaning-fulfillment. His later thought uses the term “sense” (Sinn) in a more encompassing way and uses the more restrictive term of “meaning” (Bedeutung) for the meaning belonging to expressions. This entails that the notion of fulfilling sense can be more broadly employed to refer to the sense of any act that
fulfills an empty intention. See also SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION; SIGNITIVE INTENTION.

FULFILLMENT (Erfüllung). Fulfillment is the synthesis of identification involved in recognizing the identity of the object as emptily intended in, for example, a signitive intention associated with a linguistic expression and the object as intuitively given. See also DISTINCTION; EMPTY INTENTION; INTUITION; SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION.

FULL INTENTION. A full intention is one that carries presenting contents or re-presenting contents, that is, intuitive fullness, within itself and thereby presents an object in its actual presence. It is opposed to an empty intention that presents an object through linguistic signs and can, therefore, present the object while absent. A full intention must be distinguished from a fulfilling intention. All fulfilling intentions are full intentions, but not all full intentions are fulfilling. A full intention is fulfilling only in relation to an empty intention and only insofar as the full intention presents the object as it has been emptily intended and thereby “satisfies” or “fulfills” the empty intention. See also FULFILLMENT; HYLETIC DATA; SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION; SIGNITIVE INTENTION.

FULL NOEMA. The full noema is the correlate of a noesis or act. The full noema comprises the noematic sense, for example, the table as brown, and a thetic character, for example, belief in the case of perception (Wahrnehmung).

FULLNESS. Fullness is a full intention’s property of being “filled” with presenting contents or re-presenting contents. See also HYLETIC DATA.

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GADAMER, HANS-GEORG (1900–2002). Although Hans-Georg Gadamer was not himself a student of Husserl, he attended lectures by Husserl in Freiburg in 1923. Gadamer’s major work, Truth and Method, develops a philosophical hermeneutics that is based most directly on Martin Heidegger’s discussions of understanding and language in Being and Time but also engages the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Husserl. For Gadamer, the experience of understanding texts and works of art,
especially from other historical periods, is the model for all understanding. Central to this experience is the need to understand the parts of the text in order to understand the whole, and to understand the whole in order to contextualize the parts. This is true not only at the level of an individual text and its parts, but of the individual text considered as a part of the culture from which it arose. Hence, understanding for Gadamer always takes place within a hermeneutic circle and can never be presuppositionless—an ideal toward which Husserl was oriented, although Husserl might have meant only that all presuppositions must constantly be put to a critical test.

Hermeneutical understanding, for Gadamer, arises in the fact that the historical text we encounter is both familiar and strange. It is strange because it dates from another period with different views and mores. It is familiar, however, because those views continue to operate, albeit perhaps in a different way, in our own time and historical situation. Gadamer captures this idea in his notion of ‘effective-historical consciousness’ (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewuβtsein). Any historical consciousness is subject to the effects of effective-history, which is at work in advance as providing an initial schematization for all our possibilities of understanding and in determining both what seems worth investigating and what will appear as an object of investigation. The universe of understanding, therefore, encompasses both the world from which the text springs and the world in which the interpreter is situated; it is the single horizon that embraces everything contained in historical consciousness. This horizon is not acquired by placing ourselves in the past, but by reaching out from the present to the past, to a historical situation, and understanding what it has to say as a response to the questions of its own time and also as still speaking to us, as still making truth-claims upon us. In this way, the interpreter achieves what Gadamer calls a “fusion of horizons,” in which a contemporary understanding is brought into dialogue with a past understanding. This employment of the notion of horizon and its rootedness in Husserl’s reflections on inner time-consciousness marks the chief indebtedness of Gadamer to Husserl.

GEIGER, MORITZ (1880–1937). Moritz Geiger was a member of the Munich Circle whose members were devoted to following the realistic tendencies they saw in Husserl’s Logical Investigations while rejecting the idealistic tendencies in his transcendental phenomenology. Geiger’s work covered a broad range of topics, from mathematics to psychology to aesthetics. It was in the last area that Geiger did some of his most important work. Geiger was an original co-editor of Husserl’s Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Jahrbuch für Philoso-
phie und phänomenologische Philosophie). He also had much contact with American philosophers, serving as visiting professor at Stanford in 1926 and 1935 and, after being deprived of his chair at Göttingen by the Nazis, as a member of the faculty at Vassar College.

GENERAL POSITING. The positing of the world as a spatio-temporal, existent unity that characterizes the natural attitude with its general thesis. See also PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE; PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION.

GENERAL THESIS. Husserl speaks of the general thesis that characterizes the natural attitude. By this he means the thesis that the world, which our natural, straightforward experience continually finds before itself as a single spatio-temporal actuality to which both the experiencing subject and the objects of its experience belong, exists. The world is found before the experiencing subject as a factually existent actuality and as presenting itself to the subject as factually existent. See also GENERAL POSITING.

GENERALIZATION. Generalization is that form of abstraction that grasps morphological essences, that is, that grasps genera and species. Generalizations regarding genera and species can be directed toward independently existing objects, for example, trees, or toward non-independent moments of those objects, for example, colors. One can, in other words, grasp a substantival universal at the level of either species or genus, for example, tree in general and plant in general, or we can grasp an adjectival universal at the level of either species or genus, for example, green in general and color in general. In the case of substantival universals, however, a still higher level of generality is possible, that of the region. The recognition of patterns of similarity among objects grounds the specific, generic, and regional concepts, that is, the awareness of the universal objects species, genus, and region. We abstract what is similar from the objects, focusing our attention not on the multiplicity of similars but the identical feature by virtue of which they are similar. We thereby apprehend the ideal objects we call universals. These concepts are not exactly formed; they can be somewhat vague and imprecise grasplings of an identical element in all the objects possessing the similar characteristic and to be ordered under the universal. When our abstractions are based solely on actual, worldly examples as we perceive or remember them, we arrive at an empirical generalization, an empirical concept, say, of a material thing or of a tree or of green. When our abstractions are based not only on actual examples but systematically, by means of eidetic variation, consider possible cases as well as actual, we arrive at the ideal,
a priori concept of an essence. See also FORMALIZATION; IDEALIZATION.

GENERATIVE COMMUNITY. A generative community is one that is historical and intergenerational. Hence, a generative community is characterized by biological kinship and a common cultural ancestry. See also GENERATIVITY.

GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY. While Husserl uses the term “generativity” to point to a certain class of issues involving historical and social relations in which transcendental subjectivity is ensnared, he does not himself employ the expression “generative phenomenology.” However, some commentators consider the extension of genetic phenomenology into this class of issues, that is, into what might also be called “generative problems,” to be a distinctive kind of phenomenology beyond static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology. Generative phenomenology, then, extends beyond the horizon of the genetic account of transcendental subjectivity and of the sense of things by taking into consideration these “generative” relations and by explicating how the historical and intersubjective structures of these relations become meaningful for an experiencing consciousness. See also GENERATIVE COMMUNITY.

GENERATIVE PROBLEMS. Generative problems are those that arise on the basis of generativity and that are approached through generative phenomenology. They include problems such as the opposition between normality and abnormality, the opposition between home-world and alien world, “transcendental birth” and “transcendental death,” and the intergenerational constitution of sense.

GENERATIVITY. Husserl employs the term “generativity” to capture the two senses of generation: (a) becoming; and (b) the historical and social notion of generations. Hence, generativity denotes an intersubjective or intergenerational becoming that is at once historical (successive generations) and simultaneous (contemporaneous generations with different histories). See also GENERATIVE COMMUNITY; GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY; GENERATIVE PROBLEMS

GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY. Genetic phenomenology is contrasted with static phenomenology. Whereas static phenomenology identifies the structures of fully constituted objects and the acts in which they are presented, genetic phenomenology analyzes the coming-to-be (the
“becoming” or genesis) of those fully constituted **objectivities** with their particular **significance**. Hence, genetic phenomenology is first made possible by Husserl’s analyses of **inner time-consciousness**, but genetic phenomenology is not reducible merely to the analyses of time-consciousness. Genetic phenomenology is concerned with the building up of **sense** through **time**.

Insofar as a **phenomenological analysis** might begin with an already constituted **objectivity**, genetic phenomenology is concerned to uncover the “origins” of the layers of sedimented sense that characterize that objectivity and the transformations of that sense over time. This entails exploring the **horizons** against which an object is given in order to disclose how the background against which and the context within which the object is presented contribute to its sense for us. The building up of sense over time can occur in both **passive syntheses** and **active syntheses**, and a genetic phenomenology is devoted to the analyses of both kinds of **synthesis**. **Active synthesis** must be understood against the background of the passively constituted materials with which active synthesizing works. Ultimately, the analysis of passive syntheses takes the phenomenologist back to the roots of all syntheses in the productive achievements of a bodily, mobile, and self-temporalizing **subjectivity**. See also CONSTITUTION; GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY.

**GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY.** Husserl contrasts genetic psychology with **descriptive psychology**. Genetic psychology is a **theoretical science** that seeks to explain behavior by identifying the causes of **psychic acts** and states. See also DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE; EXPLANATION.

**GESTALT.** A **Gestalt** is a **form** unifying the constituent **parts** of a **whole**, but it is not a form that is added to the parts. Instead, the formation arises out of the functional interrelations of the parts themselves. See also GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY; MOMENT.

**GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY.** Gestalt psychology is most closely associated with a group of Berlin psychologists including Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, and Wolfgang Köhler. The Gestalt psychologists rejected the prevalent “atomism” of the empirical **psychology** of their time, arguing instead that the primary phenomenon on which psychologists ought to reflect and which they ought to explain are formed **wholes** (Gestalten), whose constituent **parts** are functionally interrelated in such a way that their **meaning** and **significance** depends upon their functional role in the whole. The principles of the Gestalt psychologists find a parallel in the Husserlian notion of **figural moments** and Husserl’s claim that **moments**
of a whole are necessarily interrelated in their mutual supplementation and that no additional moment of unity has to be added to the parts to account for their unification in a whole. Gestalt psychology was a major influence on the work of Aron Gurwitsch and the early Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

**GIVENNESS.** Givenness is the condition of being given to consciousness as an object. It is associated with the notions of an object’s presence to consciousness and the disclosure of the object in the process of constitution.

**GÖTTINGEN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.** The Society was one of two phenomenological circles that were begun by students of Husserl during his early years of teaching at Göttingen. The Society was begun around 1907 as an informal discussion group. Chief among its members were Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Alexandre Koyré, Jean Héring, Roman Ingarden, Fritz Kaufmann, and Edith Stein. These early members of the Society were attracted by Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, and by and large they did not follow him in his turn to transcendental idealism, preferring a “realist” understanding of phenomenology. After 1910 the Society was formally organized with Conrad-Martius as chairwoman, and Max Scheler became its most prominent figure. See also MUNICH CIRCLE.

**GURWITSCH, ARON (1901–1973).** Aron Gurwitsch was not formally a student of Husserl, but he did work closely with him after 1920. Gurwitsch was concerned to formulate a phenomenology with close contacts with psychology, especially the psychological positions developed by William James, Jean Piaget, and the Gestalt psychologists. Gurwitsch’s most influential work was his *Théorie du champ de la conscience* (The Field of Consciousness); in this and other works he developed a noematically oriented phenomenology of perceptual and theoretical experience. His most important contributions concerned the application of Gestaltist principles within phenomenology and his development of the distinctions between the theme, the field, and the margin of consciousness. While in his *Habilitation* titled *Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt* (Human Encounters in the Social World) he turned his attention to issues in social philosophy, these investigations were never as fully developed as his work on perception and the theory of science. Gurwitsch was very influential in introducing phenomenology to North America. After fleeing Europe just before World War II, he held positions at Johns Hopkins University, Brandeis Univer-
sity, and for many years at the New School for Social Research in New York. See also HORIZON; NOEMA.

– H –

HABITUALITY. A habituality is a habitual conviction. Once an evident judgment has been achieved, that is, once the truth of a judgmental or propositional sense has been recognized in the kind of experience that Husserl calls “evidence,” that judgment with its judged state of affairs becomes an abiding possession of the judger. The person lives “permanently” in the conviction of that judgment—and, by extension, in the conviction of any evident act—and can return to it over and over again in her understanding of the sense of the object about which the judgment has been made. This return to the judgment as evident is possible even when the judged state of affairs is not present at the moment of the re-assertion of the judgment. Such a habituality lends assurance and confidence in the judgment to the person as she carries on in life without having to be forced constantly to renew evidences at every turn. The person develops a “habitual” style of thinking, feeling, willing, and acting—in short, of experiencing the world. These habitualities, this habitual style, constitute the personality and exhibit the character of the subject. See also PROPOSITION; VOLITION.

HARTMANN, NICOLAI (1882–1950). Nicolai Hartmann, trained as a neo-Kantian, was the successor to Paul Natorp at Marburg. Hartmann had a somewhat ambivalent relation to Husserl and phenomenology. While Hartmann was sympathetic to the work of phenomenological description, he had reservations about Husserl’s phenomenological method. Hartmann preferred to maintain an ontological dimension in his philosophy, and he feared that Husserl’s phenomenological reduction rendered that impossible. His main connections to the phenomenological movement were with Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler. Hartmann overlapped with Heidegger on the faculty at Marburg for two years—although this was not a happy situation for Hartmann since Heidegger’s personality in the classroom weakened Hartmann’s position. Hartmann came into direct contact with Scheler after moving to Cologne in 1925, and he shared with Scheler a profound interest in ethics. Hartmann’s major work is his Ethik (Ethics), which is the closest Hartmann would come to an explicitly phenomenological work, albeit in the realistic vein characteristic of the Munich School and Scheler. Nevertheless, Hartmann always remained
interested in developing a critical ontology that surpassed what he understood to be the limitations of phenomenology.

**HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1889–1976).** Martin Heidegger is after Husserl the central figure in the development of phenomenology. Profoundly influenced by Husserl’s development of phenomenology, Heidegger nevertheless developed a position that, although continuous with Husserl’s phenomenology in many respects, moved beyond it in fundamental ways.

Heidegger’s early studies were of the classics and the Catholic philosophical and theological traditions. He was introduced to Franz Brentano’s study of the equivocity of the Aristotelian notion of being, and he subsequently turned to Brentano’s student Husserl, and in particular to Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, to see if he might find assistance in understanding Brentano’s account of Aristotle. Instead he found in Husserl, and especially in the sixth of Husserl’s investigations, an original thinker who emphasized the objectivity of truth in a manner consistent with the Catholic tradition, but who also emphasized that our experience of the being of a thing is a categorial achievement of subjectivity. This suggested to Heidegger that the problem of being could only be investigated by way of investigating the being of the being who encounters and understands beings. This is the phenomenological and transcendental insight at the core of Heidegger’s philosophy: we must study at once and in their unity both the being of the being who comprehends beings and the being of the beings comprehended. In Heidegger’s hands, then, phenomenology becomes fundamental ontology, the study of the Being of beings.

Heidegger was not formally a student of Husserl. Heidegger’s interest in Husserl, and especially in the *Investigations*, predates his first meeting with Husserl, which occurred after Husserl’s move to Freiburg in 1916. Heidegger’s formal education was already complete by the time of this meeting, and Heidegger had already commenced his own teaching and publishing career. It was only after World War I that Husserl and Heidegger began a close, but ill-fated, collaboration, epitomized by their failed attempt in the 1920s to co-author an article on phenomenology for the *Encyclopedia Brittanica*. In January 1919, Heidegger became Husserl’s assistant while also serving as Privatdozent in Freiburg. From 1919 until 1923, when he left for a position at Marburg, Heidegger regularly offered courses in phenomenology, and he continued offering such courses at Marburg, where he maintained contact with Husserl. In 1928 Heidegger returned to Freiburg as Husserl’s successor.

Heidegger’s philosophical work in the 1920s is profoundly transcendental and phenomenological in character, even as he moves away from
Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology. Heidegger’s great philosophical (and phenomenological) work is *Sein und Zeit (Being and Time)*, published in 1927. The major philosophical difference between Husserl and Heidegger that emerges in that work can be understood in methodological terms. Although Heidegger makes the same kind of reflective move as found in Husserl’s **phenomenological reduction**—one that focuses on the unity of the experiencing agent and the experienced world—Heidegger insists that he is not performing Husserl’s reduction. By this insistence, Heidegger rejects what he takes to be the idealistic turn in Husserl’s philosophy. Heidegger understands this idealistic turn as bringing the **world** into subjective **immanence** and as failing to recognize adequately the **transcendence** of the world.

For Heidegger the transcendence of the world manifests itself in the fact that we find ourselves “thrown” into a world that is always already there for us. Conversely, according to Heidegger, insofar as the transcendence of the world is not fully accounted for and the world becomes “immanent” to **consciousness**, the nature of subjectivity is inadequately thematized. Indeed, Heidegger’s main criticism of Husserl is that Husserl cannot account for the being of the **intentional**, that is, the being of the being who is intentional. Heidegger’s philosophy, then, becomes a fundamental ontology, the ontology of that being (*Dasein*) which **has** a world. Since, however, Husserl often speaks of **transcendental subjectivity** in the same terms, the dispute between Husserl and the Heidegger of the 1920s appears to be about how best to characterize this being that has a world, about what categories are most appropriate for the **phenomenological description** of this being.

Husserl, for his part, rejects Heidegger’s work as a kind of **anthropologism**. Husserl’s view is that by not fully making a turn to **transcendental subjectivity**, Heidegger is simply giving an account of the **subject** in the world rather than the subject that **has** a world, that is of and for the world. However, while it is clear that Heidegger is concerned to develop an account of the essential structures of human subjectivity, rather than of **reason** as such, it is also clear that his account is what Husserl would call “eidetic” and “descriptive,” that is, it is phenomenological and not merely psychological or anthropological. Each of these thinkers was fiercely committed to his own point of view, and neither seemed able to interpret the other’s view sympathetically or to find a common ground, although there was in fact much common ground between them.

This methodological difference has its roots in more substantive differences, for at least some of this failure to find common ground arose no doubt as a consequence of the fact that Heidegger was doing something quite different from Husserl. Heidegger criticized Husserl for too exclu-
Heidegger, on the other hand, from the beginning of his phenomenological investigations, was concerned with human experience in the fullness of its affective and practical dimensions, dimensions which, although not without cognitive moments, were not primarily cognitive. His focus on the existential dimensions of experience began what some have called “existential phenomenology,” although Heidegger forcefully rejected the label “existentialist.” For Heidegger, then, Husserl’s focus on cognitive and theoretical reason was always an abstraction from the original experience of things—a view with which, in fact, Husserl would agree, although he never emphasized this point to the degree that Heidegger did. So, whereas Husserl emphasized the experiential correlation “consciousness-of-the-world,” Heidegger emphasized the existential situation of “Being-in-the-world.”

Shortly after the publication of *Being and Time* and after delivering his course on *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* in the summer of 1927, Heidegger’s thought gradually turned away from phenomenology toward the investigation of a more “poetic” mode of thinking necessary for disclosing that Being which tends to hide itself as much as reveal itself in beings. This turn was occasioned, then, in part by the phenomenological insight into the fact that the appearances in which Being discloses itself at the same time necessarily hide or conceal the Being of beings. Hence, the philosopher concerned to disclose Being must examine previous manifestations of Being in order to see how Being has been at the same time hidden in these manifestations. This Heidegger does through an examination of the showings of Being in the history of metaphysics, that is, through a “destruction” or destructuring (*Destruktion*) of metaphysics. In a more positive vein, the poetic mode of thinking discussed by the late Heidegger is an attempt to gain those hidden aspects of Being through Being’s more ordinary manifestations.

More specifically, the role of metaphor, in which the ordinary *meaning* of an *expression* discloses Being and the metaphorical meaning
seeks to bring to light what is hidden in that ordinary manifestation, comes to the fore in Heidegger’s thinking. As Being speaks itself through language, the role of individual Dasein as actively bringing the Being of beings to disclosure is diminished. Being is active, and subjectivity, that is, Dasein, if present at all, is largely passive. In this move to poetic thinking, Heidegger has gone beyond the descriptions of experience and of the responsible agent of disclosure that characterize phenomenology to an account of Being’s own self-disclosures and self-concealments. See also CATEGORIAL INTUITION; EIDETIC INTUITION; EIDETIC PHENOMENOLOGY; EIDETIC REDUCTION; IMMANENCE; TRANSCENDENCE.

HERBART, JOHANN FRIEDRICH (1776–1841). Johann Friedrich Herbart was one of those philosophers whom Husserl credited as preparing the way against psychologism. In particular Husserl credited Herbart with distinguishing pure logic from psychology and with recognizing the ideal objectivity of concepts, by which Herbart understood the presentation in the logical sense. Herbart insisted that the concept was neither a real object in the world nor a real act of thinking. Nevertheless, according to Husserl, Herbart failed to clarify the distinctions among different senses of terms such as “presentation,” “content,” and the like, and thereby failed to clarify fully these important logical concepts. On Husserl’s view, Herbart reduced the ideality of a logical concept to its normality by claiming that the unified meaning of a concept-term was to be found in its normal use rather than in a genuinely ideal meaning instantiated in different uses of the linguistic sign expressing the concept. See also BOLZANO, BERNARD; FREGE, GOTTLOB; IR-REAL CONTENTS; TWARDOWSKI, KASIMIR.

HÉRING, JEAN (1890–1966). Jean Héring was one of the members of the Göttingen Philosophical Society. Héring was a New Testament scholar who taught in Strasbourg, but before that he was an important interpreter of phenomenology to the French-speaking world. His own phenomenological work was in phenomenological ontology, and he devoted special attention to the issue of essences, including individual essences.

HERMENEUTIC-AS. This is a Heideggerian term that captures well what Husserl aimed at disclosing in his analysis of the perceptual noema. In the full noema, Husserl distinguishes the noematic sense and the thetic characteristic. Within the noematic sense he further distinguishes the determinable $X$, which is the “bearer” of noematic “properties,” specifically, the noematically (that is, reflectively) modified properties of
the **intended object** just as it is intended. Since these properties make up the **sense** of the object, Husserl also describes them as “**predicates**” and refers to the determinable $X$ as the “**subject**” of predicates. This structure indicates that the **intentional apprehension** of the object grasps $Sp$, say, the brown table. To put the matter in other terms, the perceptual apprehension grasps or “interprets” $S$ as $p$. This “as” is the hermeneutic-as, and it both underlies and is contrasted with the apophantic-is, the “is” of the **judgment** “The table is brown.” There is a certain kind of articulation present in the perceptual noema—a certain kind of anticipatory categoriality—and it underlies the explicit categoriality of the judgment. See also **APOPHANSIS**; **APOPHANTIC LOGIC**; **HEIDEGGER, MARTIN**.

**HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE.** The hermeneutic (or interpretive) circle arises from the fact that in understanding cultural artifacts, say, a text or painting or musical composition, we are always situated in a context that has already been affected by the cultural tradition out of which the past artifact has arisen or by the cultural tradition to which both we and the artifact belong. In other words, we always have an implicit understanding of the artifact that informs our explicit understanding. In articulating an explicit understanding we transcend that previous understanding, thereby coming to a better understanding of the cultural situation out of which the artifact arose and, at the same time, of our own cultural and historical situation. In this sense, the hermeneutic circle is more like a hermeneutic spiral, since it is not vicious and since it leads to ever more detailed and richer understandings. See also **CULTURE**; **HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY**; **HERMENEUTICS**; **HISTORICISM**.

**HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY.** Hermeneutic phenomenology recognizes that every form of human **experience** (even fulfilling experience) is interpretive in character, and that the interpretation involved in all experience is mediated by a pre-existent **language** and tradition that already affects the analyses of the reflecting phenomenologist. Hence, for the hermeneutic phenomenologist the goal of a **presuppositionless** philosophy is unattainable, for a direct, non-linguistically mediated grasp of things and the structures of experience is unattainable. There is instead always a pre-comprehension or pre-understanding of things at work in our experience, and the explicit understanding involves in part making this pre-understanding explicit. While Husserl recognized the role of **secondary passivity** in experience, he believed that it was possible at least to question all our presuppositions in such a way that we could have a direct and **evidential** experience of things, although not all presuppositions could
be critically examined at once. See also HERMENEUTICS; HISTORICISM.

HERMENEUTICS. The term “hermeneutics” refers, most fundamentally, to the interpretation of texts (and, at least originally, scriptural texts in particular). Crucial to a hermeneutical methodology are the recognition that a text must be understood in relation to the context in which it was produced; the recognition that this is not fully possible, since the interpreter stands in a different context with different questions and concerns from those of both the author of the text and its immediate audience; and the recognition that the interpreter’s context has nevertheless been affected by the previous context. This last is the recognition that the interpreter stands in a “hermeneutic circle.”

The sense of “hermeneutics” has been broadened in two directions. The first extends hermeneutics to the interpretation of plurivocal expressions, for example, signs, symbols, and dreams. The second extends hermeneutics, as in Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, to a general theory of understanding. In Gadamer, this view asserts that understanding anything that involves traces of human cognitive and expressive activity is analogous to the understanding of a text. Hence, buildings, useful artifacts, works of fine art, and the like must be interpreted as human expression. But even the world as understood scientifically is an expression of human activity, for the “world” which is the object of science is necessarily the world in its significance for a comprehending, theorizing consciousness. It is, therefore, possible to extend the meaning of “hermeneutics” still further and to understand it denoting, as in Heidegger, the understanding of the meaning of Being itself. Since to be is to have a certain significance, to understand Being is to understand the ground of significance. See also HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY.

HISTORICISM. There are strong and weak versions of historicism. The weak version asserts that human knowers are always historically situated and, therefore, that their understanding and knowledge always reflect their being so situated. This fact of being so situated is also referred to as the “historicity” of the subject. The strong version further asserts that insofar as our understanding and knowledge are historically conditioned, truth itself is relative to our historical situation. The strong version, in other words, claims not only that the particular form our understanding takes is relative to historical conditions but the very truth of our understanding is relative to the historical conditions in which the understanding is achieved.
In the strong sense, then, historicism is a form of relativism and is criticized by Husserl as such.

HISTORICITY. Historicity is that feature of human existence whereby we are always already situated in a historical and cultural situation, and this historical situatedness means that our thinking is always already informed by the history and the traditions that have shaped that situation. The historicity of the human situation with its sedimented traditions is what underlies the hermeneutic circle involved, according to hermeneutic phenomenologists, in all understanding. See also HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY; HISTORICISM.

HORIZON. The term “horizon” has both a noetic and noematic significance. Noetically, the horizon is the intentional reference to other acts or act-phases whose senses both contribute to the present apprehension of the direct object of consciousness and present a more or less indeterminate context of indirectly intended, co-given objects. The temporality of consciousness is central to understanding the horizon from a noetic perspective. Every experience has a horizon of the before and after, and the before and after experiences include their intentional content, by virtue of which we can speak of horizons as well from a noematic perspective. Noematically, the horizon is what is given in experience—but not directly thematized—as contributing to the sense of the object thematized or the appearance directly given in the momentary phase of consciousness; it is both what transcends the genuinely given in any momentary presentation of the object and contributes to our sense of both the object and its surroundings or context.

More specifically, Husserl distinguishes between what he calls the inner and outer horizons. The inner horizon—by virtue of the three-fold structure of the living present—intentionally refers to other appearances or presentations of the identical intended object. For example, the momentary perceptual phase in vision presents one side or aspect of the object from a particular perspective. This momentary phase, however, has intentional connections to past presentations of other sides of this same object, and it has intentional connections as well to possible presentations of the object that might arise in the course of a continued perceptual inspection. This noetic structure allows one to say from a noematic standpoint that the genuinely and directly appearing side refers beyond itself to its other sides and aspects. The inner horizon, in other words, unites in a single awareness a multiplicity of differentiated senses internal to the total significance the identical object has for us. The experience
including its inner horizons thereby presents the object that is the identity proper to these unified senses.

The outer horizon, on the other hand, intentionally refers to other objects in the “surroundings” of the object that is the thematic concern of consciousness. These surroundings may be a spatial field—a background of other objects—in and against which the perceived object stands out. But it might also be, say, a context for a judgment, a context, for example, comprising relevant judgments about similar objects or comprising other judgments belonging to a theory in which the present judgment will take its place. At the most general level, the outer horizon comprises intentions presenting other objects that co-inhabit the world with the intended object. This view of outer horizons also has its noematic counterpart in the view that the world is the ultimate horizon of all intended objectivities.

In summary, the inner horizon considered noematically is the set of senses that present an object identical to the object directly presented in the momentary phase of consciousness, which senses combine with the directly presented appearance in determining the objective sense of the intended object as a whole. The outer horizon, on the other hand, is the set of senses that present other objects, some of which are connected by bonds of relevance to the intended object and some of which are not. The ultimate outer horizon of experience is the world, considered phenomenologically as the horizon of sense in which all meaningful entities are situated. See also NOEMA; NOESIS; THEME.

HUMAN SCIENCE (Geisteswissenschaft). A human science is a “science of the spirit (or mind).” As such, it investigates those worldly entities in which spirit manifests itself, chiefly humans but also, in some cases, non-human animals. In particular, the human is studied as individual (for example, in descriptive, non-experimental psychology), as social (for example, in sociology), and as cultural (for example, in anthropology or ethnology). See also DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY.

HYLETIC DATA. Hyletic data include, first, the sensuous contents that present the objective, sensible determinations of an object. This is the fundamental meaning for Husserl of the expressions “sensuous contents” and “hyletic data.” However, hyletic data also include, second, feelings such as sensuous pleasures and pains that are involved in the awareness of the value of objects. And they include, third, what Husserl calls “drives,” the instinctual tendencies that involve bodily feelings of certain kinds. Husserl understands all such hyletic data to be real (reell) moments of experience.
Husserl isolates the basic notion of hyletic data in reflecting on the perception (Wahrnehmung) of material things in space. He imaginatively varies the perception such that the sensible qualities of the intended object remain constant while their appearance to us varies. Husserl attributes this change in appearance to changes in the fullness and vivacity of the really (reell) inherent sensuous contents. He concludes, therefore, that the intentional experience must be composed of two real (reell) moments: an intentional apprehension or noesis and the sensuous contents. The noesis is a form (íñogb) that animates or interprets the sensuous matter (úèç). The basic idea is that the hyletic data are the presenting or representing “stuff” that is really inherent in the experience. However, because hyletic data are sensuous in character, Husserl extends the scope of the term to include all really inherent sensuous moments. Hyletic data do not themselves bear the mark of intentionality; they are referred to an object only by virtue of their being intentionally “formed” by the apprehension.

Originally Husserl thought that all acts have some sort of material stuff or hyletic data to be intentionally formed, but his analyses of both inner time-consciousness and of categorial acts persuaded him otherwise. Consequently, it appears that he retained the doctrine of hyletic data only for the impressional moment, that is, primal impression, within the momentary phase of consciousness. Moreover, although he initially characterized hyletic data as a really inherent moment of the experience, there are places in Husserl’s works where he speaks of hyletic data more noematically as the immediate sensible presence of the objective determination itself. Finally, the broadest sense in which Husserl speaks of hyletic data is to refer that which is passively pregiven as the materials on which active thinking operates. See also EIDETIC VARIATION; NOEMA.

IDEA (Idee). An essence or eidos. Husserl rejects the early modern, psychological understanding of ideas as mental entities, events, or states. He rejects also the Kantian understanding of ideas as rational rules for organizing into totalities the objects, both inner and outer, known in the application of the categories of the understanding to the manifold of sense-data. A Kantian ideal serves as a regulative ideal, that is, an ideal involving the passage to a limit that cannot be directly grounded in a perception and which, therefore, transcends the limits of the application
of the categories. For Husserl, ideas in the Kantian sense include not only the ideas of totalities, for example, the complete presentation of the infinite number of appearances of a perceived object, but also the exact concepts that are the correlate of exact essences. Opposing these uses of the term “idea,” Husserl recovers the ancient notion of the éäÝá as a necessary and universal structure or form of things. In order to avoid confusion with the modern and Kantian meanings of “idea,” Husserl often uses the Latinized Greek term eidos—as did Plato—or the German Wesen to express this sense of “idea.”

IDEAL. 1. The ideal is that which is not real (real) but which is experienced in a categorial act or, to say the same, in the constitution of a categorial object. For example, Husserl claims that “being” is ideal insofar as it is the categorial object experienced in the judgment “S is p” that grasps S’s being p (rather than merely perceiving S as p). A collection, for example, S and S and S, is also ideal insofar as it is the categorial object grasped in an act of colligating, and a number, for example, three, is ideal insofar as it the categorial object grasped in an act of counting.

2. The ideal is that which is not real (real) but is an object known in an ideating act, for example, a species or an essence known through a process of abstraction, or an exact essence grasped in formalization, or an ideal individual known through a process of idealization.

3. The ideal is that which is not real (reell), that is, not an inherent component of an act; hence, the intentional content of an act is an “ideal” component of the act. This last usage is found primarily in Husserl’s early writings, where, for example, he says that the meaning of an expressive act is its “ideal” content. In Husserl’s later writing, this usage of “ideal” is generally replaced by the expression “ir-real” (irreell). See also IDEAL CONTENT; IDEALISM; IDEALIZATION; IDEATING ABSTRACTION.

IDEAL CONTENT. The ideal content of an experience is the single, self-identical intentional unity over against the multiplicity of experiences of actual and possible subjects intending the same object in the same manner. It is opposed to the experience’s real contents, understood either psychologically (real) or phenomenologically (reell). Husserl uses the expression “ideal content” primarily in his early writings on intentionality, replacing it later with the expression “ir-real content.” In his early writings, he uses the expression even more particularly to refer to the meaning-unity of expressive acts, a unity that he characterizes as the unity of an ideal species (although he abandons this position in his explicitly transcendental philosophy).
IDEAL INDIVIDUAL. An ideal individual is an ideal object that comes to be known in the activity of idealization.

IDEALISM. 1. The view, commonly called “metaphysical idealism,” that there are no mind-independent existents. The strongest version of this claim, as found, for example, in George Berkeley (1685–1753), is that there are no existents other than minds and the perceptions or ideas contained therein. On this view, whatever appears to exist extra-mentally is, in fact, a perception or idea in the mind. More common, however, is the claim that the characteristic properties of objects are what they are only insofar as they stand in a causal correlation with the mind or mental activities. This is, in other words, the claim that the existence of things or their characteristics is mind-dependent. Sometimes, this idealistic claim is limited to the being of higher-order or abstract objects. That is, an idealist might claim, for example, that while physical objects are mind-independent, universals exist only in the mind or as correlates of a mental activity.

In Husserl’s case, the phenomenological reduction means that the philosopher takes no stance toward the existence or non-existence of the object as experienced (although she is concerned to account for those experiences in which we assert one or the other position). But Husserl is clear that the natural attitude itself, on which the philosopher reflects, is characterized by a realistic presumption that he calls the “general thesis” of the natural attitude. For Husserl, then, realism is the presupposition of our natural and straightforward experience, but he rejects both metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism as philosophical theories, as conclusions of a philosophical argument.

2. The view, commonly called, “epistemological idealism,” that we cannot know things as they are in themselves, that we can attain no knowledge of mind-independent reality. Epistemological idealism is compatible with both metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism. The epistemological idealist, in other words, can admit the existence of a mind-independent reality but deny that we can attain knowledge of it. Alternatively, the epistemological idealist can claim that we know only our own ideas. If what we know are our own ideas, the “objects” are nothing more than these ideas organized into wholes as a function either of customary or habitual patterns of experience or according to rules that define the nature of mind or reason itself. In the former case, we have what is sometimes called “subjective” or “psychological” idealism, while the latter moves toward transcendental idealism such as we find in Immanuel Kant and Husserl (cf. 4. below).
3. The view, which we might call “semantic idealism” but which is more often characterized as a semantic “anti-realism,” that linguistic expressions do not refer beyond themselves to referents whose nature is not fully determined by language itself. While the anti-realist could hold a metaphysical realism, we could not know or speak of that mind-independent and language-independent reality. Like the epistemological idealist who asserts a metaphysical realism, the “real” world has no significance for us and cannot be elucidated in scientific or philosophical theories.

4. The view, known as “transcendental idealism,” that the significance (rather than the existence) of the world is mind-dependent. This view is typically characterized by the idea that there are necessary and universal structures in our experience that account for the objects appearing to us in determinate ways and that the organization of these appearances presents the object insofar as it can be known by mind. To the extent that transcendental idealism in Kant and Husserl distinguishes between the object as known and the object itself, it must give an account of the relation between the two. Kant does so with his distinction between appearances and the thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich), thereby committing himself to the view that the mind-independent noumenal realm cannot be known by a theoretical understanding (although it can be known by practical reason).

Husserl’s view is harder to discern and the subject of much debate. His claims about the relation of the intended and intentional objects are tied up in his views of the noema. Some scholars claim that the distinction between the object as intended and the object which is intended—that is, between the intentional object or noema and the intended object—is an ontological distinction between two entities, while others argue that there is no ontological distinction but only an internal one dependent upon a shift of focus. Even the latter camp, however, is divided among those who view the intended object as a whole of noematic parts and those who view the intended object as an identity in a noematic manifold.

IDEALITY. 1. The quality of being ideal; 2. An ideal object.

IDEALIZATION. A kind of abstraction that, like generalization but unlike formalization, yields abstract objects having a determinate material content. Unlike generalization, however, idealization does not focus on the similarities of objects and abstract an identity typifying them all. Instead, the similar objects are arrayed in such a way as to form a progression. What characterizes this progression is an asymptotic approach toward a limit that is not itself realized in any member of the progression. The limit, in other words, exists on a different plane; it is not real (real) but is,
rather, ideal, and its ideality differs from that of the empirical generalization and the pure essence. The shift of attention to the ideal limit as such apprehends what Husserl calls an “exact essence.”

Idealization is most genuinely achievable when measurement is possible, and the paramount examples of idealization are the figures of Euclidean geometry. Since the array upon which our apprehension of the ideal limit also extends beyond those actually given to those recognized as purely possible, it yields an a priori object rather than an empirical generalization. The universal must be understood against the array through which it is approached; without the awareness of the array, there can be no genuine awareness of, say, the ideal figure of the cube as opposed to the merely empirical concept of the box-like, three-dimensional volume. Moreover, the idealizing abstraction completes—or, better, replaces—the movement begun in the generalization of measurable properties, for the identical element present in all the similar objects is now exactly, mathematically defined in a manner unattainable in the abstraction of the empirical type or even the pure, morphological essence. We see an example of this in the manner in which technical, geometric terms (rather than non-technical terms expressing empirical generalizations) are used in our everyday descriptions of sensible shape.

IDEAS I. See IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY (Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie).

IDEAS II. See IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY (Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie).

IDEAS III. See IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY (Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie).

IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY (Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie). Planned as a three-volume work, only the first volume was published during Husserl’s lifetime. The first volume, subtitled General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, is remarkable for it is the only work in which Husserl provides a comprehensive glance at his entire system of philosophy. The volume treats the methodology of phenomenology, outlines in general the intentional structures of transcendental consciousness, and culminates
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in an account of reason broadly construed as encompassing theoretical, axiological, and practical reason. The second volume, subtitled Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, undertakes regional studies that explore, in turn, material nature, animal nature, and what Husserl calls “the spiritual world.” The third volume, subtitled Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences, is a brief clarification of the idea of a phenomenological philosophy that relates it to other scientific and philosophical disciplines.

Usually known by its abbreviated title Ideas I—and sometimes more simply Ideas—the first volume was published in 1913 in the first number of Husserl’s Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. It was reprinted in 1922 with an index prepared by Gerda Walther and again in 1928 with Ludwig Landgrebe’s index replacing Walther’s. A critical edition of Ideas I, prepared by Walter Biemel, was published in a critical edition in Husserliana (the critical editions of Husserl’s works) in 1950. This edition included in its critical apparatus the handwritten notes Husserl had made in the three printings appearing in his lifetime as well as some appendices including research manuscripts in which Husserl further treated concepts and approaches developed in the main text. A revised critical edition, prepared by Karl Schuhmann, was published in Husserliana in 1976. This edition appears in two parts. The first part provides a corrected text of the three printings of 1913, 1922, and 1928. The second part includes corrected copies of the critical material and appendices in Biemel’s edition as well as additional supplementary material.

Ideas I commences with logical and ontological considerations that prepare the way for phenomenology. Here Husserl clarifies the notions of fact and essence; universality; necessity; species, genus, and region; generalization and formalization; and dependent and independent part. He also provides a critique of epistemological skepticism and its claim that we can have no genuine knowledge of essences. Following these preliminaries, Husserl develops at length the contrast between the natural attitude and the phenomenological attitude by way of an extensive treatment of the phenomenological reduction and the realm of consciousness that it discloses. He further clarifies this realm of consciousness by examining the intentional structure of consciousness as the noesis-noema correlation. Indeed, the treatment of intentionality here and in the Logical Investigations are among the most extensive of Husserl’s treatments of the structural characteristics of intentionality. Husserl concludes Ideas I with a discussion of reason as grasping in evidence things (Sachen) as they are.
The second volume of *Ideas* has a complex history. Husserl drafted the basic text of *Ideas II* and *Ideas III* in 1912 immediately after he completed *Ideas I*. Husserl revised this text in 1915, and in 1916 his assistant Edith Stein began the process of editing the manuscripts. After editing the original manuscripts, Stein prepared another version that included other texts from this period that were interwoven with the original texts, and this reworking of the text became the basis of the version that was eventually published. Before publication, however, Landgrebe in 1925 once again reworked the text, incorporating additional manuscripts into the sections of the text dealing with the spiritual world. Landgrebe produced a publication-ready copy, but Husserl once again hesitated and continued to revise the manuscript. Husserl’s final annotations from 1928 were incorporated into the text after Husserl’s death by Marly Biemel in the course of preparing the critical edition for *Husserliana*. This edition was published in 1952.

*Ideas II* is a set of constitutional analyses devoted to different regions of *being*. The first part is devoted to the constitution of material nature, and it explores both the perceptual grasp of *objects* as well as the theoretical *apprehension* of the world in the natural sciences. The second part directs its attention to the constitution of animal nature, and here the discussions of the body and of *empathy* are of crucial importance. The final section deals with the spiritual world, that is, the world not of the mere animal but of the person. In the course of this volume, Husserl again introduces important distinctions, such as those between the *phantom* and the *material thing*, between presenting sensations and *kinaesthetic sensations*, between the merely physical *body* (*Körper*) and the animate *body* (*Leib*), between the *ego* as human animal and the ego as person, and, most fundamentally, between nature and spirit.

*Ideas III*, as indicated above, was also written along with *Ideas I* and II during 1912. Whereas those texts were revised over years, however, *Ideas III* received scant revision. It was published more or less in its original form for the first time in *Husserliana* in 1952. Husserl commences the work with a brief overview of the different regions that belong to the world. By far, the major portion of this small work deals with those sciences that investigate the regions of spirit—*psychology*—and nature—*physics* and *ontology*—and the relation of these sciences to phenomenology. See also HYLETIC DATA; MOMENT; PIECE.

**IDEATING ABSTRACTION.** An abstractive act in which the knower grasps an *essence*. The abstractive act can be either *generalization*, which grasps an inexact *morphological essence*, or *idealization*, which grasps an *exact essence*. The *empty* ideating abstraction grasps the *concept*, that
is the essence as conceived; the fulfilling intention is an eidetic intuition that grasps the essence itself in its direct presence.

**IDEATING ACT.** See IDEATING ABSTRACTION.

**IDEATION.** See IDEATING ABSTRACTION.

**IDENTIFICATION.** An identification arises in a synthesis. The identification can occur on various levels. First, a multiplicity of appearances manifesting a certain phenomenal continuity can be brought together in the synthesizing act that identifies an individual object. Insofar as such an identification involves recognition of the individual as a kind of object, the basis is laid for a synthesis of the individual objects manifesting the similarity characteristic of a kind. Second, therefore, given the experiences of different individuals manifesting a similar property, an identifying synthesis can unify the objects into a class and identify an empirical species (for example, ‘red’) or an ideal singular (for example, ‘the square’).

Moreover, in the consciousness of fulfillment, there is an identification of the object emptily intended with the object intuitively given. More precisely, we experience the intentional essence of the act of intuition as more or less perfectly fitted into the intentional essence of the mere or empty judging or into the semantic essence of the empty expressive intention that expresses the judgment and intimates the judgmental intending. See also EMPTY INTENTION; EXPRESSION.

**IMAGE (Bild, Bildobjekt).** An image contains three moments: the physical and sensible basis for the image, for example, the pencil sketch, the portrait painting, or the bronze sculpture; the image (Bild) or image-object (Bildobjekt) itself, that is, what appears to us when, for example, we look at the sketch, the portrait, or the sculpture; and the subject of the image, the re-presented or imaged object, for example, my sister who is depicted in the sketch, my wife whose portrait I see, or the burghers of Calais. The images and the object imaged in the image have in some respect a similar content; the image is a re-presentation of the imaged, although in the case of art, this representation might be more symbolic without dependence upon visual or auditory similarity. The physical or sensible basis of the image-object, appearing directly, is perceived, but the image-object itself and the imaged object are not. The image is presented in what Husserl calls image-consciousness, and the imaged object is only indirectly re-presented.
IMAGE-CONSCIOUSNESS (Bildbewusstsein). Image-consciousness is that experiential act in which the subject is aware of an image. The intentionality involved in the consciousness of an image is complex, for the subject is aware of the sensible substrate awakening the image in a perceptual moment of the image-consciousness, and the subject is aware of the image or image-object and the subject of the image in the image-consciousness proper. Image-consciousness involves the interplay of—and sometimes the conflict between—the image, the perceptible substrate that awakens it, and the subject. Image-consciousness is not a mode of perception (Wahrnehmung). In perception, the appearing object and the intended object coincide, whereas in image-consciousness the appearing image and the subject of the image do not coincide. The subject perceives the physical substrate as an actuality, but the image-person in, say, a portrait, is not experienced as an actual existent, although the subject, the person depicted, might be so experienced. Hence, Husserl sometimes speaks of the awareness of the sensible substrate contained in image-consciousness as Perzeption rather than as Wahrnehmung in order to reinforce the point that the image-consciousness does not include the belief or thetic characteristic proper to perception wherein the subject takes the object as an actual existent here and now before her. See also PERCEPTION (Perzeption).

IMAGE-OBJECT. See IMAGE.

IMAGINATION. 1. An experience that represents an object that is both absent and non-actual. In both aspects imagination is opposed to perception. The imagined object can take the form of an image or image-object, but it need not. Imagination can represent (that is, make present) an object by refashioning materials gathered from memory and perception. The structure of this representation is such that the objective content of these memories and perceptions are grasped apart from their temporal and belief indices and thereby a new object is represented as if it were an actual object. The refashioning that imagination achieves can be spontaneous and creative; the imagination is not bound by the content of the memories and perceptions from which it departs. In representing objects as if actual, the imagination presents objects either as pure possibilities or as feigned. Moreover, in the case of imagination’s constituting an image, the intentionalities involved are even more complex, since the resultant image-consciousness incorporates a specifically perceptual moment in its grasp of the sensible basis of the image.

2. The capacity for imaginative experiences. Imagination in this sense plays an important methodological role for Husserl. Imagining is
intimately involved in the process of thinking. Distinctions arise, for example, insofar as we are able to represent to ourselves the difference between, say, the actualities we perceive and the possibilities we imagine. More important, the imagination with its quasi-positing of pure possibilities plays a crucial role in eidetic variation and eidetic intuition. See also EIDETIC REDUCTION.

IMAGINATIVE PHANTASY. See EIDETIC VARIATION.

IMAGINATIVE VARIATION. See EIDETIC VARIATION.

IMAGING. The imaginative experience that constructs an image or image-object. See also IMAGINATION.

IMMANENCE. In its ordinary meaning, “immanence” refers to the state of being really inherent in something. This is Husserl’s usage, but the shift in attitude involved in the phenomenological reduction introduces an ambiguity into the term. In an explanatory or descriptive psychology carried out in the natural attitude with its acceptance of psychic events as real (real), caused events in the world, “immanence” would refer to the fact of being a really (real) inherent component of the psychic act. On this view, sensations, say, are immanent to the act while the object of the act is transcendent to the act.

Upon the performance of the reduction, however, with its shift of attention to transcendental consciousness as the whole that is the intentional correlation of consciousness and world, it is tempting to consider objects just as they are intended as immanent to the act. In a sense, to do so is correct, but Husserl nevertheless insists on the distinction between real (reell) content and intentional content. Hence, Husserl distinguishes a second sense of immanence proper to the phenomenological attitude. The object is “immanent” to consciousness, but not in the sense of real immanence, where “real” is understood in both its psychological (real) and phenomenological (reell) senses. The noesis and presenting contents (or representing contents) are immanent in the first sense of really (reell) inherent. The intentional object (the intended object just as intended) is, on the other hand, immanent in the sense of intentionally contained (“contained” as the act’s object) but not really (real) inherent. This second sense of immanence allows Husserl to speak—in terms that appear paradoxical but are not—of “transcendence [of the object] in immanence [that is, ‘intentionally contained’ in transcendental consciousness].” See also HYLETIC DATA.
IMMANENT. See IMMANENCE.

INCARNATION. See EMBODIMENT.

INDEPENDENT CONTENT. See PIECE.

INDEPENDENT PART. See PIECE.

INDICATION. A sign that refers the attention of a thinking being to some other object by a process of association. The basis for the association can be natural or conventional. Hence, a sign can be a natural indicator, as in the case of smoke indicating fire, or it can be a conventional indicator or mark, as in the case of a flag indicating a nation-state. In the case of both natural and conventional indications, some entity or state of affairs of which a person has actual knowledge indicates the reality of other entities or states of affairs such that the person believes in the reality of the second. The knowledge of the first motivates a belief in the second, and the indicator and indicated are constituted as a certain kind of unity. Husserl distinguishes indications not only from expressions, but also from a certain kind of demonstration. Indications are different from the former insofar as they do not express a meaning and have only an external relation to that which they indicate. Indications differ from the latter insofar as they do not yield insight into the indicated in the way that the premises of a demonstration, which motivate an inference, yield insight into the conclusion that follows from them. See also CONSTITUTION; INTIMATION; MOTIVATION.

INDIVIDUAL OBJECT. An individual object might be either a whole concrete thing or—as the object of an abstractive act—an individual piece or moment belonging to such a whole.

INDIVIDUAL RELATIVISM. Individual relativism claims that truth is relative to an individual knower, that is, that what is true is what seems or is taken to be true by an individual.

INGARDEN, ROMAN WITOLD (1893–1970). Roman Ingarden, a Polish philosopher, first studied under Kasimir Twardowski, who, along with Husserl, was one of Franz Brentano’s students. Ingarden then studied under Husserl at Göttingen beginning in 1912. He followed Husserl to Freiburg and completed his dissertation on Henri Bergson there. He returned to Poland, habilitated under Twardowski and took a position at
the University of Lvov. In 1945, he accepted a chair at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.

Ingarden was among those early students of Husserl who declined to follow Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction that they saw as leading the way to idealism. It is no small irony, therefore, that he was suspended by the Communist authorities from his teaching position for several years during the 1950s for his supposed idealism. Nevertheless, Ingarden remained in contact with Husserl and maintained familiarity with Husserl’s later philosophy, even writing commentaries on it.

Ingarden’s most significant phenomenological work is in aesthetics, especially the philosophy of literature. His most noted works are Das literarische Kunstwerk (The Literary Work of Art) published in 1931 and O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego (The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art) published in 1937. These works are eidetic in character. Regarding the work of art, Ingarden identifies as essential the material basis of the work (for example, the words on paper), the work of art, which is a purely intentional object having neither real nor ideal existence, and the aesthetic object, which is also a purely intentional object and the “concretization” of the work of art achieved by a reader or member of the audience in the aesthetic attitude. Bound up with the distinction between the work of art and the aesthetic object is the distinction between artistic value, which pertains to the work of art as produced by a skillful artist, and aesthetic value, which belongs to the concretized work. The ontological significance of the claim that the work of art is purely intentional is clear; it is an attempt to break through the opposition between realism and idealism.

INNER PERCEPTION. The reflective and “perceptive” apprehension of real (reell) contents of experience. Husserl first claimed that inner perception was characterized by absolute evidence by which he understood adequate evidence. He later claims that inner perception, because of the temporality of consciousness, cannot be adequate and that inner perception grasps its object only apodictically. In particular, it is the living present that is grasped apodictically. It remains an open question, however, how far that apodicticity extends given the horizional character of consciousness. See also ADEQUACY; HORIZON; REFLECTION.

INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS. Inner time-consciousness is the consciousness of the temporality that belongs to the flow of lived (erlebt) experience. In his account of inner time Husserl is concerned to account for more than the succession of consciousness. He seeks to account for the essential structures of consciousness that make possible the consciousness
of succession. The subject is aware both of objective time and of “subjective” time, that is, the lived time in which the subject’s experiences flow, as involving succession. Husserl claims that this fact of experience means that any momentary phase of consciousness must have a structure such that a temporal extent is made present to consciousness in the single momentary phase. Husserl identifies this structure as a tripartite one: primal impression, which is directed to the now-phase of experience; retention, which is directed to elapsed phases of experience; and protention, which is directed to yet-to-come phases of experience. See also ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS; LIVING PRESENT; PHENOMENAL TIME.

INTENDED OBJECT. The intended object is the object which is intended pure and simple, that is, without consideration of the manner in which it is intended. Husserl distinguishes the intended object simpliciter from the intentional object (the object as intended), which he later calls the noema. The nature of this distinction is a matter of some controversy. Some think it an ontological distinction between two entities, while others deny this. The latter commentators claim that distinction arises as a function of considering the same object from two different attitudes, namely, the natural attitude and the phenomenological attitude. See also INTENTIONAL CONTENT.

INTENDING SENSE (intendierender Sinn). The intending sense is the meaning of a meaning-intention. Husserl uses this term in the Logical Investigations in relation to expressions and linguistic meanings. His later thought uses the term “sense (Sinn)” in a more encompassing way and uses the more restrictive term “meaning (Bedeutung)” for the meaning belonging to expressions. In general, the intending sense “gives” or “projects” meaning in an empty intention. It posits an object or refers to an object as having a particular significance. This empty intention is subject to fulfillment or disappointment. See also SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION; SIGNITIVE INTENTION.

INTENTION. An intention is a direction to something as having a particular significance; to intend something is to be directed to it as having that significance. Ordinarily, the intention is of an object or state of affairs, but the intention can also be directed to other experiences either pre-reflectively or reflectively. It is important to note that the notion of intention should not be restricted to volition. Cognitions are directed to the cognized object; wishes are directed to the object desired; volitions are directed toward desirable, but not yet existent, states of affairs, and so
INTENTIONAL CONTENT

forth. See also APOPHANSIS; HERMENEUTIC-AS; INTENTIONAL;
INTENTIONAL ACT; INTENTIONALITY; JUDGMENT; PREEFFL
REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS; SELF-AWARENESS.

INTENTIONAL. 1. The adjective “intentional” qualifies the experience or
act of consciousness that bears the mark of intentionality. In this usage,
it designates the fact that the experience is directed toward something, that
is, that the experience refers to something, that it is of something. Since
intentionality primarily belongs to conscious experiences or acts, this is
the primary use of the adjective.

2. The adjective “intentional” by extension modifies the objective
correlate of intentional acts. Hence, Husserl speaks of the intentional
content of the act. Of special interest here is the intentional ob-
ject—what he later comes to call the noema. This use of “intentional”
enables the distinction between the object which is intended (the intended
object simpliciter) and the (intended) object just as it is intended (the
intentional object).

INTENTIONAL ACT. An intentional act is an experience or act of
consciousness that is directed toward an object. To put the matter another
way, an intentional act is an experience or act of consciousness that is
characterized by intentionality. See also EMPTY INTENTION; FULL
INTENTION; FULFILLING INTENTION; FULFILLING SENSE;
MEANING-INTENTION; MEANING-FULFILLMENT.

INTENTIONAL ANALYSIS. Intentional analysis is the analysis of the
intentional structure of experience. In particular, it involves distinguishing
the various layers of sense belonging to the intentional object and the
intentional relations obtaining among the layers of experience correspond-
ing to these layers of sense. See also PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALY-
SIS.

INTENTIONAL CONTENT. In the Logical Investigations, Husserl
distinguishes three senses of “intentional content”: 1. the intentional ob-
ject of the act; 2. the (intentional) matter of the act; and 3. the intentional
essence of the act.

1. Intentional content as intentional object can be considered from two
different perspectives, that of the object which is intended and that of the
object as it is intended. While some commentators understand this
distinction in ontological terms, others claim that Husserl does not use
these two expressions to denote two different entities—an immanent
intentional object and a transcendent intended object—but only to
indicate two different ways of considering the object: the intended object simpliciter and the same object considered precisely as intended in the act in question. It is the latter perspective that is the phenomenologically more important, for a descriptive account of experience will necessarily turn its attention to the object as experienced. The distinction between the object which is experienced and the object as experienced also points toward Husserl’s view of the intended object as an identical object manifested in a multiplicity of appearances or presentations. In his discussions of the intentional object Husserl also distinguishes the object taken in its entirety and the partial objects to which are directed the constituent parts of the experience intending the identical object. This distinction points toward Husserl’s use of whole/part analyses in his discussions of various kinds of objects, including and especially those whole/part analyses that appeal to the notion of ‘foundation.’

2. Intentional content as act-matter is distinguished, first, from the intentional object of the act and, second, from the act-quality. While the quality of the act determines the act’s kind as perceiving, naming, judging, or the like, the matter of the act determines the act as perceiving this, naming this, judging this, and so forth. The matter, in other words, is that moment in the act that accounts for the act’s intending a particular object in a particular manner. The matter accounts for the act’s reference to the object and fixes the object’s significance or sense in a particular way; it is the interpretative or objective sense by virtue of which the object appears or is significant to us in a particular, more or less determinate manner. The distinction between the quality and the matter of an act plays an important role in the Logical Investigations, but Husserl in later works assimilates the notion of matter to that of noematic sense.

3. Intentional content as intentional essence denotes the unity of quality and matter. Together they form only the essence of the act and not its totality. The act in addition contains as non-essential parts, for example, the contents that are animated or interpreted in the act. The notion of intentional essence as an apprehension animating or interpreting contents plays an important role throughout Husserl’s Logical Investigations, but his view of the structure of intentionality and of how to conceive the relations between the intention and its presenting contents and between the act and its objective sense changes in later works. See also ACT-MATTER; DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE; HYLETIC DATA; IMMANENCE; NOEMA; REPRESENTING CONTENTS.

INTENTIONAL CORRELATE. See INTENDED OBJECT; INTENTIONAL OBJECT.
INTENTIONAL ESSENCE. The intentional essence of an act is defined in the Logical Investigations as the unity of the act-quality and act-matter. In the case of expressive acts the intentional essence is specified as the semantic essence. Husserl subsequently drops the language of the intentional essence of an act when he reinterprets the matter of the act as noematic sense and abandons the view that the meaning (or sense) of an act is the instantiation of an ideal meaning-species. See also INTENTIONAL CONTENT.

INTENTIONAL FORM. See MORPHÉ.

INTENTIONAL OBJECT. The intentional object is the intended object just as it is intended. The intentional object is the object intended in a particular manner, that is, as having a particular significance or sense for the subject, and intended in a particular kind of act, that is, an act having a particular act-quality. The intentional object is distinguished from the intended object simpliciter, that is, the object apart from its particular manners of appearing and the object which is an identity appearing in manifold ways. Husserl later calls the intentional object the noema.

INTENTIONALITY. In its philosophical usage, the term “intentionality” extends beyond the everyday sense that it is tied to volition. Intentionality is that feature of conscious experience by virtue of which it is directed-to or tends-toward. Ordinarily the term “intentionality” is used philosophically to refer to an act’s being directed to an object. For example, an act of visual perception is directed to a material thing in space; a memorial act is directed to something past; a judgmental act is directed to a state of affairs; a willing act is directed to a state of affairs (presumptively) realizable in action; and so on. While that is its most common philosophical sense, the term can also be used to refer more broadly simply to the feature of directedness. Hence, it can be used to refer to the non-objectifying and pre-reflective intentional directedness of one momentary phase of consciousness to other conscious phases by means of retention and protention, and to the non-objectifying intentionality operative in pre-reflective self-awareness. See also ACT-MATTER; ACT-QUALITY; CONSCIOUSNESS; INTENTIONAL ACT; INTENTIONAL CONTENT; INTENTIONAL OBJECT; NOEMA; NOESIS.

INTERPRETATION (Auffassung). See APPREHENSION; HERMENEUTICS.
INTERSUBJECTIVITY. In its most general sense the term “intersubjectivity” refers simply to a multiplicity of subjects standing in some relation to one another. In its phenomenological and transcendental significance, however, the notion of intersubjectivity departs from the fact that the world is experienced by a subject not as a private world but as a world shared with other experiencing subjects. This fact of experience leads to a twofold reflection. First, Husserl provides an account of the experience of other subjects in an empathic experience with its moment of “analogizing appresentation.” In this experience a subject recognizes another subject as both like but also irreducibly different from oneself. Second, Husserl provides an account of how this recognition of others is involved in the constitution of the world as a world “for us.” The possibility of different subjects experiencing the world from different perspectives is shown to be a necessary condition for the experience of an object as presenting itself as an identity in a manifold of presentations and, therefore, as a condition for the possibility of objective knowledge and the scientific grasp of the nature of things.

The nature of intersubjectivity as involving both likeness and irreducible difference has moral significance for Husserl. It underlies one’s sense both of the bonds we establish in friendly or loving relationships with the other as well as the obligations we owe to one another as irreducible sources of cognition, feeling and emotion, judgment, and action. See also EMPATHY.

INTIMATION. Intimation is that special case of indication wherein the physical sign that is a moment of the linguistic expression indicates the expressive act and other acts that form part of the communicative intention of the one using the expression. This notion can be extended to include other forms of non-linguistic expression (behaviors such as gestures, emotional reactions, and so forth) that can also be considered indicators of mental states or experiences.

INTROSPECTION. A form of psychological reflection in which a subject inspects his or her own experiences. The aim of an introspective reflection is to understand those experiences in their particularity as real (real), psychological events. Husserl insists that the phenomenological method is not introspective in character. While phenomenological reflection might commence with introspection, such introspection is not necessary for the exercise of the phenomenological method. What is necessary is that the phenomenologist’s attention is turned to a typical example of a certain type of experience. Moreover, phenomenological reflection goes beyond introspective reflection in two ways. First,
phenomenological reflection is not concerned with examining experiences as real, psychological events. The exercise of the phenomenological reduction means that the reflecting phenomenologist focuses on experiences as possible experiences of a certain type. Second, phenomenology is concerned with what is essential, rather than what is particular, to experience.

**INTUITION.** An intuition is an act characterized by intuitive fullness, that is, by the presence of presenting contents or representing contents in the act. While Husserl abandoned the early doctrine of representing contents, it remains the case for him that intuitions are characterized by the presence of sensuous content, that is, that intuitive acts are perceptions or modifications of perception. It is in this sense that intuitions present an object in its “bodily givenness” and that they serve as evidence. For example, a name expressing the empty intention of an object is fulfilled in the perceptual intuition of the named object precisely as named. Similarly, a declarative sentence expressing a judgment is fulfilled in an intuition that is the modification of a perception, namely a categorial intuition, that “bodily” presents the state of affairs as judged. See also Hyletic Data.

**INTUITIVE FULLNESS.** The presence of sensuous content in an act. See also Hyletic Data; Representing Contents.

**IR-REAL (irreell).** See IR-REAL CONTENTS.

**IR-REAL (irreell) CONTENTS.** Ir-real contents are opposed to real (reel) contents. Although contained “within” the act, they are not really (reel) inherent in the act. They are, in other words, the act’s intentional contents. As such, the ir-real content of an act is its intentional object. The notion of ir-reality, therefore, overlaps that of real (real) and ideal (ideal), for the object of an intention can be a real (real) individual in the world or it can be an ideal object, such as a species or ideal figure. See also INTENDED OBJECT; NOEMA; NOESIS.

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**JAMES, WILLIAM (1842–1910).** William James, one of the classical American pragmatists, had a wide range of interests extending from psychology to moral philosophy to religion. However, it is James’s
psychological writings that were of interest to, and greatly influenced, Husserl. Husserl was particularly impressed by James’s ideas concerning the stream of thought, which influenced Husserl’s ideas on the stream of consciousness; the specious present, which influenced Husserl’s notion of the living present; and habit, which is related to Husserl’s discussion of habituations.

**JUDGE (urteilen).** The infinitive “to judge” (urteilen) means to articulate an object by identifying its moments or properties and predicating them of the object (for example, $S$ is $p$) or to articulate an object by identifying its pieces as belonging to the whole (for example, $S$ has $a$) or to articulate an object by identifying the relations into which an object enters with other objects (for example, $xRy$). See also APOPHANSIS; JUDGMENT (Satz); JUDGMENT (Urteil); LOGIC; PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.

**JUDGMENT (Satz).** Husserl illuminates what he calls the double sense of the term “judgment” by a discussion of what he calls the judgmental “Satz.” The term Satz is ambiguous insofar as it means what is posited in the act of judging. But what is posited in the act of judging is, from one point of view, the positum or objective state of affairs itself and, from another point of view, the proposition or propositional content that expresses that state of affairs. See also JUDGMENT (Urteil).

**JUDGMENT (Urteil).** An act of judging involves a syntactical achievement in which a subject comes to awareness of a categorial object, that is, a categorially articulated state of affairs that is unified by one or another categorial form. In such judging the subject’s attention is directed to the state of affairs itself, that is, to the object about which the subject judges and to the object’s properties and relations. The state of affairs is the judgment in the sense of what is judged or posited, but the subject is not aware of anything that might be called a judgment in the sense proper to logic. The subject is not aware, in other words, of the judgment in the sense of the logical proposition. However, the subject’s attention can turn from the state of affairs posited in the judgment as actual to the state of affairs as supposed by the judgment. In this turning of attention—a modal shift that arises in the adoption of the critical attitude—the state of affairs about which the subject judges is no longer posited as actual but considered merely as a supposition. The judgment takes on a double character: the categorially formed, judged state of affairs and the judgment merely as such, the supposition precisely as supposed.

In the critical attitude, which is the attitude appropriate to anyone, such as a scientist, with an interest in truth, the state of affairs as supposed is
then measured against and by the state of affairs as supposed. The subject in the critical attitude, precisely because that attitude is in the service of the natural attitude’s cognitive interest, moves back and forth between the judgment as actual and the judgment as supposed, between the state of affairs and the proposition, in the continuous revision of her beliefs regarding the world. See also JUDGE; JUDGMENT (Satz).

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KANT, IMMANUEL (1724–1804). Husserl views Immanuel Kant as one of the great thinkers of the philosophical tradition, and he takes from Kant much inspiration. In particular, Husserl is attracted to Kant’s transcendental idealism. For Kant, transcendental idealism is concerned to identify the necessary conditions for experience, and central to this project are several distinctions: sensibility, understanding, and reason; the a priori and the a posteriori; analytic judgments and synthetic judgments; appearances and the thing-in-itself; and phenomenon and noumenon. In Kant’s articulation of how all these distinctions work together, he developed the view that the scientific understanding of the phenomenal world as causally determined arose in the application of the a priori categories (forms) of the understanding to a sensible manifold.

There is, however, a chasm between this junction of understanding and sensibility, on the one hand, and the ideas of reason, on the other. For Kant the ideas of reason yield only illusion if they are thought objectively valid and not recognized in their proper nature as regulative ideals. And Husserl rejects Kant’s view of the transcendental ego (or, as Kant calls it, the “transcendental unity of apperception”) as a formal unity external to the flow of empirical experience. Moreover, Kant’s sharp distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal and his grounding of the moral in the noumenal yield a moral philosophy in which duty or obligation is the central moral concept, while the feelings and the emotions directed to conceived goods do not contribute to the moral worth of an action.

While Husserl also identifies himself as a transcendental idealist, he rejects Kant’s distinctions with the exception of that between the a priori and the a posteriori. Even there, however, Husserl’s notion of the a priori is drawn from our encounter with things and is not tied to a set of objective categories that belong to the understanding apart from all experience. This is part and parcel of Husserl’s rejection of the Kantian dichotomy of the understanding and sensibility, for Husserl sees these two as working in a much closer union than does Kant; indeed, this is most
evident in the Husserlian doctrine of categorial intuition in which the
categorial (the understanding) and the intuitive (the sensible) are united in
a manner that they never are in Kant. Moreover, reason, for Husserl, is
not distinguished from the understanding and sensibility; instead reason
is the striving for evidence of the sort achieved in categorial intuitions in
which judgments are confirmed or disconfirmed by insight into the
directly, clearly, and distinctly presented things themselves. Finally,
Husserl rejects Kant’s formalism in ethics, adopting instead an axiological
approach that grounds volition in both evaluation and cognition.

What fundamentally unites Kant’s and Husserl’s transcendental
idealism is the view that a transcendental subject is active in the
disclosure of the world as experienced by empirical subjects in the world.

KAUFMANN, FELIX (1895–1949). An Austrian, Felix Kaufmann was
concerned with questions regarding scientific method and the logic of
procedural rules in the social sciences, especially the law. His interest in
logic led him to study the logical writings of both Husserl and the Vienna
Circle, but he rejected the positivism of the Vienna Circle. Kaufmann also
introduced Alfred Schutz to Husserl’s work. In 1938, Kaufmann
emigrated to the United States and taught at the New School for Social
Research in New York City. In 1944 he published his main work
composed in the United States, namely, Methodology of the Social
Sciences.

KAUFMANN, FRITZ (1891–1958). Fritz Kaufmann studied in Berlin and
was immersed in the same psychological tradition that shaped Husserl. In
addition, he was drawn to the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey. Kaufmann
studied with Husserl in Göttingen from 1913 to 1914, and he became
interested in constitution as a manifestation of historical life. In particular,
he became interested in art as a world-disclosing phenomenon.

KERNEL (Kern). Husserl uses the German term der Kern (kernel) to refer
to the noematic core. “Core” is the usual English translation for Husserl’s
use of der Kern. See also NOEMATIC SENSE.

KINAESTHESIS. 1. The capacity to experience the movement of one’s own
body (Leib), that is, the capacity to experience kinaesthetic sensations;
2. Husserl sometimes uses the term “kinaesthesia” idiosyncratically to
refer to the capacity to move, the “I can” that belongs to the body (Leib).
The bodily movements or activities with which Husserl is here concerned
are those that contribute to perception by moving the sense organs so as
to motivate varying appearances of the object.
KINAESTHETIC SENSATIONS. Kinaesthetic sensations are real (reell) contents of an act by which the subject is aware of the movements of its body (Leib) and sense organs. Husserl’s view is that changes in the flow of kinaesthetic sensations motivate a flow of presenting contents animated by the noesis so as to produce a flow of appearances presenting the object. However, it is difficult to understand how the flow of kinaesthetic sensations would itself motivate new appearances. Hence, it is more plausible to think that the bodily movements themselves of which we are aware in kinaesthetic sensations motivate new appearances. This view still preserves Husserl’s idea that there is a correlation between the flow of kinaesthetic sensations and the flow of presenting contents. See also HYLETIC DATA; KINAESTHESIS; PERCEPTION (Wahrnehmung).

KNOWLEDGE. A central concern of Husserl’s philosophy is to explain the objectivity of knowledge, specifically how objectivity arises in and for subjectivity. Husserl’s response to this question is contained in his theory of intentionality, and specifically in his account of fulfilling intentions. Fulfilling intentions constitute evidence, and evidential insight is an achievement of reason. These evidences pertain not only to individual judgments but to the combination of judgments into arguments and theories. The validity of these combinations is itself capable of being insightfully judged. For Husserl, then, rational insight is the attainment of objective knowledge.

KOYRÉ, ALEXANDRE (1892–1964). Alexandre Koyré was a Russian emigré who arrived in Göttingen via Paris where he had already become acquainted with the thought of Henri Bergson. In Göttingen Koyré studied mathematics and philosophy, and he became a member of the Göttingen Philosophical Society. Husserl did not think Koyré’s proposal for a doctoral dissertation sufficiently strong, and Koyré returned to Paris, earning his doctorate at the Sorbonne. Afterwards he renewed his acquaintance with Husserl, visiting him for extended periods. Koyré was influenced by Husserl’s notion of empathic understanding, and this played a role in his interpretations of important figures in the history of philosophy.

Koyré was very influential in introducing Husserl’s phenomenology to France through his involvement in translating a summary for the audience of Husserl’s Paris Lectures of 1929 and in revising and supervising the publication of the French translation of the Méditations cartésiennes, and by virtue of his co-founding the journal Recherches philosophiques he also introduced phenomenological work by a host of other authors. Koyré gained fame in his own right for his work in the
history of philosophy of science, especially his work on Galileo (Études galiléennes) of 1940 and the history of cosmology from Nicholas of Cusa to Gottfried Leibniz (From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe) of 1957. His more specialized works on Copernicus, Kepler, and Borelli as well as the posthumously published collections of articles Newtonian Studies (1965) and Études d’histoire de la pensée scientifique were all also very well received. See also EMPATHY.

– L –

LANDGREBE, LUDWIG (1902–1991). Ludwig Landgrebe served as Husserl’s penultimate assistant during the years 1923 to 1930. When in 1928 Husserl began to plan for a large, systematic work on transcendental logic on the basis of lecture courses he had delivered several times during the 1920s, he asked Landgrebe to organize these manuscripts, supplementing them with materials going as far back as 1910, for the work. In the meantime Husserl began to compose an introduction to these text, an introduction that became the full-length Formale und transcendental Logik (Formal and Transcendental Logic), itself published in 1929. The fruits of Landgrebe’s work were published as Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience and Judgment) in 1939 in Prague. Many of the texts cover ground also covered by Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, which is volume 11 in the critical edition of Husserl’s works.

Landgrebe offered important discussions of Husserl’s philosophy, and his “Husserls Abschied vom Cartesianismus” (“Husserl’s Departure from Cartesianism”) influenced how many commentators conceive the relation between Husserl’s earlier and later works. Landgrebe’s own philosophical work remains rooted in phenomenological considerations, although he was more open to the investigation of metaphysical issues than was Husserl.

LANGE, FRIEDRICH ALBERT (1828–1875). A leading German neo-Kantian, Friedrich Albert Lange was also an opponent of psychologism in logic and interested in developing the purely formal components of logic. However, even as Husserl praises Lange for his commitment to a purely formal logic, he criticizes him for not realizing all the work that had already been done in this regard, in particular in the writings of Bernard Bolzano.
LANGUAGE. Husserl conceives language as a communicative form. What is communicated are meanings (Bedeutungen) that express the sense that objects have for experiencing subjects and that intimate the experiences of those subjects. Husserl presents his philosophy of language in his account of expressions. There are important changes in Husserl’s position. In the Logical Investigations Husserl claims that meaning-intentions instantiate an ideal meaning-species and impart meaning to a sensible sign that serves as the carrier or bearer of meaning. In his later work, however, without rejecting the ideality of meaning, he rejects the view that meanings are species. Instead he claims that the sense of an object is grasped in a significative intention and that this sense is then made the objective determination of an expressive sign in a signitive intention. See also INTIMATION; OBJECTIVITY.

LASK, EMIL (1875–1915). Emil Lask, a student of Heinrich Rickert, was trained in neo-Kantianism, although he developed a version peculiar to himself. Husserl was much impressed by Lask’s work, and Lask seems the neo-Kantian who is closest in spirit to Husserl. However, important differences remain, most notably the difference between Lask’s ontological understanding of sense and Husserl’s phenomenological understanding. Both, in a sense, are concerned with the object constituted or disclosed in the subjective activities of consciousness just as that object is meant by the subject. But Lask’s concern with this object remains, relative to Husserl’s, somewhat naive and ontological. Husserl with his phenomenological reduction specifically marks the difference between sense as the object in its significance for a subject and the object simpliciter, a difference that Lask does not fully articulate. Given the fact that among the neo-Kantians Lask’s thinking is closest to Husserl’s, it is perhaps just this closeness that marks the difference between phenomenology and neo-Kantianism, for neither Husserl nor Lask accepts the views of the other. Nevertheless, after Lask was killed in action in 1915, Husserl in a letter to Rickert laments the loss of “one of the brightest hopes of German philosophy.”

LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM (1646–1716). One of the most important figures of 17th-century philosophy, Gottfried Leibniz was the culminating figure of the philosophical movement known as rationalism as well as a co-inventor of the calculus. Husserl’s interest in Leibniz centered around issues of logic and mathematics, especially Leibniz’s attempts to unite formal logic and formal mathematics into a purely formal mathesis universalis that would serve as a theory of science.
Husserl in his later philosophy also borrows from Leibniz the term “monad” to refer to the concrete subject with its world.

**LIFE-WORLD** (*Lebenswelt*). Husserl develops the notion of the life-world in his later works, especially *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie* (*The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*), although the notion has a predecessor—at least in part—in the idea of the “surrounding world” or “environment” (*Umwelt*) found in *Ideen II* (*Ideas II*). Husserl’s use of the notion of life-world is ambiguous. On the one hand, he speaks of the life-world as a subjective-relative meaning-fundament for the natural-scientific view of the world. By this he means, first, that the life-world is the world experienced in relation to the interests, the determinations of value, the practices, and the ends of experiencing subjects. In contrast to this, the world disclosed by natural science is not subject-relative. Science achieves this status by abstracting from the subject-relative features of the world in order to develop a purely objective, theoretical account. On the other hand, however, Husserl speaks of the life-world as the surrounding world that is taken for granted by subjects.

Before the rise of the natural sciences, these two senses of “life-world” might have coincided, but once science develops and scientific views become sedimented as habitual understandings in a culture’s understanding of the world, the two meanings of “life-world” divide. Scientific discoveries become fixed in our understanding as they are confirmed; they are transmitted to and passively accepted by subsequent generations. This taken-for-granted life-world provides a basis for new activity and new thought, but it is no longer the same life-world as that which is the meaning-fundament for all science. The latter is a life-world, in fact, in which no one any longer lives. Hence, the concept of the life-world is transformed in its second sense from a critical concept elucidating the nature of science to a social concept whose role in our understanding of the world is made clear in discussions of passive synthesis and in a genetic phenomenology.

**LIVED BODY.** See BODY (*Leib*).

**LIVED EXPERIENCE.** See ENCOUNTER; EXPERIENCE.

**LIVING PRESENT.** The living present is the momentary phase of consciousness. It is not present in the sense of a Now contrasted with the past and future. As a living present, it has a certain “stretch” or extent to it, for in the present the subject is already aware of a temporal extent. The
subject is, for example, aware of a present perceiving as having originated with past, elapsed appearances, as extending into the Now, and as “anticipating” continuing appearances as the perception continues to unfold into the future. This possibility exists because the living present is a compound intentionality that comprises primal impression, retention, and protention and that accounts for inner time-consciousness as well as the awareness of objective time.

LOGIC. Logic is the philosophical discipline that serves as a theory of science. As such, logic comprises both normative and technological (that is, practical or methodological) dimensions. It is normative insofar as it provides the norms by which we distinguish well-formed from ill-formed propositions in a first level of logic that Husserl calls “pure logical grammar” and by which we distinguish good reasoning from bad reasoning in a second level of logic called the “logic of consistency.” Husserl also identifies a third level of logic that he calls the “logic of truth.”

Logic is practical or methodological insofar as it provides rules to follow in the production of good arguments. The normative and methodological dimensions of logic require that there be a theoretical discipline underlying them, for it is possible to know what a good argument is only to the extent that one knows what an argument is. There must be, then, a theoretical discipline that investigates the fundamental concepts pertaining to arguments, concepts such as meaning, proposition, inference, and the like. The candidates for this theoretical discipline are psychology (or a related discipline such as anthropology or biology) and pure logic.

The view that psychology grounds the normative and practical dimensions of logic is psychologism, a view criticized by Husserl. His own view is that pure logic grounds the normative and practical aspects of logic, and his early notion of pure logic becomes developed as transcendental phenomenology, which includes as a moment transcendental logic. See also FORMAL LOGIC.

LOGIC OF CONSEQUENCE (Konsequenzlogik). See LOGIC OF CONSISTENCY.

LOGIC OF CONSISTENCY (Konsequenzlogik). The logic of consistency is the second level of logic, after pure logical grammar, that concerns the rules that govern the relations among propositions. These are the rules of inference that determine what proposition (conclusion) follows as a consequence from other propositions (premises). See also FORMAL LOGIC; PURE LOGIC.
LOGIC OF NON-CONTRADICTION (Logik der Widerspruchslosigkeit).
See LOGIC OF CONSISTENCY.

LOGIC OF TRUTH. Logic as a theory of science is ultimately ordered toward truth. Hence, Husserl identifies as a part of logic a level that is concerned with the truth of conclusions and not merely their validity. Since the truth of a conclusion depends upon a valid inference from true premises, the logic of truth is properly concerned with the evidence in which the premises are given. Husserl’s distinction, in other words, between the logic of consistency and the logic of truth parallels the standard distinction in logic between validity and soundness. See also PURE LOGIC.

LOGICAL CATEGORIES. 1. In the broad sense, everything logical would fall under the two correlated categories of ‘meaning’ and ‘object.’ Hence, in this broad sense, logical categories would be distinguished into meaning-categories and object-categories.
   2. In the narrow sense, logical categories are the meaning-categories. These categories form meanings into logically coherent wholes that are themselves unified meanings. The laws expressing these formal relationships are the laws of pure logical grammar as well as the laws of logical inference belonging to the logic of consistency. See also LOGIC.

LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS (Logische Untersuchungen). Husserl’s first, properly philosophical publication and one of his five major works, the Logical Investigations, published in 1900–1901 are divided into two volumes. The first, the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic,” is devoted in its first 10 chapters to Husserl’s detailed and systematic refutation of psychologism, thereby preparing the way for the specification in the 11th chapter of the idea of pure logic. The second volume (“Investigations Pertaining to Phenomenology and Epistemology”), itself divided into two parts, comprises six investigations in which are found the descriptive-psychological accounts of those experiences in which logical objectivities are intended and known.

In writing the Philosophy of Arithmetic and its planned, but not written, second volume, Husserl came to realize that the grounding of mathematics involved profound philosophical questions affecting not only mathematics but logic and, indeed, all cognition. Moreover, his own dissatisfaction with the psychologism of parts of the Philosophy of Arithmetic led him to criticize all forms of psychologism. These criticisms, developed over the years, were detailed in his sustained argument in the “Prolegomena.” At the same time, having argued for the independence of
logic from psychology, Husserl recognized that one must account for the relation between the ideal meanings proper to logic and the acts in which such meanings are grasped and put to use. Hence, he also turned his attention to a description of intentional experience, a description capable of clarifying how a “subjective” experience, that is, an experience belonging to a subject, can attain “objective” knowledge, that is, knowledge that is valid for an intersubjective community of knowers.

Given that our everyday encounter with logic first occurs in grasping the meaning of expressions, particularly the sentences that express judgments, Husserl addresses the first investigation of the second volume (“Expression and Meaning”) to the theory of meaning (Bedeutung). Here Husserl develops an account of meaning as an ideal species instantiated in individual acts. The particular act is directed to its object (the referent of the expression) by virtue of its instantiating this species; nevertheless, the meaning itself is an ideal entity and not reduced to a real (reell) content of the experience.

If meaning is an ideal species, then meaning is an abstract object of some kind. Hence, Husserl devotes the second investigation to an analysis of the notion of the ‘abstract.’ He criticizes inadequate conceptions of the ‘abstract,’ in particular the views of the classical British empiricists. Husserl identifies an important distinction between the notion of an abstract species, which is an individual, albeit ideal and universal, object and an abstract part or abstract content. Although Husserl has identified meaning as an abstract species in the first edition of the Investigations, he comes to reject explicitly the view that the ideality of meaning is the ideality of a species.

The notion of an abstract content is the starting point of the third investigation (“On the Theory of Wholes and Parts”). Husserl here develops a mereology—a theory of wholes and parts—grounded in the distinction between an abstract or non-independent content or object and an independent content or object. This distinction has systematic significance for Husserl’s phenomenology, underlying his account of eidetic variation and eidetic intuition. In this context, however, Husserl is concerned to develop the “logic” of parts and wholes by developing a set of laws that govern the relationships among non-independent parts as well as those between non-independent parts and the wholes of which they are parts.

The fourth investigation (“The Distinction Between Independent and Non-Independent Meanings and the Idea of Pure Grammar”) develops further the notion of a non-independent part in the domain of meaning. In particular, Husserl develops an account of simple and complex meanings and, more importantly, a theory of syncategorematic meanings on the
basis of the distinctions developed in the third investigation. This theory allows him to develop an account of well-formed propositions. The theory applies to propositions rather than the sentences expressing those propositions. Husserl’s concern, in other words, is with what would be a grammatical construction in any language even though he does not offer a bit of grammar for any particular empirical language. But any language, if it is to be grammatical, would have to embody structures for expressing these well-formed propositions.

The fifth investigation (“On Intentional Experiences and Their ‘Contents’”) distinguishes three senses of consciousness, all of which are correct in their own manner, and identifies one—consciousness as intentional experience—as fundamental. Husserl here outlines those distinctions in terms of which he details the intentionality of conscious experience: real contents versus intentional contents; act-quality versus act-matter; intentional essence versus sensation-contents, what Husserl later calls “hyletic data.” In the light of these distinctions, Husserl refines the notion of presentation (Vorstellung) and reinterprets Franz Brentano’s claim that all experiences are either presentations or founded on presentations. As is the case with the theory of meaning in the first investigation, Husserl significantly revises his account of the distinction between real and intentional content in later works and, consequently, offers in those works an account of intentionality markedly different from that found in the first edition of the Investigations.

The sixth investigation (“Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge”) makes up the second part of the second volume of the Investigations. It is arguably the most important of the investigations because here is found Husserl’s completed account of knowledge, and it clearly brings together the themes of all the earlier investigations. Husserl picks up a distinction from the first investigation, that between empty intentions or meaning-intendings and fulfilling intentions or meaning-fulfillments. In combination with the more detailed account of the structures of intentionality, Husserl now turns his attention to the manner in which our empty intentions are fulfilled and realized as knowledge. The expressive act, with whose analysis Husserl began, intends an object whether or not that object is present to us—indeed, whether or not that object even exists. This is precisely the power of language: it can direct our attention in an empty intention to an object or state of affairs in its absence. Insofar as one is concerned with the truthfulness of expressive acts, one seeks to fulfill that empty intention in a fulfilling, intuitive experience in which the object or state of affairs is given in its full or partial presence. The sixth investigation is the investigation of intuitive
experiences and, in particular, of the category intuitions in which the state of affairs meant in an empty judgment is intuitively grasped.

Although the publication of the Investigations led to Husserl’s appointment at Göttingen, that appointment occurred over the objections of the faculty there. This reaction to his work disappointed Husserl and led him to question its validity, and this along with Husserl’s own recognition that the Investigations needed reworking led him to revise the Investigations. Husserl worked on this project over the next years, but he never published the proposed revisions, which have now appeared in the two-part volume 20 of Husserliana. Instead Husserl made only slight revisions in the first five investigations and published a second edition, minus the sixth investigation, in 1913, the same year he published Ideas I. A second edition of the sixth investigation appeared only in 1921, again without any important changes. It is only in Formale und transzendental Logik that one finds the radical reworking of Husserl’s views on pure logic (or transcendental logic) that fully take into account the transcendental perspective of Ideas I and Husserl’s new views regarding meaning and intentionality. See also MOMENT; PIECE.

LOTZE, RUDOLPH HERMANN (1817–1881). A student of Johann Herbart, Rudolph Lotze was an important opponent of psychologism who insisted on the objectivity of logical content.

– M –

MAKING PRESENT (Vergegenwärtigung). See RE-PRESENTATION.

MANDELBAUM, MAURICE (1908–1987). While Maurice Mandelbaum did not consider himself a phenomenologist in any narrow sense of the term, he wrote an important work in moral phenomenology (The Phenomenology of Moral Experience). His moral phenomenology was influenced by the work of both Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand. Mandelbaum’s work examined the nature of human moral consciousness without arguing for a particular normative viewpoint.

MANIFOLD (Mannigfaltigkeit). 1. A multiplicity in the formal and mathematical sense. 2. A multiplicity in which an identity reveals itself. For example, the perceived object is an identity in a multiplicity of appearances, in a multiplicity of causal relations, for a multiplicity of subjects, and so forth. See also IDENTIFICATION.
MATERIAL A PRIORI. The material a priori is apprehended through eidetic intuition and idealization, and it comprises the necessary and universal features of a particular kind of being. Insights into pure essences and idealizations are directed toward particular types of objects and their defining characteristics, whether this occurs at the level of species, genus, or region. In both essential insight and idealization, therefore, there is a determined material content in the universal which renders it inapplicable to any object whatsoever but definitive of and applicable to a particular kind of object. Because of the presence of this materially determinate core, Husserl claims that essential insight and idealization yield a material a priori or, alternatively, a contingent a priori. Even in the case of the material a priori certain formal a priori conditions hold; the objects comprised by the material region, genus, or species, in other words, must satisfy all the requirements of the formal a priori binding all objects. But there is added to these conditions a material core which as a contingent matter of fact, that is, as dependent upon a material core gathered from experience, limits those variations which can be performed and thereby limits, again as a contingent matter of fact, the discoverable a priori truths governing objects possessing that material core.

For example, the discovery of the a priori of material things or of living things is limited by the formal a priori of objects in general; all material things and all living things alike must be individuals entering into relations with other objects. But in addition to possessing the formal properties of objects, material things and living things must possess a materially determinate core of properties belonging only to a subset of all things. Material things, for example, must be spatially individuated, possess sensible qualities (of some, not yet determinate type), and enter causal relations with other material things. Living things, however, possess a more fully determined material core. In addition to the properties belonging to all objects and to all material things, living things must manifest a particular kind of causality whereby they cause changes in themselves, for example, the changes wrought by exercises of the nutritive power or the locomotive power.

MATERIAL ONTOLOGY. A material ontology is one whose scope is restricted to a particular kind of thing. The limitation is grounded in a determinate and essential material content. At the highest and most general level, this determinate material core is a region; at lower levels it is a genus and then a species. See also FORMAL ONTOLOGY; REGIONAL ONTOLOGY.
MATERIAL THING. A material thing, according to Husserl, is composed of two strata. The lower stratum he calls the “phantom,” that is, the purely sensible thing. The upper stratum is founded on the phantom, and it is the thing in its full materiality and substantiality. What is added to the phantom in this upper stratum is its causal relations with other things and, hence, the causal “properties” of the thing, those properties that are the effects of other objects as well as those properties that can causally affect other things. The material thing, then, is the identity in the manifold of its sensible appearances and properties, and it is the identity in the manifold of causal relations.

MATHEMATICAL LOGIC. Husserl contrasts mathematical logic with the apophantic logic deriving from Aristotle. The formalization present in the Aristotelian apophantic logic is not complete since it remains tied both to the notion of a class and to existence. Franciscus Vieta’s development of the formalization appropriate to algebra allows one to speak of form as that which is applicable to anything at all with a most empty universality that leaves every material determination indeterminately arbitrary. Since algebraic formalization makes possible a purely formal mathematical analysis that abstracts from the materially determinate mathematical disciplines such as geometry, mechanics, and acoustics, there is an even wider concept of “mathematical” form emptied of all material content, even that of quantity. When applied to the forms of judgment, this purely formal analysis yields a syllogistic algebra (as in Augustus De Morgan and George Boole). Mathematical logic, then, concerns the formation of purely formal propositions and their deductive relations. Husserl, in the light of his view concerning the correlation of the judgment as posited and the judgment as supposed, reinterprets mathematical logic—the mathematics of sums and sets and relations—as formal ontology. See also FORMAL LOGIC; MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS; PURE LOGIC.

MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS. Husserl finds in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s notion of mathesis universalis the first systematic attempt to unify the formal apophasis of Aristotle with the formal mathematical analysis deriving from Franciscus Vieta. According to Husserl, Leibniz saw the possibility of combining the formalized scholastic logic with other formal disciplines devoted to the forms that governed, for example, quantity or spatial relations or magnitude. Leibniz distinguished between a narrower and a broader sense of mathesis universalis. In the narrower sense, it is the algebra of our ordinary understanding, the formal science of quantities. But since the formalization at work in algebra already makes conceivable a purely formal mathematical analysis that abstracts from the materially
determinate mathematical disciplines such as geometry, mechanics, and acoustics, we arrive at a broader concept emptied of all material content, even that of quantity. When applied to judgments, this formal discipline yields a syllogistic algebra or mathematical logic. But, according to Leibniz, this formal analysis of judgment ought to be combinable with all other formal analyses. Hence, the broader mathesis universalis would identify the forms of combination applicable in any science, whether quantitative or qualitative. Only thereby would it achieve the formality allowing it to serve as the theory-form for any science, whatever the material region to which that science is directed.

According to Husserl, however, Leibniz does not give an adequate account of how this unity is achieved. Husserl’s development of Leibniz’s notion of mathesis universalis recognizes the identity of apophantic logic and mathematical logic insofar as both apply to the forms of judgments and of arguments at different levels of abstraction. Moreover, when the principles of a mathematical logic are applied to any object whatever, it becomes clear, given the identity of the judgment as posited and the judgments as supposed, that mathematical logic can also be understood as formal ontology. Formal ontology as the formal theory of objects is characterized in the first instance by its contrast with formal apophantic logic. Formal ontology investigates a set of forms—correlative to those we find in apophantic logic—forms that Husserl calls “object-categories” (Gegenstandskategorien). These categories include object, state of affairs, unity, plurality, number, relation, set, ordered set, combination, connection, and the like. Formal ontology, however, is united with formal logic, for logic concerns the state of affairs just as supposed in the judgment. This means that meaning-categories (Bedeutungskategorien) and object-categories are the same forms, but they are considered differently and named differently in the natural and critical attitudes. See also BOOLE, GEORGE; DE MORGAN, AUGUSTUS; PURE LOGIC.

MATTER. See ACT-MATTER; HYLETIC DATA.

MATTERS (Sachen). Husserl’s famous phenomenological slogan was zu den Sachen selbst, usually translated as “[back] to the things themselves.” The slogan was no doubt a reply to the slogan zurück zu Kant of the neo-Kantians. The translation of Sachen as “things” uses the broadest possible English sense of “things.” Husserl’s slogan, in contrast to the neo-Kantian slogan, counseled examining not the texts of past philosophers but the matters at hand (Sachen) themselves.
MEANING (Bedeutung). Husserl in the Logical Investigations distinguishes the meaning of an expression from the meaning-intention that confers a meaning upon the expression, and he also distinguishes the meaning from both the expression’s relation to something objective (reference) and the object (the referent) itself. Meanings, unlike expressive acts and unlike the expression-tokens used in communication, are ideal in the sense that an identical meaning can be present in multiple acts and can be borne by multiple expression-tokens of the same expression-type. Hence, Husserl claims that the meaning of an expression is an ideal species that is instantiated in different expressive acts. Thus each act instantiating that meaning refers to the same objectivity in identically the same manner. Along with the distinction between meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfillments, Husserl also distinguishes between the intending sense (or mere meaning or meaning simpliciter) and the fulfilling sense.

Husserl’s later works, however, reconceive the nature of meaning. In the first place, Husserl recognizes that all acts are meaning-intending, although the term he now uses is “sense” (Sinn) rather than “meaning” (Bedeutung), reserving the latter term exclusively for the meaning of expressive acts. Moreover, he no longer considers the ideal, identical meaning of an expression to be a meaning-species instantiated in multiple expressive acts. Instead he conceives the ideality of the expression’s meaning in relation to the ideality or irreality of the objective correlate of the act, that is, its intentional object. His later account of the meaning of expressive acts is more fully developed in his discussions of noematic sense and of significative intentions and signitive intentions.

MEANING-CATEGORIES (Bedeutungskategorien). The categories of meaning are those logical categories that form meanings into logically coherent wholes that are themselves unified meanings. The laws expressing these formal relationships are the laws of pure logical grammar as well as the laws of logical inference. See also LOGIC OF CONSISTENCY.

MEANING-FULFILLMENT. Meaning-fulfillments are those acts, not essential to expression, that possess intuitive fullness. They thereby fulfill, that is, confirm or illustrate, more or less adequately a meaning-intention and realize the expression’s relation to its referent. In the meaning-fulfillment, the sense-informed expression with its meaning-intention unites in an identity of recognition with the meaning-fulfilling act. See also CONGRUENCE; TRUTH.
MEANING-INTENTION. Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* first developed his account of intentional acts in relation to expressions. Husserl distinguishes in the expression between the physical sign and the act that gives the sign its meaning. Meaning-intentions are meaning-conferring acts; they are essential to expression insofar as they give meaning to the physical sign that serves as the expression’s meaning-carrier. Meaning-conferring acts lack intuitive fullness, that is, they lack a realized relation to the expression’s referent. Meaning-intentions, in other words, function merely significantly, directing our attention to absent objects. Meaning-intentions were distinguished from and contrasted with meaning-fulfillments or meaning-fulfilling acts.

This view of meaning-conferring acts and meaning-intentions is, however, problematic in view of some other positions taken regarding intentionality in the *Investigations*, and Husserl soon began to modify his position. All acts came to be seen as disclosing meaning, although Husserl began in the first volume of *Ideas* to use the term “sense” (*Sinn*) to describe this phenomenon, reserving the term “meaning” (*Bedeutung*) for the meaning of expressions. In this new context, Husserl distinguished significative from signitive intentions.

MEANING-SPECIES. In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl conceived the ideality of meaning along the lines of the ideality of a species. Hence, he thought that meaning was a species instantiated in a meaning-intending act and, in particular, in the act-matter. The meaning thereby determined the reference of the act to an object in a particular manner. Subsequently, however, Husserl recognized that the ideality of meaning was to be distinguished from the ideality of the species. The ideality of meaning was to be understood instead as ir-reality. The ir-reality of the noema supplanted the ideality of meaning, and the noematic sense supplanted act-matter. See also MEANING-INTENTION.

MEINONG, ALEXIUS (1853–1920). Alexius Meinong, whose teaching career was spent largely at the University of Graz (Austria) was, like Husserl, a student of Franz Brentano at the University of Vienna. He is best known for his “theory of objects” (*Gegenstandstheorie*). Like Husserl, Meinong rejected the Brentanian view that the intentional object (*Gegenstand*) is immanent to consciousness. Meinong does, however, allow that the intentional content (*Inhalt*) of the act exists “in” consciousness, thereby echoing Kasimir Twardowski’s distinction between the act, the content, and the object. Meinong claimed that all mental acts have objects, and, he further claimed, that when the object of the act is not
an actual existent, the object is “outside” being. It is this claim that provides the basis for Meinong’s theory of objects.

Mental acts can be directed both to a logical contradiction (the round square) and empirical non-existents (green virtue or the golden mountain). It is precisely this sort of consideration that led Brentano to view the intentional object as an immanent objectivity regardless of its transcendental existence or non-existence. Furthermore, mental acts can be directed to individual realities that do not exist in the present, but have existed or will exist. But Meinong rejects any response distinguishing between the immanent “merely presented” object and the transcendent actuality (or non-actuality). It is clear to Meinong that the objects to which our experiences are directed cannot be immanent, for there is no acceptable sense in which we can say that the golden mountain exists immanently in us. What does exist “in” the act is the content ‘golden mountain,’ but that is a far cry from saying that the golden mountain itself exists in our acts. When we speak of the golden mountain, we are not referring to the content of our experience.

Moreover, as seen in the case of intending past and future objects, the content and the actual object have different properties. Intending in a memorial presentation the no-longer existent maple tree in the front yard of the house occurs in the present. Since the presentation is in the present, so too must its content be in the present. But the intended object is past. The content in which an object appears is real, present, and psychic, but the object appearing in it might be non-real, not presently existent, and non-psychic. Such differences in properties are what requires the distinction between the content and object of the act.

Finally, mental acts can be directed also to ideal relations (such as the equality of ‘3’ and ‘2 + 1’ or the difference between red and green). Statements of these ideal relations express truths, but the relations do not exist in the way individual physical objects, e.g., the desk and the door, exist. Ideal relations subsist, whereas the round square, green virtue, and the golden mountain neither exist nor subsist. According to Meinong, an ontology must account for the being of such “non-existent,” “non-actual,” ideal objectives.

MEMORY (Errinerung). Memory is the present encounter of a past object precisely as past. Husserl rejects the view that the memorial presentation of a past object is mediated by an image or sensuous content that is itself present. Husserl maintains that such a view is contradictory for a present image or content cannot present anything as past. The memorial presentation, according to Husserl, directly apprehends the past as such.
What makes the grasp of the past possible is retention, the holding on to past phases of the flow of experience. Early in his career, Husserl called retention “primary memory” to distinguish it from “secondary memory,” that is, memory in its ordinary sense as directed to the past as past. Retention itself does not present something as past; it retains the past in a manner that allows our past experiences to inform a present experience. But the holding on to past experiences in the flow of consciousness makes it possible to turn one’s attention explicitly and thematically to the retained past as past. In so doing, one remembers.

Memory, therefore, is the intentional directedness to the past experience as past, and by virtue of its directedness to the past experience of a particular object, it is directed to that object as well and precisely as past. The thematic attention of the memory can be either the past experience as past (for example, I remember seeing the art exhibit last week) or the object itself as past (for example, I remember our first house as it looked when we bought it). In the latter case, the house is not presented but re-presented. But the structure underlying both memories is the same: attention is turned to the past experience in which the object was given in a determinate manner. See also IMAGINATION; PERCEPTION; RECOLLECTION; RE-PRESENTATION.

MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE (1908–1961). Maurice Merleau-Ponty was interested in both philosophy and psychology, especially Gestalt psychology, and his psychological interests led him to important philosophical insights. His first work La structure du comportement (The Structure of Behavior) in 1942 argued that animal behavior was not to be explained in behaviorist terms. Instead the animal, so Merleau-Ponty argued, experiences a structured environment as having a certain significance to which it makes a meaningful response. This focus on meaning led Merleau-Ponty naturally to phenomenology, which he developed in an original way. Merleau-Ponty’s major work La phénoménologie de la perception (The Phenomenology of Perception) in 1945 developed this dialogical approach to a bodily organism’s awareness of a significant world, an approach encapsulated in Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine of the body-subject. This approach relied on positions Husserl adopted in the then-unpublished “Thing-lecture” of 1907 (Ding und Raum) and the also then-unpublished Ideen II (Ideas II), but Merleau-Ponty developed some of these ideas in new directions. Most importantly, perhaps, the development of the idea of the body-subject led Merleau-Ponty to important new positions regarding space, motility, and sexuality as well as significantly new views regarding aesthetics and aesthetic perception. Merleau-Ponty’s later work moved in the direction of a philosophy of
language and of politics. His final, unfinished work develops—or, on some views, abandons—the notion of the body-subject in that of the ‘flesh.’

MILL, JOHN STUART (1806–1873). John Stuart Mill was Britain’s most significant 19th-century philosopher. An empiricist in his epistemology and a liberal in his politics, Mill’s contributions to the empiricistic tradition were the most important after David Hume in epistemology and John Locke in ethics and politics. From Husserl’s perspective, the most important feature of Mill’s philosophy is its psychologism regarding logic. Indeed, Mill’s System of Logic (1843) is one of the main targets of Husserl’s critique of psychologism in the “Prolegomena” to the Logical Investigations.

MODALITY. A general term for what Husserl more specifically calls “doxic modalities” and “being-modalities.” These two kinds of modality are correlative with one another. Belief-characteristics or doxic modalities are noetic. The primal doxic modality—the “protodoxa”—is the certainty that belongs to perception, the simple certainty that the object perceived exists as perceived. This doxic certainty can vary in multiple ways. It is subject, for example, in a process called “modalization,” to neutralizing, to doubting, to deeming likely or possible, and to nullifying or negating. Correlatively, the being-modalities are noematic, characterizing the object of the experience. The correlative of doxic certainty is the actuality of the object, of doubting the doubtfulness of the object, of deeming possible the possibility of the object, and so forth. See also FULL NOEMA; THETIC CHARACTERISTIC.

MODALIZATION. The process in which the belief-certainty that accompanies perception (Wahrnehmung) and the judgments rooted therein is transformed into a new belief-modality. This process arises in the disappointment of the empty intentions (protentions) that form a part of a subject’s encounter of an object or state of affairs. This disappointment leads to a reappraisal of our sense that the object or state of affairs exists as experienced. In this process the subject now experiences the dubitability of the object or state of affairs as originally experienced.

Belief-certainty in the actuality of the object or state of affairs is restored by an evidence that intuits the object or states of affairs as originally intended. Conversely, the intuitive evidence might disclose the object or state of affairs as other than originally intended, thereby grounding the negation of the original perception or judgment. There are also intermediate possibilities between affirmation and negation. It is
possible, for example, that on the basis of a partial evidence the subject will deem a judgment likely and posit a likelihood of S's being \( p \) on this basis. All of these intentional moves are modifications of the original belief-modality and being-modality and are thereby modalizations of that original modality.

MODE OF BEING. A mode of being is a being-modality.

MODE OF GIVENNESS (Gegebenheitsweise). The mode of givenness is related to what Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* first called act-quality. The distinction among modes of givenness is a distinction among the kinds of experiences in which an object may be disclosed, that is, as perceived or remembered or imagined or doubted and so forth. Husserl contrasts the mode (Weise) of givenness to the how (Wie) of givenness, that is, to the object in the “how” of its determinations, the table as rectangular. The object in the how of its determinations is the noematic sense. See also MODALITY.

MOMENT. A moment is any part that is non-independent relative to the whole of which it is a part. A moment, in other words, is an abstract part or abstract content that cannot exist apart from other parts with which it forms a concrete whole. Moments are non-independent, therefore, in relation both to one another and to the whole that they compose. Moments supplement one another necessarily, and it is this notion of necessary supplementation arising out of a necessity in the nature of the things presented that defines Husserl's notion of the non-independence of moments.

Husserl views the notion of moment as central to his formal ontology. Sometimes, however, he presents the notion in presentational terms, that is, he claims that a moment is a non-independent content insofar as it is an element in a presentational complex, but an element that does not by its nature permit of a separate presentation. For example, color and extension are both moments, since each is presented only along with the other. While color and extension can be distinguished and independently varied, in maintaining a constant color and varying the extension, only the species of extension that limits the color is truly varied. The genus 'extension' is not replaced with another genus. Replacing 'extension' with another genus would eliminate the extension altogether and simultaneously eliminate the visual color. Similarly, in varying the color, only the species of color is varied; color is not entirely removed, for, were it to be, visual extension would also be eliminated. Hence, visual color and visual extension are not separately presentable; they are interwoven in their
presentation, and the presentation of one moment is necessarily supplemented by the presentation of the other. The inseparability and interweaving of the presentation of moments is an indication of the non-independent existence of the moments. See also ABSTRACTUM; CONCRETUM; PIECE.

MOMENTARY PHASE. The momentary phase of consciousness is that phase the subject experiences, in the sense of lives through (erleben), in the present. It is incorrect to think of the momentary phase as the experience I undergo in the Now, for the momentary phase encompasses more than the Now. In the momentary phase of consciousness, in other words, I am aware of temporal objects that have arisen in the past, endure in the Now, and extend into the future. The momentary phase encompasses more than the Now; it has a temporal “stretch” to it. Husserl refers to this momentary phase with its consciousness of succession as the “living present.” It is made possible by the complex intentionality belonging to absolute consciousness, a complex intentionality that encompasses primal impression, retention, and protention. See also INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS.

MONAD. Husserl uses this term, borrowed from Gottfried Leibniz, to refer to the subject considered as a concretum, that is, as a subject including all its real (reell) and intentional components. The monad is the concrete ego as a personal subject. However, whereas Leibniz’s monads are “windowless,” Husserl’s are not. Leibniz views each monad as an independent substance, and all the monad’s actions and passions arise out of its own individual nature. The individual nature, in other words, provides a sufficient reason for everything that the substance does or undergoes. There are no genuine relations among monads, and the appearance of such is a function of the fact that God ordains the unfolding of monads through time in a pre-established harmony. Husserl, on the other hand, conceives monads as having “windows.” Monads enter into various kinds of real and intentional relations, especially those of empathy and co-constitution of the world. Hence, for Husserl, the existence of monads entails an intermonadic community for which the world is an intersubjective and objective world.

MONADOLOGY. The science of monads. For Husserl, this involves an account of intersubjectivity and, in particular, the intersubjective constitution of the world.
MONOTHETIC. The term “monothetic” is contrasted with “polythetic,” and both refer to the intentional rays involved in an experience. Monothetic rays have a single directedness; they are directed to a single, unarticulated object, as in the perception of an apple. While there is a synthesis of a multiplicity of perceptual phases in the perception of the apple, the act considered as a concrete temporal unity has a single object.

MOOD. A mood is a synthetic unity of feelings that enters the horizon of our experiences of objects. In particular, moods serve as an affective horizon of experience, whether those experiences are themselves affective or cognitive. Insofar as moods provide an affective context, they do not have a specific and direct intentional direction to an object in the way that feeling-acts and emotions do. The intentional relation of a mood to an object is instead mediated and indeterminate; it “colors” the experience of objects without revealing particular affective characteristics in the way that fear, say, discloses a situation as dangerous. If, however, one’s mood is apprehensive, that will initiate and sustain fearful acts such that one’s fearfulness in a situation is heightened.

MORPHÉ (ìï kn Þ). The intentional form is that which animates the presenting or representing contents (hyletic data or àëç) belonging to an act. Husserl also referred to the intentional form as “apprehension.” In general, however, with the exception of the impressional moment within the living present, Husserl abandoned the view that claimed that intentional acts comprise an apprehension animating presenting or representing contents. See also PRIMAL IMPRESSION.

MORPHOLOGICAL ESSENCE. A morphological essence is an essence that is characterized by a determinate material content and is known in an ideating act Husserl calls generalization. Morphological essences are distinguished from exact essences; unlike the latter, morphological essences involve a measure of inexactness or vagueness. Determining whether an object belongs to the extension of the morphological concept is sometimes a difficult question. See also EXACT EXPRESSION; EXACTNESS; FORMALIZATION; IDEALIZATION; IDEATING ABSTRACTION.

MOTIVATION. Motivation involves a descriptive unity among different acts of consciousness or phases within a single act of consciousness such that the intentional correlates of those acts or phases become constituted for the thinker as involving a certain kind of unity. Motivation for Husserl is distinguished from causation; one act or act-phase provides a
reason—justified or not, certain or probable—to join another act or act-phase to it. For example, a continuous bodily activity—turning the head to the right, for example—is felt in kinaesthetic sensations and this activity with its appertinent kinaesthetic sensations motivates a flow of appearances such that the perceiver experiences this flow of appearances as constituting a synthetic unity and presenting an identical perceived object. See also CONSTITUTION; SYNTHESIS.

MOTIVE. A motive is that which within an act or experience motivates a synthetic unity among senses (Sinne). See also CONSTITUTION; MOTIVATION; SYNTHESIS.

MULTIPLICITY (Mannigfaltigkeit). The term Mannigfaltigkeit as used by Husserl poses difficult translational problems. The term was used in the mathematics of the late 19th-century in relation both to set theory and to geometry and, in particular, to the theory of Euclidean and non-Euclidean manifolds. In Husserl’s usage, a multiplicity is the correlate of a theory-form. It is a set of objects that is and can be governed by the operations proper to a theory-form, which operations are defined by a set of elementary, logical laws.

A theory unites a series of logically related propositions into a unity that describes and explains a certain region of beings. The formalization of the logical relations obtaining among the propositions of a theory yields a theory-form. Several theories might have the same theory-form, and the science that examines theory-forms for relations of conjunction, disjunction, inclusion, and the like is the theory of theory-forms. A multiplicity is the objective correlate of a theory-form; hence, a multiplicity is a formal object that manifests relations correlative to the logical relations obtaining among the propositions comprised by the theory. The relations of the states of affairs articulated by the judgments belonging to the theory are governed by the theory-form, and the objects and states of affairs themselves make up the multiplicity.

The theory of multiplicities, then, is the theory that explains the relations of conjunction, disjunction, inclusion, and so forth among these objects and states of affairs considered from a purely formal point of view. Because the state of affairs as judged belongs to the apophantic domain, ultimately the theory of theory-forms and the theory of multiplicities are united in formal mathematics. Because, in other words, the mathematician or formal logician disconnects the interest in truth in favor of the interest in consistency, the examination of the formal relations among judgments and the examination of formal relations among objects as supposed and the states of affairs into which such objects enter, consid-
See also APOPHAN-SIS; APOPHANTIC LOGIC; FORMAL LOGIC; PURE LOGIC; THEORETICAL SCIENCE.

MUNDANE. A synonym for “worldly,” “mundane” has the sense of real (real) object or event. The distinction in Husserl between the mundane and the transcendental is roughly analogous to Martin Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic and the ontological.

MUNDANE PHENOMENOLOGY. Mundane phenomenology is a descriptive science of the intentional experiences of a psychological subject in the world. See also TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY.

MUNICH CIRCLE. A group of students that included Johannes Daubert organized themselves around the psychologist Theodor Lipps in Munich. After the publication of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Daubert traveled to Göttingen to visit Husserl. Persuaded by Husserl’s refutation of psychology, of which Lipps himself was guilty, Daubert introduced Husserl’s work to other students in Munich, and this group came to be known as the “Munich Circle.” The group also included Adolf Reinach, Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pfänder, and, somewhat later around 1906, Max Scheler. Husserl was very interested in this group, traveling at least once to meet them and deliver a lecture. Reinach and Scheler both subsequently went to Göttingen and became active members of the Göttingen Philosophical Society. The Munich School was committed to a form of metaphysical realism and a Platonism regarding ideal objects that finds its roots in the first edition of the Logische Untersuchungen, but which Husserl arguably abandoned after 1907. Pfänder wrote an important work on the will; Geiger did significant work in aesthetics; and Reinach did very important work on the theory of law and of speech acts.

NATANSON, MAURICE (1924–1996). Maurice Natanson, an American-born phenomenologist, earned a Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Nebraska and a Ph.D. in social science at the New School for Social Research in New York. Natanson held teaching positions at the University of Houston, the University of North Carolina, the University of California at Santa Cruz, and Yale University. A renowned teacher, he wrote notable
works in the fields of the phenomenology of the social sciences and the philosophy of literature. He achieved the rare honor of winning the National Book Award for non-fiction for his 1973 book *Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks*.

**NATORP, PAUL (1854–1924).** Paul Natorp was one of the leading figures of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. He was influential in moving Husserl away from an overly psychological approach to philosophical questions and toward a more transcendental approach. Nevertheless, he and Husserl differed in important ways. The most famous point of difference is Husserl’s rejection in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* of Natorp’s notion of the purely formal ego of apperception. By the time of the second edition, however, Husserl claims to have found the pure ego, but it is an ego that is importantly different from the ego he could not earlier find. Whereas Natorp posits the transcendental unity of apperception as the consequence of a transcendental argument that reconstructs the synthetic unity of all experience, Husserl claims—consistent with his more empiricistic leanings—to “find” the ego, to grasp it in an intuitive moment in the course of describing the structures of experience. These two, related differences—reconstruction versus description and argument versus intuition—mark the most important divergences between the neo-Kantian and phenomenological traditions.

**NATURAL ATTITUDE.** The natural attitude takes for granted both the existence of the world in which the objects of a subject’s experiences are thought to exist and the validity of the subject’s judgments about these objects. Characteristic of the natural attitude, in other words, is what Husserl calls its “general thesis,” the belief that the world before one is a factually existent world and that it presents itself as a factually existent actuality. The natural attitude comprises the naive, straightforward attitude in which subjects experience worldly objects as existent actualities, and it also encompasses two generalized attitudes: the practico-religious attitude that considers the actual world as a whole in its response to compelling existential and practical questions; and the theoretical attitude that also regards the world as a whole but apart from any practical considerations in order to understand the nature and workings of the world. See also NEUTRALIZATION; PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE; TRANSCENDENTAL ATTITUDE.

**NATURAL SCIENCE.** The natural sciences are characterized by three essential features: they are undertaken in a theoretical attitude that
NATURALISM. The view that considers everything exclusively as a natural being, that is, as a spatio-temporal being enmeshed in a causally mechanistic, purely physical world. Whatever exists, on this view, exists as either a physical individual subject to causal laws or as a merely dependent function of physical variations, which variations are themselves governed by fixed laws. What is most problematic about naturalism in Husserl’s view is its tendency to reduce the psychic to the physical, thereby naturalizing consciousness and collapsing into psychologism. Naturalism, in other words, both fails to grasp the psychic properly and collapses all ideal laws, most importantly, those of logic, and all ideal norms into merely empirical laws and normative generalizations. See also NATURAL SCIENCE.

NATURALISTIC ATTITUDE. The naturalistic attitude is a species of the natural attitude, and it is contrasted with the personalistic attitude. Someone unreflectively experiencing objects in the naturalistic attitude takes physical nature to exhaust reality, where physical nature is understood as the domain which is the object of the natural sciences, including empirical psychology. In the naturalistic attitude, one takes the constructions of science as the “real,” and replaces the world as lived, with its cultural objects that are human achievements having functional and axiological attributes, with the world as mere material nature. The naturalistic attitude absolutizes nature, the merely physical world. See also PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE; TRANSCENDENTAL ATTITUDE.
NEUTRALITY-MODIFICATION. See NEUTRALIZATION.

NEUTRALIZATION. Neutralization can be considered both the activity and the result of what Husserl calls the “neutrality-modification.” Characteristic of the natural attitude is the belief expressed by its general thesis, that is, that the world in which the objects of one’s experiences exist is a factual existent and presents itself as such. Neutralization is the suspension of one’s participation in this general thesis and the general positing of the world that goes along with it.

Neutralization can occur in a variety of experiential contexts. In, for example, the modalization of belief into doubt, the subject neutralizes, say, a particular judgment, neither affirming nor denying it. The subject focuses attention on the judgment simply as a supposition about the world. This neutralizing modalization involves a shift from the natural to a critical attitude that characterizes not only ordinary experiences of doubt but also the critical questioning that characterizes scientific or theoretical experiences. Neutralization also underlies what we might more narrowly call a “logical” or “mathematical” attitude, in which the subject does not seek confirmation or disconfirmation of judgments but is concerned solely with the deductive relations existing among different propositions or among objects considered purely formally. The neutralizing suspension of belief is found yet again in aesthetic awareness. A member of a theater audience, for example, does not posit an actor’s being assaulted on stage as a real worldly event, and this precludes the audience member from rushing to the stage in order to intervene on behalf of the assaulted actor. What is experienced is a merely portrayed assault, a portrayal whose reality is posited while the reality of what is portrayed is neutralized.

The phenomenological reduction or “bracketing” of the natural world-belief also involves just such a neutralization of belief, although in this case the neutralization is universal in scope. The bracketing of the natural belief in the existence of the world and its objects neither affirms nor denies natural belief and neither posits nor negates the existence of the world and its objects. Rather, the world and its objects, precisely as experienced, remain available for phenomenological reflection.

The neutrality-modification, in brief, is invariably a moment within shifts of attitude that focus our attention, in one way or another, precisely on the sense of the object of our regard. But the neutrality-modification is only a moment in these shifts of attitude, for they are all also characterized by a certain kind of interest. So, in the critical attitude the interest concerns the truth or falsity of my experience; in the logical or mathematical attitude the interest concerns the logical relations obtaining among
propositions or objects considered purely formally; in the aesthetic attitude
the interest is in the significance of, say, the drama, its meaning for us,
rather than its worldliness; and in the phenomenological attitude the
interest is in describing the essential structures of intentional experience.

NISHIDA, KITARO (1870–1945). Kitaro Nishida, the founder of the Kyoto
School, introduced Western philosophical ideas, including phenomenol-
ogy, into Japan and employed both Western and Buddhist ideas in
addressing philosophical problems. At the same time Nishida, who, unlike
his own students, did not study under any of the European phenomenolo-
gists, maintained a critical distance from phenomenology. Nishida was
concerned to overcome oppositions and to identify the ultimate unity in all
things. His thought was phenomenological to the extent that he explored
the different types of experiences in order to identify the unity pervasive
to each and all of them, but in the end Nishida’s thought was dialectical
in character. Nishida’s most renowned work is Zen no kenyku (A Study of
the Good).

NOEMA. Husserl introduced the technical term noema in Ideas I (1913) to
denote the intentional object of conscious experience. In that work he
describes the intentionality of experience as a noesis-noema correlation.
Whereas noesis refers to a real (reell) content of experience, viz., the
meaning-intention which is directed toward an object in a determinate
manner and with a certain positional or thetic characteristic, noema
refers to the intentional content of the experience, its “objective”
correlate, i.e., the intentional object or the object as intended.

Husserl’s account of the noema, however, appears ambiguous. In
speaking of the noema, Husserl uses the language of objects suggesting
the noema is the intended object itself but simply as intended (for
example, the perceived as such, as perceived); the language of contents
(ir-real, ideal, or intentional contents); and the language of sense (that is,
language which connects the notion of noema to that of sense as a
determinate mode of presentation). This apparent ambiguity has
generated much controversy regarding how to interpret the notion of the
noema.

Some, for example, Johannes Daubert, criticized the very idea of the
noema. Among those who did not, however, there arose two main
interpretations. The first emphasizes the similarities between Gottlob
Frege’s notion of sense and Husserl’s notion of the noema. On this view,
the noema is an abstract entity that mediates the relation of the noesis to
the intended object. The view combines two claims: the intentional object
or noema is the intentional content but not the intended object of the act,
and the *noema* is an abstract, intensional entity, which is to be understood as a linguistically expressible *meaning* and to be characterized basically as Gottlob Frege characterized meaning. On one version of this interpretation, the *noema* is an abstract ideal object, that is, a *meaning-species* that is instantiated in acts or, alternatively, a type that is tokened in individual acts. On another version, the *noema* is an abstract particular entertained by the act and referring to the intended object.

The second interpretation emphasizes the *noema* as the intended object precisely as intended, and it is thereby committed to deny the ontological distinction between *noema* (intentional object) and intended object posited by the first interpretation. On this view, in other words, Husserl’s adoption of the technical term *noema* is meant to indicate that one is speaking of the intended object from a philosophical, rather than a natural, perspective after having performed the *phenomenological reduction* and entered the *phenomenological attitude*. In employing this technical language, Husserl introduces no new existents; he merely transforms the way in which we attend to intended objects. The *noema* is the intended *objectivity* philosophically considered, just as it is intended with its *significance* for us, in relation to our animating interests and concerns, and with certain thetic characteristics. Once again, there are two versions of this interpretation. One characterizes the relation between the intended object and the multiplicity of noemata presenting the single intended object as a *whole* of noematic *parts*. On this view, the object, more precisely, is the ideally realizable, but not actually realized or realizable, totality of noemata presenting it. The other version characterizes this relation as an identity-in-a-manifold, wherein each phase of the *manifold* discloses the identical object in its horizontal connections to other phases of the manifold.

Some, but by no means all, interpreters argue that the differences between the two interpretations are not as marked as they first appear and can be reconciled. Others—again by no means all—argue that both interpretations are correct within a limited range of application—the second interpretation for *perceptions*, the first for non-perceptual experiences.

These interpretational differences have to do with what Husserl on occasion calls the “full” *noema*. He distinguishes in the *full noema* three *moments*: the *thetic characteristic* (the noematic correlate of the *actuality*), the *noematic sense* (the assimilation of *act-matter* into the newly conceived intentional content), and the *determinable* $X$ (the “innermost *moment*” of the *noema*). See also *HORIZON*; *IDEAL CONTENT*; *IDENTIFICATION*; *IR-REAL CONTENTS*.

**NOEMATIC CORE.** See *NOEMATIC SENSE*. 
NOEMATIC NUCLEUS. See NOEMATIC SENSE.

NOEMATIC SENSE. Husserl distinguishes within the noema two moments: the thetic characteristic and the noematic sense. Husserl’s characterization of the noema as “the perceived [object] as perceived,” “the remembered [object] as remembered,” “the judged [state of affairs] as judged,” or, more generally “the intended [object] just as intended” foreshadows this distinction. The object’s manners of givenness with its appropriate thetic characteristic—for example, in perception the object as perceived is believed to exist—is distinguished from the noematic sense. Husserl uses the image of a core to distinguish the noematic sense from the full noema: the noematic sense is at the core of the full noema. The noematic sense, then, corresponds to what Husserl had formerly called act-matter, and it accounts for the presentation of the object in a determinate manner. In particular, the identical object is given with its “attributes” or, as Husserl sometimes puts it, its “predicates.” This reveals that the noematic sense is itself further distinguished into two moments: the determinable X which is the formal placeholder for the identical object and the attributes or predicates belonging to or predicable of that object.

NOESIS. Husserl introduced the technical term noesis to refer to what he had formerly identified as the apprehension of an object in experience, an apprehension that bears the mark of intentionality. Noesis refers, then, to the real (reef) content of the experience, namely, the meaning-intention which is directed toward an object in a determinate manner and with certain positional or thetic characteristics. In a broad sense, the term can be used to refer to the subjective side of the intentional correlation, but in its proper sense it refers only to the apprehension or intending of the object. See also NOEMA; REAL CONTENTS.

NOMINAL ACT. A nominal act is an expressive act that names an object. The nominal act employs a word or group of words that do or could serve as the complete simple (that is, not grammatically compound) subject of a statement (even when this subject is a complex state of affairs that has been nominalized). See also NOMINALIZATION; NON-POSITING ACT; OBJECTIFYING ACT; POSITING ACT.

NOMINALIZATION. Nominalization involves the transformation of a complex, articulated object disclosed in a many-rayed synthesis, for example, a judgment, into a single-rayed meaning that can serve as the grammatically simple subject of a statement. Husserl typically speaks of
nominalizing judgments, for example, the judgment ‘S is p’ can be transformed into the nominalized subject “that S is p” and can itself become the subject of a judgment as expressed, for example, in the sentence, “That S is p is fortunate.”

**NON-INDEPENDENT CONTENT.** *See* MOMENT.

**NON-INDEPENDENT PART.** *See* MOMENT.

**NON-OBJECTIFYING ACT.** A non-objectifying act does not present an object to consciousness. Some feelings, for example, present the bodily self, but do not present it as an object. Instead, those feelings present the body as a bodily subject undergoing certain experiences. In some case, the object, in the light of these feelings, is recognized as possessing certain attributes. The tensing of the stomach muscles in fear, for example, present an already objectified situation as dangerous. *See also* NON-POSITING ACT; OBJECTIFYING ACT; POSITING ACT.

**NON-POSITING ACT.** A non-positing act does not intend or mean its object as actually existent. *See also* NON-OBJECTIFYING ACT; OBJECTIFYING ACT; POSITING ACT.

**NONSENSE (Unsinn).** Nonsense arises when meanings are combined in such a way that no unified meaning results. Nonsense involves a violation of the laws of pure logical grammar. An example is “Or is green.” *See also* COUNTERSENSE; PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.

**NOW-PHASE.** The now-phase is that phase in the stream of lived experience that is temporally present. It is, in other words, the temporally present in subjective or phenomenal time. It is the correlate of the moment of primal impression in absolute consciousness or the living present, whereas the past and future phases of lived experience and phenomenal time are the correlates, respectively, of retention and protention. *See also* INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS.

**NUMBER.** Husserl’s early interest in mathematics reveals itself in his first philosophical investigations (“On the Concept of Number” and the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*). These works analyze the “psychological” or phenomenological origins of the presentation of number and trace mathematics to what Husserl then thought its fundamental notion, namely, cardinal number. Husserl grounds his analysis of the presentation of number in the spontaneous activities of collecting and combining, and he
identifies the content of the concept as “something and something and so on.” The “something” reveals that the concept of number is a purely formal concept, whereas the “and” captures the sense of collective combination.

One experiences a number in experiencing a multiplicity as a unified group that is the object of a unitary interest, although the particular nature of the objects making up the multiplicity is irrelevant to the experience of number. The experience of the unified group (for example, a flock of birds) does not exhaust the experience of a number. The experience of a number arises only in the experience of a determinate group when a second-order, reflective act upon the acts presenting the individual members of the group grasps the connection among the objects so given. Husserl believed, however, that only the first few cardinal numbers—perhaps up to 12—were actually presented in the activity of collective combination. His treatment of the larger cardinals was very different. For these, Husserl took the connections between the acts as a symbol of the collective combination among the objects of those acts.

Husserl later abandoned as psychologistic his account of the higher cardinal numbers, and he likewise abandoned his claim that the concept of cardinal number is the foundational concept for mathematical analysis. Husserl’s later analyses take up the question of negative and irrational numbers, as well as the sense of ordinal numbers. Even as Husserl extends his analyses of number, however, they recede into the background of his phenomenology as his attention turns more directly to logic, rather than arithmetic and mathematics, and to the phenomenological analysis of experience in general. See also FORMAL A PRIORI; PHENOMENOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGISM; PSYCHOLOGY.

OBJECT (Gegenstand or Objekt). An object in the broad sense that Husserl uses is anything that stands over against a subject as that to which the subject’s act is intentionally directed. Objects can be real (real) or ideal objects, and they can be individual, categorial, or universal objects. The object of an act need not be existent. While some translators distinguish the two German terms by capitalizing “object” when translating Objekt, there is no substantive difference in Husserl’s use of the two German terms. See also INTENTIONAL OBJECT; INTENTIONALITY; NOEMA.
OBJECTIFYING ACT. Objectifying acts—the class of acts denoted by what Husserl takes to be the most precise sense of the term “presentation”—are those acts in which something becomes objective to us in a determinate manner. Objectifying acts may be either pre-predicative or predicative, that is, objectifying acts include both nominal and perceptual acts as well as judgmental and propositional acts. The class of objectifying acts also includes both positing and non-positing acts. Objectifying acts may also involve either intuitive acts that present an object directly and include intuitive fullness or they may be (founded) signifying acts with their signitive intentions that present an object through the medium of a sign—a complex of words, for example.

Hence, an objectifying act presents an object to consciousness, which object might be either an individual or a state of affairs and which object might or might not be meant as existent. The objectifying act establishes both the act’s objective sense and its referent.

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl adopts the view that acts, including objectifying acts, are composed of act-quality and act-matter, and the sense and referent of an act is determined primarily by its matter. Hence, Husserl claims that Franz Brentano’s thesis that every act is either a presentation or based on a presentation is reinterpreted as the claim that every intentional experience is either an objectifying act or based on an objectifying act. In the latter case, the founded act must contain an objectifying act such that the matter of the founded act is (at least in part) the same as the matter of the objectifying act that can be separated out from the founded act. Ultimately, according to Husserl, every act must be grounded in a simple nominal or perceptual act such that the matter of the founded act includes the matter of the objectifying act that presents the unarticulated referent with a certain significance, and such that the quality of the founded act is rooted in the objectifying quality of the underlying act. In the works from Ideas I on, however, Husserl transforms what he had called the matter of the act into the noematic sense contained within the full noema. It is this noematic sense that determines the referent. Hence, although Husserl does not drop the
language of objectifying acts, the notion of noematic sense takes over in
Husserl’s later philosophy some of the role of the objectifying act. In the
later works, in other words, the noematic sense of the founded act must
have as a component the noematic sense (objective sense) proper to an
originally objectifying act, that is, a nominal or perceptual act that could
occur independently of the founded stratum.

Moreover, in works subsequent to the Logical Investigations, Husserl
also draws a distinction between significative intentions and signitive
intentions. The former are the intentions belonging to objectifying acts,
whereas the latter are the intentions belonging to expressive acts. The
former present an object with a certain significance, whereas the latter are
the intentions belonging to the act expressing in words the sense belonging
to the objectifying act. See also FOUNDED MOMENT; INTUITION;
JUDGMENT; NOMINAL ACT; PERCEPTION.

OBJECTIVATING ACT. See OBJECTIFYING ACT.

OBJECTIVE EXPRESSION. Objective expressions are those whose
meaning does not vary from use to use. They can be understood apart
from any reference to the person using the expression or to the circum-
stances in which the expression is used. See also OCCASIONAL
EXPRESSION.

OBJECTIVE SENSE. The sense of an objectifying act by virtue of which
the object appears or is significant to us in a particular, more or less
determinate manner. The objective sense presents the object precisely as
an object, as that toward which the intention is directed, and as that toward
whose fulfilling sense the intention strives. See also NOEMATIC SENSE.

OBJECTIVE TIME. The temporal flow in which spatial objects endure,
temporal objects process, and events occur. Objective time, unlike
subjective or phenomenal time, is measured in units. See also INNER
TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS.

OBJECTIVITY. 1. An objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) is that toward which
an intentional act is directed. The term is broad enough to encompass
anything that stands over against the subject intending it. It is more or less
equivalent to “object” (Gegenstand), although the latter term is often
restricted to real (real), individual objects, whereas the former term is
sometimes used as a covering term to include not only these but also
categorial objectivities or ideal objects.
2. Objectivity is a characteristic of knowledge. At the most primitive level, something appears as an “object for me” for a single experiencing subject insofar as it can be experienced repeatedly in time. However, this is an inadequate sense of objectivity, insofar as one’s experience of objects always includes the sense that the object is “for us.” Hence, the notion of objectivity is tied to the possibility of being experienced by an intersubjective community of experiencers. Finally, especially in the case of ideal objects, objectivity is tied to language. Expressing the sense of an object in language yields a higher level of objectivity precisely because the significance of the object as experienced by a single subject is made public and objective and available to all experiencing subjects who speak that language. If the language is written, the sense of objectivity as permanence through time is also achieved. See also INTERSUBJECTIVITY.

OCCASIONAL EXPRESSION. Occasional expressions are those whose meaning varies from use to use. This does not occur because the expressions are equivocal in any normal understanding of equivocation. Instead, the meanings vary because the expressions can be understood only by taking into account the person uttering the expression (as in the pronoun “I”) or the circumstances of the utterance, the situation in which it is uttered (as in the demonstrative pronouns “this” and “that” and their plural forms or subject-bound determinations such as “here,” “there,” “today,” “tomorrow,” and so forth). Once the relation to the speaker or the circumstances is taken into account, the meaning of these terms can be understood without ambiguity. See also OBJECTIVE EXPRESSIONS.

ONTIC. See MUNDANE; TRANSCENDENTAL.

ONTOLOGICAL. See MUNDANE; TRANSCENDENTAL.

ONTOLOGY. Ontology is the science of objects. For Husserl this must be understood in the sense of a science of objects of experience. In this regard, the transcendental subject falls outside the scope of ontology, and this underlies Martin Heidegger’s criticism that Husserl did not give an account of the being of the intentional, that is, the being of the being who is intentional. Providing such an account became the task of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. It is possible to argue, however, that for Husserl transcendental phenomenology, with its categories of attitude, interest, temporality, and so forth, is just this “ontology” of the transcendental, constituting subject. See also CONSTITUTION; FORMAL ONTOLOGY; REGIONAL ONTOLOGY.
OPEN POSSIBILITY. All experiences involve what Husserl calls a horizon, by which he means a set of possible experiences or experiential phases intentionally related to the momentary phase of experience. These experiences contribute to the sense of the object by way of bringing past experiences into the present so as to inform the present apprehension of the object. The horizons, however, also point to the as yet not fully determined sense of the object. Every object, in other words, is characterized by a determinable indeterminacy; every experience can further explicate its object in a continued inspection of the object. There are, however, limited possibilities for the ways this development can occur, and these are what Husserl calls “open possibilities.”

They are not merely logical possibilities, that is, not every possible sense that avoids a formal contradiction with what already belongs to the sense is truly possible for experience. A material countersense could arise, and anything that would involve a material countersense, while logically possible, is not an open possibility. The range of open possibilities is limited by the already determinate material sense of the object. This does not rule out frustration or disappointment of our experience, but it does mean that the frustrating senses will not belong to the same species as the already determinate sense, but they will continue to belong to the same genus. For example, in continuing to inspect a spatial object, one’s sense of the color of the object might change—and this is an open possibility for the experience—but it is not an open possibility that the object not be colored, for the extension of the spatial object is necessarily intertwined with color.

ORIGIN. 1. “Origin” can be understood in the context of causal genesis; this is the sense of the term proper to psychology, and Husserl is careful to distinguish his use of “origin” from this sense. 2. “Origin” can refer to the phenomenological origin of sense in passive synthesis; to analyze the origins of sense in this context is to account for how the sense arises in the experience of historical and cultural communities and informs the understanding of subjects who inherit that tradition. 3. “Origin” can also refer to the ground for the presentation of objects and their manner of givenness, including those aspects of sense that arise through passive synthoses; in this context, “origin” refers to transcendental subjectivity.

ORIGINARY. Husserl uses the adjectival “originary” as a modifier for “givenness” and the adverbial “originarily” as a modifier of “given.” What is given originarily is materially equivalent to an originary givenness. These terms refer to that which is given intuitively, given with
intuitive content. Husserl uses the term most frequently in relation to perception. See also CATEGORIAL INTUITION.

ORTEGA Y GASSET, JOSÉ (1883–1955). José Ortega y Gasset, although he could be considered a phenomenologist only at an early stage of his career, introduced phenomenology into Spain and, by extension, Latin America. Ortega was attracted to Husserl’s phenomenology understood as a pure description of essences, and after reading Ideas I, he introduced this phenomenology into his courses at the University of Madrid. By the end of his career, however, Ortega criticized Husserl for both excessive rationalism and idealism.

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PAIRING. Pairing is the unique form of passive synthesis or association present in experience of another subject. In the course of experiencing, say, a table, a flow of appearances is synthesized in an identification that grasps the multiple appearances as presenting an identical object, a spatial individual. However, in the course of experiencing an animate body (Leib) as manifesting movement or activity that is neither one’s own voluntary and spontaneous movement nor caused by another object, a subject apperceives another conscious life as the source and ground of this movement or activity. This apperception involves an analogizing transfer of the sense of self as a conscious subject who governs spontaneous movement and action to the other conscious life. The analogizing apperception, which is not an inference, yields the appresentation “other ego.” Insofar as this other ego is an independent conscious life, there can be no identification of self and other. Hence, the experiencing subject “pairs” self and other; the other is experienced as “like me” but also irreducibly “other than me.” See also ANALOGIZING APPRESENTATION.

PART. A part is anything that is either a real component or constituent of the object in which it is found or a relational part by which an object finds itself really associated with other objects. Parts are distinguished into non-independent parts or moments and independent parts or pieces.

PASSIVE GENESIS. Passive genesis is an object’s coming to be in passive syntheses. In particular, the appearance of objects having certain determinations and relations—as having a certain objective sense—with-
out any activity on the part of the cognizing agent is an achievement of passive synthesis that relies both on association within the subject’s stream of consciousness and on the secondary passivity in which what has been learnt from the cognizing agent’s culture determines the sense of the object for that agent.

PASSIVE SYNTHESIS. The activities of reason in all its forms—theoretical, axiological, and practical—presuppose the presentation of objects on the basis of which articulated, categorial objectivities are produced. These objects are passively given in synthetic achievements that occur without any explicit articulating or combining activity. The object that is “always already there” for thinking is passively given as an achievement of synthesis that discloses the identity in a manifold of appearances. The principle of such passive synthesis is association, and passive synthesizes occur on two levels. The first—the level of primary passivity—involves the association of experiences belonging to the subject’s own stream of experiences, and the second—the level of secondary passivity—involves the association of a subject’s experiences with those of the intersubjective communities of which the subject is a member. Hence, secondary passivities incorporate history and tradition, including linguistic and cultural traditions, into the formation of a subject’s experience. See also PASSIVE GENESIS.

PASSIVITY. The passivity of consciousness is its being affected by objects such that objects are presented to it as “already there.” The passivity of consciousness is not to be understood in causal terms. The object’s being already there is an intentional achievement of passive synthesis. The term is a relative term; what is actively constituted in one experience can be passively given for another experience. For example, the actively constituted state of affairs can be passively given in relation to a second-order judgment about that state of affairs. The judgment “The crocuses have come up” can become the passively given state of affairs for the second judgment “That the crocuses have come up is a harbinger of spring.” See also AFFECTION; ASSOCIATION; SECONDARY PASSIVITY.

PERCEIVE. See PERCEPTION (Perzeption); PERCEPTION (Wahrnehmung).

PERCEPTION (Perzeption). Perception is the direct “perception” of a side or aspect of an object. Within the momentary phase of a perception (Wahrnehmung) as ordinarily conceived, the moment of primal
impression animates sensuous contents and thereby directly presents a genuine appearance of the object—more precisely, the genuinely perceived side or aspect of the object. The moment of Perzeption is contrasted with the moments of apperception (Apperzeption) that belong to the same perceptual experience (Wahrnehmung). The term Perzeption is sometimes used analogously for other, more complex types of intuitive presence to denote what is directly, rather than horizontally, presented with intuitive content. See also HYLETIC DATA.

PERCEPTION (Wahrnehmung). Perception is an act characterized by the direct appearance of a material thing in space to the perceiving subject. In this respect, perception is contrasted with imagination wherein a thing appears through an image or likeness. Perception, in other words, is the direct apprehension of an object. A concrete act of perception (Wahrnehmung) includes moments of both perception (Perzeption) and apperception (Apperzeption).

More broadly, the notion of perception (Wahrnehmung) is used as a general term denoting intuition. The more general uses of “perception” and “apperception” involved in this extension to intuitive acts are sometimes replaced by “presentation” and “appresentation,” and their noematic correlates are the presented and the appresented.

PERFORMANCE. See ACHIEVEMENT.

PERSONALISTIC ATTITUDE. The personalistic attitude is a species of the natural attitude, and it is contrasted with the naturalistic attitude. Whereas the naturalistic attitude abstracts from the cultural achievements of humans and views the world merely as physical nature, the personalistic attitude does not. Especially significant is the fact that the personalistic attitude does not naturalize the psychic or mental by approaching it exclusively from the perspective of empirical psychology. In the personalistic attitude, one understands the world through the perspective of persons and of personal interactions and relations. One takes account of the cognizing agent’s animated body (Leib) rather than viewing it merely as a natural body (Körper), and one takes account of the constitutive and communicative activities of the body. Moreover, the world is taken not merely as nature but in all its human significance, as the object of evaluative and volitional experiences and the locus of culturally significant objects that are the achievement of human persons.

In the personalistic attitude, physical nature is not absolutized; it is relativized as our surrounding world or environment and considered in its relation to the performances and achievements of experiencing
subjects. The merely natural world is an abstraction from this personalistic world. This attitude does not yet focus on the intentional relation to subjects, as does the phenomenological attitude, but it does focus on the person as engaged in the world and the world as lived in our rich, concrete experience. See also CULTURE; INTENTIONALITY; LIFE-WORLD.

PERSONALITY OF A HIGHER ORDER. Husserl claims that genuine communities are constituted as personalities of a higher order. By this he means that the community is a unified personality with its own striving, willing, and active life. This life is analogous to that of an individual person; it is directed to a single end, and the willing and acting of the individuals comprised by the community are coordinated with one another and subordinated to the communal willing. Such a community is not reducible to the mere collection of individuals it comprises, nor are its achievements reducible to their joint achievements. See also SOCIAL WORLD.

PFÄNDER, ALEXANDER (1870–1941). Alexander Pfänder, a prominent student of Theodor Lipps, was a member of the Munich Circle. By virtue of his age and seniority as well as the fact that he was the first of the group to hold a professorship at the University, he was broadly recognized as the leader of the Circle. As a student of Lipps, Pfänder was interested in psychology, although not the empirical psychology of his time. His concern was to develop a descriptive, philosophical psychology and a phenomenological philosophy that would explore not only features of behavior but features of the human personality. He developed a phenomenology of the will, explored issues of motivation, character and the human soul, and lectured on the significance and goals of life. In the period from 1920 to 1927, Pfänder was the de facto editor of the Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung).

PHANTOM. The phantom is the purely sensible thing. Our experience of objects in the world grasps them in their full materiality and substantiality as having causal and functional properties along with their value attributes. The experience of the object as having these properties is rooted, however, in our grasp of the purely descriptive and sensible properties of the thing. The object considered purely with respect to its sensible properties is the phantom. It must be stressed that the phantom, while it can be experienced as such, is essentially an abstract moment upon which is founded the material thing in its full substantiality and with its full scientific and causal significance. Husserl thinks that there are
concretely existing phantoms—rainbows, the blue sky, the sun, stars and planets in the night sky—but these examples are themselves troublesome and the experience of concrete phantoms is rare.

PHENOMENAL TIME. Phenomenal time is the temporality that organizes the flow of subjective experiences. It is distinguished from objective time that orders the duration or procession of objects and that is measurable in units. Alternatively, phenomenal time can be considered the temporality organizing the flow of appearances, that is, of objects as appearing to a subject’s flowing experiences. See also INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. Phenomenology analyzes the eidos, the essential structures both of the intentionality that characterizes experience and of the objects as appearing in these intentional experiences. Phenomenological or intentional analysis aims to provide a description of these structures, and it proceeds by way of eidetic variation and eidetic intuition. See also DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE. Adopted by means of the performance of the phenomenological reduction, the phenomenological attitude is the reflective attitude in which one carries out phenomenological analysis. It attends to the intentional correlation between consciousness and the world, and its interest is in descriptively identifying and evidently grasping essential truths about the structures of that correlation. See also TRANSCENDENTAL ATTITUDE.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONTENT. Phenomenological content is that which is contained in experience simply as lived. It is properly focused in the performance of the phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s view about what is included in the phenomenological content of experience changed between the first (1900–1901) and second (1913) editions of the Logical Investigations, the latter of which was published in the same year as Ideas I. The change arose as a consequence of Husserl’s identification of the methodological technique of the phenomenological reduction whose performance is necessary for properly attending to phenomenological content and its structures.

In the first edition of the Investigations, where Husserl conceived his project as a descriptive psychology, Husserl distinguishes the real (reell) or descriptive-psychological content of the experience from its intentional content, and he further identifies the descriptive-psychological content as phenomenological content. The phenomenological content comprises the
partial experiences that make up the complex experience along with all those parts that inhere in the subjective act itself. In particular, the phenomenological content comprises the intentional essence of the act, that is, its act-quality and act-matter, as well as the sensation contents by means of which the act presents or represents the sensible features of the object. On this view, the intentional content of the experience does not belong to its phenomenological content. This phenomenological (descriptive-psychological) content, it should be noted, is distinguished as well from real (real) content, which is the same content but as thematized by an explanatory psychology that understands this content as belonging to actual, worldly, psychic events that are the effects of causal sequences initiated by the objects of experience. Husserl’s interest, on the other hand, in phenomenological content is to describe the structures that belong to possible, and not merely actual, experience.

In the second edition of the Investigations and in Ideas I, Husserl expands the notion of phenomenological content to include the intentional content of the experience. He now distinguishes within the phenomenological content between its real (reell) and ir-real (irreell) or intentional content. The phenomenological content is now the intentional correlation itself with its real and intentional components. In Ideas I Husserl uses the technical term noesis to refer to that part of the act that bears its intentional directedness to the object, and he uses the expression “hyletic data” to refer to the sensuous contents that are animated by the intention. He also uses the technical term noema to refer to the intentional content of the act. See also DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE; IDEAL CONTENT; IR-REAL CONTENTS; REPRESENTING CONTENTS; THEORETICAL SCIENCE.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION. Phenomenological description is concerned to identify the essential structures of experience as reflected upon phenomenologically. Hence, it is concerned to describe the experience just as it is experienced or lived without appeal to anything (for example, a cause) or to any principle that is not directly available in the content upon which the investigator reflects. This last requirement is to maintain conformity with Husserl’s fundamental principle of evidence, the “principle of principles.” See also DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE; ESSENCE.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION. See DESTRUCTION.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL EGO. See TRANSCENDENTAL EGO.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEALISM. See TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD. The phenomenological method has four main components: the phenomenological reduction, by means of which the phenomenological attitude is adopted and the intentional correlation between noesis and noema is thematized while questions regarding real (real) or actual existence are “bracketed” or put out of play; the limitation, without presupposing or aiming at causal explanation, to the description of the intentionality at work in experience; eidetic reduction, which proceeds by eidetic variation and discloses the essence, the essential structures, of experience; and eidetic intuition, in which is evidently given the structures disclosed by eidetic reduction. See also Bracketing; Descriptive Science; Theoretical Science.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. Husserl distinguishes phenomenological psychology from both phenomenology proper, that is, transcendental phenomenology, and from empirical, causal-genetic, psychology. Phenomenological psychology is distinguished from empirical psychology insofar as the latter is a theoretical science concerned with the explanation of psychic events as real (real) occurrences in the actual world. Phenomenological psychology, on the other hand, is a descriptive science that takes as its subject matter the intentional directedness of consciousness to the world. Phenomenological psychology is distinguished from transcendental phenomenology insofar as it does not completely effect the phenomenological reduction. While it brackets the existence of the objects of experience, it continues to accept the psychic events upon which it reflects as real (real) or actual occurrences in the world. Transcendental phenomenology, on the other hand, puts all questions of existence out of play and considers experience as possible experience in order to disclose what is essential not merely to actual, psychological experience but to all possible experience. See also Bracketing; Essence.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION. The phenomenological reduction, which Husserl sometimes calls the “transcendental reduction” or “transcendental-phenomenological reduction,” is a methodological device that introduces a particular reflective attitude in which the attention of the one reflecting is led back (reductus) from the object straightforwardly experienced to the experience in which the object is given and to which it is the correlate. The modifier “phenomenological” in this context focuses attention on the “phenomenon,” the appearing of
the object or, alternatively, the object just as it appears. The phenomenological reduction, therefore, discloses and secures in an apodictic evidence the intentional correlation as the field for phenomenological research and description, and its bracketing of questions regarding the actual existence of the experiences on which we reflect and the object of those experiences and focusing instead on the object just in the manner of its appearance has the effect of putting out of play all presuppositions that might arise in our natural experience in which the existence of the object experienced is taken for granted.

The reduction, in brief, suspends the philosopher’s participation in the general positing or general thesis characterizing the natural attitude. The universal positing embedded in natural experience is put into question and disconnected not in order to deny the existence of the worldly objects of experience, but in order to hold reflectively this positing as something whose nature is to be examined. Objects are within the scope of the reduction presumed existents still available for reflection and analysis, but their status as objects has been modified such that they now are viewed exclusively in their being as objects of the experience in which they are posited. See also APODICTICITY.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTION. Phenomenological reflection is undertaken within the phenomenological attitude, which is adopted in the performance of the phenomenological reduction.

PHENOMENOLOGY. Husserl’s understanding of the nature of phenomenology developed through various stages, although there is clearly an underlying unity. Phenomenology originally appears in the Logical Investigations as descriptive psychology. Its concern was to describe psychic experiences. Since the psychic was characterized by intentionality, descriptive psychology was concerned to describe the essential moments of intentional experiences. However, this early descriptive psychology arrived at its field of study by abstracting the region of the psychic or psychological from the world in a manner similar to that in which the natural sciences abstract the region of material nature from the world. Recognizing that such an account of the psychic or of descriptive psychology meant that he could legitimately describe experiences only in relation to their real (reell) contents—that is, only in relation to their noetic moments—but recognizing also that many of his descriptions in fact appealed to objective or intentional content—that is, the ir-real (irreell) or noematic moments—of experience, Husserl recognized as well that his account of knowing required a methodology that allowed him to include the intentional moments of experience within the field subject to
phenomenological investigation. Hence, Husserl developed the method-
ological conception of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

The performance of the reduction directs the researcher’s attention to
the intentional correlation between consciousness and its objects and,
more generally, between subjectivity and the phenomenon of the world.
Phenomenology is the descriptive science of this domain. Its subject
matter is that individual and absolute concretum that is transcendental
consciousness (including both its real [reell] and intentional contents).
Phenomenology seeks to identify and relate the essential moments and
structures of this transcendental consciousness and its intentional
experiences. Phenomenology has as its concern, therefore, to describe
the essential structures of intentionality and the necessary connections among
different kinds of experiences insofar as these essential structures and
connections are intuitively knowable. Each statement of an essence or
essential connection is an a priori statement in the sense of the material
a priori.

Phenomenology’s analyses are both static and genetic. Static
phenomenology, while abstracting from the temporality of experience,
identifies the moments and structures that belong to a whole of intentional
experience and object. Genetic phenomenology considers experiences in
their temporal dimension and seeks to disclose the origins of experiences
in the temporal flux of consciousness. See also IDEAL CONTENT; IR-
REAL CONTENTS.

PHENOMENON. Much like the term “appearance,” there is an ambiguity
in Husserl’s use of the term “phenomenon.” “Appearance” can refer both
to the act which is the appearing of the object or to the object as
appearing, and Husserl’s use of “phenomenon” repeats this ambiguity,
although he does not use “phenomenon” to refer to the complex of
sensation-contents. In the context of Husserl’s phenomenology, however,
the term “phenomenon” can also be understood as having a broader and
a narrower meaning. Its broader meaning denotes the experience on which
the phenomenologist reflects and which is given in inner perception. In
its broad meaning, the phenomenon comprises the experience with its
object. Its narrower meaning denotes the object just as it appears. While
this sense alludes to the experience in which the object appears, this
allusion, because of the direction of the intentional relation, does not turn
the researcher’s attention to the experience in the way that the broad
meaning of “phenomenon” turns the researcher’s attention to the object
given in the experience. See also HYLETIC DATA.
PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDE. See PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE.

“PHILOSOPHY AS A RIGOROUS SCIENCE” (“Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft”). The article “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” was published in the journal Logos in 1911. It stands between the Logical Investigations (1900–1901) and Ideas I (1913), and it was written after Husserl had recognized the need for the phenomenological reduction. Nevertheless, there is little explicit affirmed of the transcendental in this article beyond the suggestion that no empirical science—natural or social—could provide a basis for—or replace—philosophy. Instead, the article appears as an extension of the refutation of psychologism found in the first volume of the Investigations to three other skeptical relativisms of the day: naturalism, worldview (Weltanschauung) philosophy, and historicism. The extension from psychologism to naturalism is both direct and unsurprising since psychology is itself an empirical science to which some have attempted to reduce philosophy. The extension into the critique of a philosophical position rooted in a human science (Geisteswissenschaft) is, however, novel.

Historicism is criticized on the ground that it anchors itself in the empirical life of the spirit. Insofar as it is grounded in a non-naturalized conception of mind, it is opposed to naturalism. But insofar as it is grounded in the empirical, it is like naturalism and inadequate to serve as a basis for or to replace a genuine philosophy. For Husserl, historicism involves an explicit relativism since it ties the truth of any proposition to the historical circumstances in which the proposition is expressed. A Weltanschauung philosophy differs from historicism in that it lacks the explicitly relativistic view that the truth of a proposition is a function of its historical circumstances. Instead, the worldview philosophy asserts its own factual, historical, and perspectival view as true for all; what it acknowledges, on the one hand, as perspectival and particular, is asserted as universal, and this, in Husserl’s eyes, is another form of skeptical relativism despite its denial of skepticism. See also DILTHEY, WILHELM.

PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC (Philosophie der Arithmetik). Husserl’s first significant publication, the Philosophie der Arithmetik, which was published in 1891, is an extension of the work Husserl undertook in his Habilitationsschrift “Über den Begriff der Zahl” (“On the Concept of Number,” 1887). Whereas the earlier work had focused on descriptive-psychological accounts of the experience of cardinal numbers, Husserl now seeks to extend his discussion in order to clarify in general the
relations between mathematics and logic. In particular, he considers the possibility, one that he will explore over his entire career, that a philosophical account of mathematics and logic can provide the foundation for all other theoretical sciences. Such an account could serve as a theory of science in general. What is novel in the Philosophy of Arithmetic is Husserl’s commitment to the idea that the radical grounding of mathematics is a philosophical, rather than a mathematical, task.

Husserl aims to provide a descriptive-psychological account of those experiences that are sufficiently secure to provide evidence for mathematical claims and to provide accounts of how other, more complex experiences are rooted—even when the rooting is not deductive in character—in these secure experiences. In order to achieve this aim, Husserl first describes the mental acts in which we are conscious of cardinal numbers. He divides the discussion into an account of the “authentic” or direct experience of the first few cardinal numbers (up to, approximately, 12) and an account of the “inauthentic” or symbolic representation of the larger cardinals. One “authentically” experiences a number in a colligating or collecting act that, first, grasps a multiplicity, without regard to the particular nature of its members, as a unified group that is the object of a unitary interest and, second, grasps the connection among the objects so given. This act of collective combination of mere “somethings” grasps the determinate number instanced by the unified group as ‘something and something and something and so on.’ Husserl’s treatment of the larger cardinals, however, was very different. For these, Husserl took the connections between the acts that run through the counting series as a symbol of the collective combination among the objects of those acts.

Husserl adopted cardinal numbers as his starting point because he had hoped in part to ground mathematical experience in the experience of the cardinal numbers. Even in writing the book, however, Husserl changed his mind, for he states in the preface that the concept of the cardinal numbers is not the fundamental concept. Moreover, by the time of the publication of the work, Husserl was already dissatisfied with the analysis of the “inauthentic” presentation of the higher cardinal numbers for the reason that they were guilty of psychologism.

While the discussion of number forms the heart of Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl is also concerned to analyze two other concepts central to our understanding of number, in particular, and arithmetic, in general. Those concepts are ‘more’ and ‘less.’ These are very complicated relational concepts that require that at once, a subject have in mind two determinate totalities presenting two numbers (say, three and five) and a third experience in which five’s surpassing of three (by two) is recognized. Hence, the subject experiences three (a and a and a), five (a and a and a
and $a$ and $a$), and five’s being (two) more ($a$ and $a$ and $a$; $a$ and $a$). A comparable account is provided for ‘less.’

Finally, Husserl’s discussion of the “symbolic” character of the inauthentic grasp of numbers led him to consider a more general question about the use of symbols in mathematics and logic. In particular, he wondered how the physical symbols used in arithmetical thinking and in mathematical notation come to represent numbers and number relations that are not and cannot be authentically presented. His concern with this question led to a much broader, logical concern about the nature of symbolic representation and “inauthentic” thinking of the sort found in all, and not merely the arithmetical, sciences. Consequently, after the publication of Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl’s attention turns primarily to logic and epistemology, the result of which was the publication in 1900–1901 of the Logical Investigations.

PIECE. A piece is an independent part that can exist apart from the other parts with which it forms a whole and, therefore, of the whole of which it is a part. Husserl sometimes discusses this distinction in ontological terms, while at other times he discusses it in presentational terms. Hence, a piece is an independent part whenever it is an element of a presentation-complex that can by its nature be presented apart from the other parts forming that complex whole. Husserl recognizes that the separated piece is not presented without any change in its sense; for example, the leg of the table separated from the table is, properly speaking, no longer the leg of the table but just the piece of wood or metal with its properties. However, the point Husserl is interested to make is that there is a continuity in the phenomenal properties belonging to the part as incorporated into the whole and to the part as separated. The leg of the table is separately presented with the same sensible and material properties that it had as a part of the table, that is, as a piece of wood or metal, round or square, of a certain length, and so forth, but apart from its functional property as supporting the tabletop.

This continuity in the properties belonging to the part both in the whole and separated from it is sufficient to establish the identity of the part. Its capacity for separate presentation, even if with an altered sense, indicates its independence. The part can exist as a sensible, material object apart from its function, even though, when separated, it is properly speaking a leg of a table in name only. Hence, Husserl calls a “piece” any part that is independent relative to the whole $W$ of which it is a part. A piece, when separated from its whole, becomes a whole in its own right, a concretum. See also MOMENT.
POLIN, RAYMOND (1911–2001). Raymond Polin, almost alone among French phenomenologists, devoted substantial work to descriptive work in phenomenological axiology. He published three books in the area: *La création des valeurs* (*The Creation of Values*), *La compréhension des valeurs* (*The Comprehension of Values*), and *Du laid, du mal, du faux* (*On the Ugly, the Evil, and the False*).

POLYTHERIC. Whereas monothetic experiences have a single directedness, the intentional rays in a polythetic synthesis are compound; they are directed to more than one “object” at once. In an explicative judgment, for example, the judging is directed both to the object about which it judges and the property or attribute it predicates of it, and in a relational judgment, the judging is directed to the various objects united by the relation. Similarly, in acts of emotion, the subject, say, fears an object or state of affairs with respect to particular features it exhibits, and in acts of preference, two objects are brought into an evaluative relation. Acts of volition are also polythetic insofar as they involve a direction, say, to a realizal state of affairs preferable to the present state, or they involve an action to be undertaken for someone else’s sake.

Polythetic acts can be transformed into monothetic acts when the articulated object of the polythetic act is taken as a unity. For example, the judgment “The weather is stormy” is the correlate of a polythetic synthesis wherein attention is directed both to the weather and its storminess. The judgment, however, can be nominalized in which case it is grasped in a monothetic experience whose correlate is the situation ‘that the weather is stormy’ and this nominalized judgment can itself become the subject of a new judgment, a new polythetic experience.

POSITING ACT. A positing act is one that intends or means its object as actually existent. See also NON-POSITING ACT; OBJECTIFYING ACT.

POSITION-TAKING (*Stellungnahme*). Husserl uses a term that can have the rather weak force of “opinion” or “comment” in a technical way to indicate a significantly stronger notion. In its broadest sense, a position-taking is to “take S as p” in the manner of a perception (*Wahrnehmung*) with its attendant belief in the existence of the object as perceived. In a narrower sense, a position-taking is an act founded on such simple “takings.” Hence, in the narrower sense a position-taking is a “taking” founded on a perception, for example, the act of simply valuing an object in a certain way (*Wertnehmung*) or, even more precisely, framing a judgment about the object, whether that judgment be cognitive, axiological, or practical. Position-takings in general are achievements of a certain
kind of act that involve taking an attentive stance toward an object in the light of particular interests and grasping the object in a particular manner in the light of that stance and interest. See also EVALUATION; FOUNDATION; JUDGE; VALUE APPERCEPTION (Wertnehmung).

POSITIVISM. In its proper sense, positivism is taking things to be just as they present themselves. This formulation evokes both the principle of principles and Husserl’s notion of evidence. It is in this sense that Husserl says that phenomenologists are the “true positivists.” In its improper sense, positivism is the view that natural science comprises all of knowledge, that the only genuine form of knowledge is based on natural phenomena, found in the positive, natural sciences, and verified by experimental methods. This view can also be called scientism. It takes the scientific study of a limited region of the world as a philosophical position that is universal in its scope.

POSSIBILITY. 1. In its ontological meaning, possibility refers to the compatibility and consistency of parts in the formation of a whole. An object is impossible insofar as the parts that are proposed to belong to it are incompatible, failing to form a consistent whole. An object is possible, on the other hand, insofar as its parts are compatible and do form a consistent whole. The laws of formal ontology and, further, of regional ontologies govern the compatibility and consistency of parts within a whole.

2. In its phenomenological meaning, possibility refers to the posited mode of being of the object. In this context, “possible” is contrasted not with “real” (real) but with “actual” (wirklich), that is, actually existent.

3. In another phenomenological meaning, possibility refers to what can arise in the continuing course of experience. In this regard, there is a distinction between open and closed possibilities. Open possibilities are those that cohere with the previous course of experience, while closed possibilities are those that do not. See also ACTUALITY; REGIONAL ONTOLOGY.

PREDELINENATION. A predelineated possibility is the open possibility most suggested by the previous course of experience. Every experience demarcates a set of possibilities most likely to arise in the continuing course of the experience. These possibilities belong to the horizon of the experience in which the possibilities are predelineated.

PREDICATE. ‘Predicate’ is a logical category belonging to formal grammar. A predicate is a term that refers to a property or attribute that is
said to belong to the object that is the subject of the proposition in which the attribution is made. This attribution takes the form of a judgment in which the relation between subject and predicate is articulated. See also PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.

PREDICATIVE. A predicative experience is one involving a judging act in which something is asserted (or denied) of some object. The predicative experience, that is, the judging act, constitutes an articulated state of affairs in contrast with the unarticulated situation encountered by the subject and founding the judgment. See also FOUNDATION; FOUNDED MOMENT; FOUNDING MOMENT; JUDGE (urteilen); PREDICATE; PRE-PREDICATIVE.

PRE-PREDICATIVE. A pre-predicative experience underlies the predications involved in judgments but does not yet explicitly articulate the relation between subject and predicate. For example, in perception, by virtue of the structure of the noematic sense, an object $S$—a house, say—is experienced as $p$—say, white. This sense underlies that of the judgment ‘$S$ is $p$’—‘the house is white’—in which the relation first grasped in perception is explicitly articulated. See also PREDICATIVE.

PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO. See PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS; SELF-AWARENESS.

PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS. Pre-reflective consciousness is the awareness of self that accompanies any consciousness of an object. It is, by virtue of the structure of inner time-consciousness, intrinsic to all intentional experience and is, therefore, a matter of intentionality. See also SELF-AWARENESS.

PRESENCE. The term “presence,” generally speaking, refers to the presence of an object to consciousness in the temporal present, that is, in the momentary phase of consciousness. The term is used in both narrow and broad senses. In the narrow sense, it refers to what is genuinely or intuitively present in the primal impressional phase of the experience, while the retentional and protential phases re-present or make present absent sides of the experienced object. In this narrow sense, presence is the opposite of absence. The term “presence” is also used more broadly to refer to an object intuitively present in a concrete, intuitive experience such as a perception or other fulfilling intention. Such experiences combine the narrow sense of presence with that of absence. The perception of a house, for example, presents (in the restricted sense) a sensed
side of the house and presents (in the broader sense) the house with both
its sensed and unsensed sides.

Finally, and more broadly still, the term can be used to refer to an
absent object re-presented in, say, memory, or to an object made present
in an empty judgment, and so forth. Hence, the term is used
in its broadest sense for all the different kinds of experience simply to
refer to the object of awareness. See also FULLNESS; INNER TIME-
CONSCIOUSNESS; JUDGE (urteilen); LIVING PRESENT; PRESEN-
TATION (Gegenwärtigung); RE-PRESENTATION (Vergegenwärti-
gung).

PRESENTATION (Gegenwärtigung). Husserl uses the term Gegenwärti-
gung to designate the subset of presentations (Vorstellungen) that
present an object originally, that is, intuitively. Such a presentation
intuitively presents (gegenwärtigt) an object by virtue of the fact that it
comprises filled intentional moments originally and directly presenting
(gegenwärtigend) a side or aspect of an object. Other moments in the act
make present or re-present (vergegenwärtigt) those sides and aspects of
the object that are not originally and directly present. Hence, while the
concrete act or presentation directly and originally presents its concrete
object, not every moment within the act originally makes present its
correlate, that is, the side or aspect of the object to which it is directed.
See also APPERCEPTION (Apperzeption); FULL INTENTION; FULLNESS;
INTUITION; PERCEPTION (Perzeption); RE-PRESENTATION (Vergegenwärtigung).

PRESENTATION (Vorstellung). Husserl identifies numerous senses of the
term “presentation,” a fact that indicates the danger in the use of the word
and that motivates Husserl’s language of “objectifying act.”

The senses important for logic and the theory of knowledge are: 1. A
presentation is the act-matter by virtue of which an object is presented in
determinate manner, as such and such; 2. A presentation is a “mere
presentation,” that is, a qualitative modification of belief such that the
existence of the object is neither posited nor denied; 3. A presentation is a
nominal act; 4. A presentation is an objectifying act; 5. A presentation
is an intuition of the presented object.

Among these logical senses, the first and the fourth are primary. A
presentation, in other words, is an act that presents an object to an
experiencing subject, an objectifying act; presentations in this sense are
on a par with and include perceptions, judgments, memories and the like.
Such objectifying acts by virtue of their matter present the object in a
determinate manner, as such and such. The presentation in this latter sense underlies the concrete act whether it is a “mere” presentation (in the sense of a non-positing objectifying act), a positing objectifying act, a complex act that includes either categorial or non-objectifying moments (for example, an emotion), or an intuition, whether simple or categorial.

Husserl also identifies additional, ordinary senses of “presentation”: 6. an imagining or remembering (as opposed to a perceiving); 7. a physical image of a thing, such as a painting; 8. a representation (Repräsentation) that provokes presentations and does duty for them, that is, a sign, whether a depiction or a linguistic sign; 9. an image; 10. a presented object; 11. a content of consciousness; 12. an opinion.

Husserl believes that these equivocations in the term “presentation” are dangerous. Most important is to isolate those that are important for logic and the theory of knowledge (that is, senses 1–5) from the everyday uses and to use the logical senses clearly and distinctly. See also CATEGORICAL ACT; CATEGORICAL FORM; CATEGORICAL OBJECT; CATEGORY; POSITING; POSITION-TAKING; PRESENCE.

PRESENTATION (Vergegenwärtigung). See PRESENTATION (Gegenwärtigung); RE-PRESENTATION (Vergegenwärtigung).

PRESENTIFICATION (Vergegenwärtigung). See PRESENTATION (Gegenwärtigung); RE-PRESENTATION (Vergegenwärtigung).

PRESENTING CONTENTS. See HYLETIC DATA.

PRESENTING SENSATIONS. See HYLETIC DATA.

PRESUPPOSITIONLESS. Husserl’s ideal of a presuppositionless philosophy can be understood in two ways. The first is to achieve a philosophy absolutely free of all presuppositions, a philosophy that secures itself against all challenges. This conception of a philosophy without presupposition is tied to Husserl’s methodological doctrine of the phenomenological reduction, which is designed to put the straightforward natural-attitude belief in the existence of the world and the objects within it, as well as our acceptances of the truth of our judgments about them, out of play. While Husserl says the reduction “brackets” the objects of experience all at once in a single methodological move, it is difficult to see how this is reconciled with his “ontological” definitions and accounts of, say, fact and essence, at the beginning, for example, of Ideas I. There is, therefore, reason to believe that this impossible ideal of presuppositionlessness was not Husserl’s real intent. The point of a
presuppositionless philosophy is, perhaps, to test continually all presuppositions against the evidence available in a reflection upon intentional experience and the grasp of the a priori, essential structures thereof. See also ESSENTIAL INSIGHT; TRANSCENDENTAL REDUCTION.

PRIMAL CONSTITUTION. Primal or primordial constitution takes place within the primal impression. Husserl often uses this expression to refer to the “constitution” associated with the apprehension by primal impression of hyletic data.

PRIMAL IMPRESSION. Primal impression is the moment within the momentary phase of consciousness that intends the now-phase of experience in subjective or phenomenal time and, by virtue of that, the presently intended object. See also INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS; LIVING PRESENT; PRESENCE.

PRIMORDIAL. Husserl equivocates with the term “primordial,” although the equivocation is necessary and essential. In particular, the term is used to refer to the most original forms of constitution either within a phase of experience or within a concrete experience. Hence, the term is used to refer both to primal constitution within the living present or to the constitution achieved by a perceptual objectifying act. See also PERCEPTION (Perzeption); PERCEPTION (Wahrnehmung).

PRINCIPLE OF PRINCIPLES. The principle of principles is the central epistemological principle governing Husserl’s philosophy. The principle states that intuition is what legitimizes cognition, that everything intuitively presented is to be accepted as true as it presents itself and only so far as and in the manner in which it presents itself. This principle underlies Husserl’s notion of evidence and his conception of reason as the striving for evidence.

PROPOSITION. The proposition is the noematic sense (noematische Sinn) of a judging act. The judging act is directed in the first place to the object about which we judge and its determinations and relations. To be directed to the object and its determinations and relations is, in general, to be directed to a categorially formed complex, that is, a state of affairs. The categorial form is not available to simple perception but becomes available in continued inspections of the object and the thoughtful articulation and judging activity based thereon.

In judging, one’s attention remains turned to the identical, objective state of affairs rather than any logical reality called the judgmental content.
or proposition. However, one can reflectively direct one’s attention to the judged as such, to the judged state of affairs precisely as supposed in the judging; one might do so, for example, in those cases where one doubts the truth of the judgment, neutralizes one’s acceptance of it, and critically reflects upon it. In such a case, the state of affairs as supposed is not something one posits for oneself; one simply considers it for confirmation or disconfirmation as the state of affairs supposed and affirmed by the person making the judgment. Hence, the judgment takes on a double character: the ontological character of the categorically formed, judged state of affairs, and the logical character of the judgment merely as such, the supposition as supposed, that is, the proposition in the logical sense.

The intended state of affairs and the proposition are properly distinguished, therefore, by means of a difference in the way the meant objectivity is focused. In the straightforward, natural-attitude focus on objects and the world, one apprehends the categorial object or state of affairs as such; in the critical focus on the state of affairs as supposed, i.e., on the supposition itself, one apprehends the judgment or proposition, more precisely, the noematic sense of the intended state of affairs, although it is only in a phenomenological reflection that one can recognize that the logical proposition is also the sense (Sinn) of the judging. The logical proposition also serves as the meaning (Bedeutung) of the declarative sentence expressing the judgment. See also APOPHANESIS; CATEGORIAL ACT; JUDGE; LOGIC; NEUTRALIZATION; PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.

PROPOSITIONAL ACT. In the broadest sense, a propositional act might be considered any judging act. More narrowly, however, a propositional act is a critically reflective act that intends a proposition, that is, a supposed state of affairs just as supposed, in order to determine its truth or falsity or to consider its logical relation to other propositions. It is a modification of the originally straightforward judging act that intends the articulated state of affairs. See also JUDGE; JUDGMENT (Satz); JUDGMENT (Urteil); LOGIC.

PROTENTION. Protention is that phase within the momentary phase of consciousness or living present that intends yet-to-come phases of absolute consciousness. See also INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS; PRIMAL IMPRESSION; RETENTION.

PSYCHIC. The psychic is contrasted with the physical. In the Logical Investigations, what essentially characterizes the psychic (or psychical
phenomena) is intentionality. In later works, Husserl’s account of the psychical, that is, of consciousness, becomes more complex, and the account of intentionality is inseparably tied to accounts of inner time-consciousness, self-awareness, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity. See also ACT.

PSYCHICAL ACT. A psychical act is simply an act. The qualifier “psychical” reinforces the view that the one reflecting on acts, whether from a psychological or phenomenological perspective, is reflecting on a psychic or mental phenomenon rather than a merely physical activity.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTENT. See REAL CONTENTS.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EGO. The psychological ego is the “I” that exists in the real world. The psychological ego is made an object in psychological reflection and is studied in the science of psychology. See also PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBJECT.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTION. Psychological reflection differs from phenomenological or transcendental reflection insofar as it is not undertaken within the phenomenological attitude. While the psychologist does not participate in the positings accepted by the subjects of psychological reflection, the psychologist does not suspend his or her own participation in the positing of the real in which the mental events and behaviors of the subjects studied occur. See also PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION; POSITING ACT; PSYCHOLOGY.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBJECT. The actual, worldly, subject of experience is the psychological subject. The psychological subject is contrasted with the transcendental subject. While the psychological subject is the same subject as the transcendental subject, that single subject is grasped as psychological in a natural (psychological) reflection and as transcendental in a philosophical or phenomenological reflection. Moreover, in self-awareness the psychological subject is constituted or disclosed as a real worldly entity by the transcendental subject that is not only makes possible all experience but also constitutes the world in which the psychological subject is located. See also CONSTITUTION; PSYCHOLOGICAL EGO; TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY.

PSYCHOLOGISM. Psychologism maintains that the theoretical discipline underlying the normative and practical or technological dimensions of
logic is psychology. This view entails that the logical laws governing thought are fundamentally the psychological laws that govern acts of thinking. Husserl criticizes psychologism on four, interrelated grounds: (1) psychologism reduces the ideal and objective meaning-content that is logic’s concern to a real (real), subjective, psychological content; for example, psychologism reduces the judgment’s “content,” that is, the proposition, to an aspect of the act of judging; (2) psychologism reduces the necessary laws governing thought to the contingent laws governing psychological acts; (3) psychologism reduces the exact laws of logic to inexact psychological laws; and (4) psychologism reduces the a priori laws of logic to a posteriori psychological laws. Psychologism, according to Husserl, is a skeptical relativism that is self-refuting.

PSYCHOLOGY. Psychology is a regional ontology. Psychology abstracts the region of the psychic or mental from the world. In one form, it is an explanatory or theoretical science that explains the connections obtaining among different acts. In another form, it is a descriptive science that seeks to identify the essential structures of psychic experiences. It was the descriptive psychology of Franz Brentano that attracted Husserl’s interest in clarifying the essence of intentional experience and that served as the immediate predecessor of phenomenology.

PURE ANALYTICS. Husserl uses this term to refer to that part of formal logic (understood as combining both apophantic logic and mathematical logic) that is concerned to identify the possible forms for the combination of meanings in judgment and of judgments in arguments. It includes the first and second levels of logic, that is, pure logical grammar and the logic of consistency or non-contradiction. As such, it is governed by the kind of evidence that Husserl calls “distinctness.” It does not encompass the interest in cognition that characterizes logic in the complete sense, that is, the sense that includes the third level of logic, the logic of truth.

PURE LOGIC. Pure logic is the theoretical discipline that, according to the doctrine of the Logical Investigations, underlies the normative and methodological dimensions of logic. Pure logic, in other words, is the philosophical discipline that will serve as a theory of science. Such a theory, fully worked out, would identify and define, first, both meaning-categories (Bedeutungskategorien) and object-categories (Gegenstandskategorien) and, second, their law-governed combinations. In the case of meanings, for example, pure logic would identify the laws governing the combination of meanings into propositions, arguments, and theories. Third, pure logic would identify the pure form of theory-forms and
correlatively of what Husserl calls a "manifold." Pure logic would also provide an account of how these meaning-structures truthfully disclose the world that science seeks to describe. Finally, pure logic would provide an account of how meanings stand in a relation to (possible) minds. On this view, philosophical logic is inseparable from both phenomenology and ontology. This double relation is more fully worked out in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, where Husserl explores the grounding of pure logic in transcendental subjectivity as well as the unity of formal logic and formal ontology.

Husserl distinguishes two different approaches in the tradition that makes up the science of formal logic. The first is the Aristotelian logic that examines the *apophansis*, the assertive judgment in which something is predicated of or in a subject. Emptying such judgments of their material content discloses the logical forms of judgments and underlies the account of the formally valid possibilities for the combination of judgments in arguments. The second approach is found in *mathematical logic*. Francisca Vieta's development of the formalization appropriate to algebra allows us to speak of form as that which is applicable to anything at all. Gottfried Leibniz's *mathesis universalis* attempts to unite apophantic logic and mathematical logic in a single science, but, according to Husserl, Leibniz does not give an adequate account of how this unity is achieved. It is in the light of this broader conception of *mathesis universalis* that Husserl interprets the new mathematical logic—the mathematics of sums and sets and relations—as formal ontology.

Formal ontology, then, as the formal theory of objects is characterized first by its contrast with formal apophantic logic. The latter is a formal theory of science, a unified theory that would govern any theoretically explanatory, nomological, and deductive science. The initial task of a formal apophantic logic is to identify precisely those forms essential to such an undertaking, that is, the meaning-categories that belong to judgments, their structure, and their combinations. Hence, formal apophantic logic would develop our understanding of the notions of judgment or *proposition, subject, predicate, syllogism*, and so forth. In addition, however, and on the other hand, we find a correlative set of forms—"object-categories" such as object, *state of affairs*, unity, plurality, relation, set, ordered set, combination, and connection. While there are two groups of categories and laws appropriate for each group, pure logic is ultimately the unity of formal apophantics and formal ontology.

All this remains inchoate in the *Logical Investigations* where Husserl introduces the idea of pure logic. In the *Investigations* it is in its apophan-
tic character that pure logic serves as the theory of science and is the theoretical discipline underlying the normative and methodological dimensions of logic. It is only in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* that Husserl more fully develops the correlative notion of formal ontology and only there with the development of the notion of *transcendental logic* that Husserl fully realizes the unity of formal apophantics and formal ontology and their common grounding in transcendental subjectivity. *See also PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.*

**PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.** Pure logical grammar comprises the set of *a priori* and *formal* laws that regulate the combination of *meanings*—both *independent* and *non-independent*—into new unified meanings. Generally speaking, the laws of pure logical grammar are the syntactical rules that govern the composition of a well-formed *proposition*. The importance of the rules of pure logical grammar is magnified in those cases where the propositions so formed are not purely formal *analytic* propositions. Where material combinations come into play, certain complex meanings are impossible, that is, the meanings cannot be combined into a unified material *meaning*. The impossibility concerns, more precisely, the impossibility of combining the *meaning-categories* (*Bedeutungskategorien*) under which the meanings in question fall. The formal laws of pure logical grammar, in other words, do not involve totally free variables, but different variables are bound to particular semantic categories. In the *Logical Investigations*, for example, Husserl distinguishes between nominal and adjectival materials, and indicates that an adjectival material cannot be substituted for a nominal material in a propositional *form* (although *nominalization* of the adjectival material is possible). In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* Husserl identifies substantivity and adjectivity (specified as either propertiness or relationality) as fundamental categories, and it is to these that the notions of nominal and adjectival meaning-categories correspond. Pure logical grammar, then, is concerned to identity those forms according to which meanings belonging to meaning-categories having a defined a priori position in the realm of meanings can be brought into a complex, unitary *meaning*. *See also COUNTERSENSE; NONSENSE; PURE LOGIC.*

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**QUALITY.** *See ACT-QUALITY.*
REAL (real). The real is that which is actual as a physical entity or one of its components, or as a psychological entity (the "soul") or one of its components or experiences. "Real" is properly contrasted with "ideal" and "ir-real." See also IR-REAL CONTENTS; POSSIBILITY.

REAL (reell). The real (reell) is that which is an inherent component of an experience or act. See also IR-REAL CONTENTS.

REAL CONTENTS. The real (reell) contents of an act are the contents inhering in the act. Real contents are contrasted with ir-real (irreell) or intentional contents. In the theory of intentionality presented in the Logical Investigations, the real components of an act are its psychological contents, namely, its act-quality, its act-matter, and its presenting (sensuous) or representing contents. In the later theory of intentionality as presented in Ideas, the real components of an act are the noesis and the ñēç (hulç or hyłç) or hyletic data. See also IR-REAL CONTENTS; REAL (real).

REALISM. 1. Husserl has a thoroughly realistic conception of our natural experience, but this realism is not a philosophical theory that arises as the conclusion of a philosophical argument. Instead Husserl believes that our experience occurring in the natural attitude, including our scientific experience, has a realistic presumption at its core. This realistic presumption is what Husserl calls the "general thesis" of the natural attitude, and it posits the world as a single spatio-temporal and factually existent actuality to which both the experiencing subject and the object of its experience belong.

2. As a philosophical doctrine, realism typically arises in contrast to different anti-realisms that deny the presumptive realism of the natural attitude. Metaphysical realism, for example, denies that the objects of our experience are in any sense mind-dependent. Husserl's phenomenological reduction means that the philosopher as a philosopher takes no stance toward the existence or non-existence of the object as experienced (although she is concerned to account for those experiences in which we assert one or the other position).

For Husserl, then, realism is the presupposition of our natural and straightforward experience, but he rejects both metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism as philosophical theories. Moreover, Husserl is difficult to classify when it comes to epistemological idealism or semantic
anti-realism, primarily because his transcendental phenomenology rejects the terms in which these positions are cast. The former view claims that we cannot know things as they are in themselves, that we can attain no knowledge of mind-independent reality, while the latter view claims that linguistic expressions do not refer beyond themselves to referents whose nature is not fully determined by language itself. From a psychological perspective Husserl denies that we know only our own ideas, even while from a philosophical or transcendental perspective he acknowledges that the significance (rather than the existence) of the world is mind-dependent.

Husserl’s transcendental idealism, in other words, claims that consciousness is the medium of access to the world, that the world has no significance apart from a consciousness that discloses that significance. At the same time, however, Husserl denies that the experienced object as experienced (the noema) is a real (reell) part of the experience itself and his articulation of the structures of the noematic sense makes clear that not all intelligibility arises from subjectivity, intersubjectivity, or language. See also POSITING ACT; POSITION-TAKING.

REALITY. 1. A reality is an object which has the quality of being real (real); 2. reality is the totality of objects having the quality of being real; 3. reality is the quality of being real. “Reality” is opposed to “ideality” and “ir-reality,” and it properly includes what is both actual and “really” possible. See also IR-REAL CONTENTS; POSSIBILITY.

REASON. Husserl was concerned to articulate a notion of “authentic” reason as an antidote to the philosophical and cultural crisis infecting his world. This concern with a more adequate account of reason characterizes his thought as early as the “Prolegomena” to the Logical Investigations and endures through his last published work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. In the 35 years intervening between the two works, what Husserl had first identified as a philosophical problem became for him as well a moral and cultural crisis. The conception of reason Husserl develops in response to this crisis goes beyond the prevalent modern sense of reason as scientific rationality in two ways: he severs the bond between reason and scientific theory, and he severs the bond between the notions of reason and rational procedure or calculation.

In severing the bond between reason and scientific rationality, Husserl by no means rejects the rationality of theory. Instead, he expands the notion of reason, insisting that there are other forms of reason as well, namely, the axiological and practical. They are not rational in exactly the same way that a theoretical science is, but they are no less rational in
their own proper way. In severing the bond between reason and calculation, Husserl moves beyond a procedural view of reason to what might be called a “teleological” and “intuitive” or “evidential” account of reason. Reason is a striving for evidence. The intuitive, evidential experiences for which reason strives take different forms in cognition and theoretical science, in valuation and axiological science, and in volition and the practical sciences. Nevertheless, common to all the forms of reason is that they involve this striving for experiences in which our emptyly intended judgments are confirmed or disconfirmed by intuitive insight into the directly, clearly, and distinctly presented “things themselves.”

Insofar as it is primarily judgments and their combinations whose confirmation is the task of reason, the notion of reason presupposes the idea that the first task of reason is to articulate objects, to introduce syntax or categoriality into things. Husserl devoted most of his energies to discussion of theoretical reason and, unfortunately, did not develop the details of his notions of axiological and practical reason. Nevertheless, he clearly believed that in all three rational domains, the aim of experiential life is the same—to live the life of reason, the life of evidential insight.

The achievement of evidenced truth is for Husserl the full exercise of reason in its various forms. Husserl believes we are called to this full exercise of reason—he calls it “authenticity” or “self-responsibility”—and it is just this call that provides the moral urgency at the center of his philosophy. There is a moral imperative that each person rediscover the proper sense of rationality and develop a sense of self-responsibility in which one decides for oneself in the light of evidence about what is true, about the proper evaluative attitudes one ought to have, and about the actions one ought to perform. See also CATEGORIAL ACT; CATEGORIAL FORM; CATEGORIAL INTUITION; CATEGORIAL OBJECT; CATEGORY; EMPTY INTENTION; INTUITION; RECOGNITION; VALUE.

RECOGNITION (das Erkennen). Recognition is the relation of static union that arises when a sense-giving thought, a meaning-intention, bases itself on intuition and is thereby related to its object. The words expressing the meaning-intention overlay, as it were, the object of intuition, and there arises a synthesis of identification between the meaning-intention and the fulfilling intention belonging to the intuitive act. Recognition occurs, for example, when I speak of an object in its presence and while inspecting it. The recognition is not identical to the intuition, but necessarily involves it and is based upon it. I recognize the object as what it is, and accordingly, I name the object as, say, “a desk.” The synthesis of recognition is
knowing in the proper sense and is the appropriate form of **fulfillment** for objectifying acts.

**RECOLLECTION (Wiedererrinnerung).** Recollection is a **moment** in an associative **synthesis**. The **affection** occurring in the impressional moment within the **living present** awakens similar **intentional contents** and their affective force. These contents are re-collected in the living present such that the **noematic sense** of the awakened **experiences** contributes to the present sense of the **object**. The object as experienced in the past is re-called to the present **consciousness** of the object. In this respect, recollection is different from **memory**, since the object of the concrete experience in which recollection plays a part might be constituted as temporally present. Memory, on the other hand, grasps an object as past. See also **ASSOCIATION**; **AWAKENING**; **PRIMAL IMPRESSION**.

**REFERENCE.** Reference is the power of an **expression** to relate itself to an **objectivity** of some sort, that is, to a **referent**. This reference occurs by virtue of the fact that an expression has a **meaning**. The referent need not be actually existent.

**REFERENT.** The referent is the **objectivity** to which an **expression** refers. Given that the same **meaning** can have many referents and that the same **object** can be the referent of many expressions, the referent must be distinguished from the meaning of the expression.

**REFLECTION.** Reflection is an **act** in which a **subject** turns its attention back on itself and its acts. Husserl distinguishes a number of different types of reflection. Fundamental is philosophical or **phenomenological reflection** in which the reflecting subject turns her attention back to the **self** as a subject **of** or **for** a **world**. **Psychological reflection**, on the other hand, involves the subject’s turning her attention back to the self as a **psychic object** in the world involved in **real** (real) spatio-temporal and causal relations with other objects in the world.

Husserl also identifies another kind of reflection that is a modification of these more fundamental senses. In turning one’s attention to one’s own acts, one also grasps the objects constituted in those acts just as they are constituted. Phenomenological reflection focuses this correlation of subject and object (or, in technical terms, **noesis** and **noema**) as such, whereas psychological reflection focuses the subject as an existent **actuality** in its own right. Critical or logical reflection, on the other hand, focuses its attention on the object as experienced in order to determine the **truth** or falsity of the subject’s grasp of the world. See also **APOPHAN-**
REGION. The region is the highest generic unity belonging to a concretum. In other words, a region is an essence belonging to a class of concrete existents. Colors do not form a region, since color is only an abstract moment in things, but material things do form a region. In addition to the material thing, spirit (animals and humans) forms a region. The region, then, is the least specified material content and the first material limitation upon the range of application of the formal a priori. The “lower” universal that is the substantival genus is ordered under the region, and the still “lower” substantival species are ordered under the genus. In summary, then, a region is the highest generic unity under which the genera and species of independently existing objects can be ordered.

REGIONAL ONTOLOGY. Husserl’s understanding of ontology comprises both formal ontology and regional ontologies. Whereas formal ontology identifies the forms and laws of combination belonging to any objectivity whatever, regional ontologies are defined, beyond the purely formal categories, by a material concept and, more specifically, by the concept of a region. To each region there belongs its own eidetic science. It is this regional eidetic science that Husserl calls a “regional ontology.” While regional ontologies are located within the categorial boundaries defined by formal ontology, they also enrich formal ontology by providing both material content and the forms belonging essentially to the particular region. See also A PRIORI; CATEGORIAL FORM; CATEGORY; EIDOS; OBJECT-CATEGORIES.

REINACH, ADOLF (1883–1917). Reinach was a student of Theodor Lipps at Munich, but he along with other members of the Munich Circle organized by Johannes Daubert, rejected the psychologism of Lipps’s psychology. Reinach was among the Munich phenomenologists who joined Husserl at Göttingen, where he also taught with Husserl as a Privatdozent. An important member of what became the Göttingen Philosophical Society, he was recognized by his colleagues as a gifted expositor and teacher of phenomenology. Like many of those colleagues, he rejected Husserl’s turn to transcendental idealism. Nevertheless, he was held in great esteem by Husserl, as is evidenced by the warm obituary Husserl prepared after Reinach’s untimely death on the battlefield.

Reinach made significant contributions to phenomenology, especially in the areas of legal philosophy and the phenomenology of what he called “social acts.” His early essay “Deliberation: its ethical and legal signifi-
cance” (“Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung”) develops an interesting theory of the “paradoxes of deliberation” and how the presence or absence of deliberation affects judgments about the culpability of the agent. His major work, titled “The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law” (“Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts”), appeared in the first volume of Husserl’s Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung). This work develops, in opposition to legal positivism, an understanding of the legal a priori as well as a theory of “social acts” that includes descriptions of those acts and expressions, for example, promises, that make no sense apart from a social whole that involves not only the agent but other persons to whom obligations are established through, say, the acts of promising and of the promise being accepted. The theory of social acts is in many ways a precursor to the development of the theory of speech acts found in thinkers such as John Austin and John Searle.

RELATIVE CONCRETUM. A relative concretum is a whole composed of abstract parts or moments, which whole, however, is or might be a moment of a more comprehensive whole; otherwise, it is an absolute concretum. See also ABSTRACTUM; PIECE.

RELATIVISM. Relativism is the view that truth is relative to the knower, that is, that what is true is what seems true or what is taken to be true by the knower. It has two forms: individual relativism or subjectivism and specific relativism. The latter case, when the species is the human species, is also known as anthropologism. Relativism ties the notion of truth to a certain set of empirical facts about the knower, whether these facts be about the individual or the species, whether they be physiological or psychological or historical facts. For Husserl, relativism of whatever type is a self-defeating claim about the nature of truth, for it confuses the empirical conditions that qualify a knower’s grasp of the truth with conditions that limit truth itself. See also HISTORICISM; PSYCHOLOGISM.

REPRESENTATION (Repräsentation). Husserl’s use of the term Repräsentation is limited largely to the Logical Investigations, where it has three meanings: 1. a representation is something that takes the place of a presentation and provokes further presentations, for example, a depiction or an image or a linguistic expression naming the presented object; 2. a representation, considered as that which underlies an act, is everything included in the act save its act-quality; hence, a representation includes
the act-matter as well as its non-essential components, specifically its 
**presenting or representing contents**, and it can be conceived broadly as 
representational content; and 3. more specifically, in the sixth investiga-
tion, a representation is defined as the **unity** of matter and representing 
contents, a unity achieved by the interpretative, intentional form $(i \bar{\varphi} \bar{\phi})$.

**REPRESENTATION (Vorstellung).** See PRESENTATION (Vorstellung); 
REPRESENTATION (Repräsentation); RE-PRESENTATION (Verge-
genwärtigung)

**RE-PRESENTATION (Vergegenwärtigung).** Husserl uses the term 
Vergegenwärtigung to designate a presentation (Vorstellung) that does 
not present an object originally, that is, as intuitively present. Such a 
presentation makes present (vergegenwärtigt) an absent object in an 
empty intention (or only partially fulfilling intention) either by re-
presenting the object, that is, presenting it again as in memory, or by 
emptily expressing a sense in expression, or by crafting an image, or in 
expectation or wishing or hoping, and so forth. All of these kinds of 
experience are contrasted with perception (Perzeption, Wahrnehmung) 
and other intuitive acts. See also APPERCEPTION (Apperzeption); FULL 
INTENTION; FULLNESS; INTUITION.

**REPRESENTING CONTENTS.** In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl was 
committed to the view that all experiences involve the apprehension of 
non-intentional, real (reell) contents and that the union of these presented 
an object to consciousness. In perception (Perzeption, Wahrnehmung) 
these contents were sensation-contents or, as Husserl sometimes called 
them, presenting contents or, as he later called them, hyletic data. The 
apprehension of these contents presented the actually present sensible 
thing. In cases where the object or objective feature presented was not 
sensible, e.g., in the experience of an absent object or categorial form, 
Husserl posited representing contents in the place of presenting contents. 
He subsequently abandoned the commitment to representing contents, 
although he maintained the commitment to presenting contents within 
primal impression. See also PHANTOM.

**RETENTION.** Retention is that phase within the momentary phase of 
consciousness—the living present—that intends just elapsed phases of 
absolute consciousness. See also INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS; 
PRIMAL IMPRESSION; PROTENTION.
RICŒUR, PAUL (1913–2005). Paul Ricoeur was one of the central figures in phenomenology in France. His translation of the first volume of Husserl’s Ideas introduced Husserl to the French-speaking world, and Ricoeur also wrote a number of commentaries on various aspects of Husserl’s work. Ricoeur’s own early work was much influenced by Husserl, even as it departed from Husserl’s own views on a number of crucial issues. In particular, Ricoeur rejected Husserl’s emphasis on the analysis of theoretical reason as well as his view that other forms of experience, in particular, valuation and volition, were founded on cognition. Ricoeur’s first major work La philosophie de la volonté (The Philosophy of the Will) is devoted to an extensive analysis of human volition and action. Originally conceived as a three-volume work, Ricoeur published only the first two volumes, titled The Voluntary and the Involuntary (Le volontaire et l’involontaire, 1950, translated as Freedom and Nature) and Finitude and Culpability (Finitude et culpabilité, 1960). The first volume explores the manner in which natural facts beyond the control of the agent, including, for example, facts about the body, limit human freedom. The second volume appeared in two parts. The first part (L’homme faillible, translated as Fallible Man) explores the conditions that make possible evil or sin, and the second part (La symbolique du mal, translated as The Symbolism of Evil) explores the ways in which actual evil is spoken of symbolically through metaphors. This monumental work reveals both Ricoeur’s commitment to the descriptive methodology of Husserl’s phenomenology and his movement into questions of interpretation and the field of hermeneutics.

Ricoeur’s later work, while never abandoning his phenomenological roots, continues this development into the field of hermeneutics (in a broad sense not limited to the interpretation of written texts but encompassing non-textual phenomena such as, most importantly, action). This led him to an investigation of both structuralism and psychoanalytic theory in order to trace the ways in which symbols contributed to our understanding of experience and of the self. Central to his later works is a narrative understanding of the self, whose central statement is found in the three-volume Time and Narrative (Temps et récit, 1983–1985). Indeed, explicating the concept of self in its fullest sense remained the driving concern of Ricoeur’s work, right up to one of his last works Oneself as Another (Soi-même comme un autre, 1990).

RICERT, HEINRICH (1863–1936). Heinrich Rickert was a leading figure in the Baden or Southwest German school of neo-Kantianism. Rickert distinguished between scientific and historical facts and, along with the other Baden neo-Kantians, sought to identify universal values that are the
condition for the possibility of historical cultures in their various forms. Rickert argued both that the historian of any culture in selecting historically significant facts must appeal to the values thought significant by that culture rather than those of the historian and that the values of different cultures approximate the universally valid values that condition them. Martin Heidegger studied under Rickert at Freiburg. In 1916, when Rickert moved to the University of Heidelberg, Husserl was appointed to the chair vacated by Rickert at Freiburg.

SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL (1905–1980). Jean-Paul Sartre studied at the École Normale Supérieure, passing his agrégation in 1929. After brief military service, he taught at a lycée in Le Havre for six years, during which time he read and studied the works of Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Sartre’s early philosophical works are thoroughly phenomenological in character. His first work, The Transcendence of the Ego (La transcendance de l’ego, 1936) was a detailed critique of Husserl’s views on the ego, although the position Sartre took is remarkably similar to Husserl’s own view, since it involves a non-egological conception of consciousness. Both also assert that a pre-reflective self-awareness belongs to all intentional experience. This leads to Sartre’s view that consciousness is best characterized as for-itself (pour-soi)—undetermined and self-determining or free—whereas whatever is not characterized by this pre-reflective self-awareness is just what it is in-itself (en-soi). Sartre’s early works on the imagination (L’imagination [1936] [Imagination: A Psychological Critique] and L’imaginaire [1940] [The Imaginary]) are attempts to work out a theory of intentionality that emphasizes this freedom of consciousness as for-itself. And his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions, 1939) develops a view of the emotions as freely chosen ways of relating to what an experiencing agent encounters in the world.

The themes of these early works were fully developed in Sartre’s masterpiece Being and Nothingness (L’être et le néant, 1943). Despite viewing consciousness essentially as freedom, Sartre develops a view of transphenomenality, the view, that is, that the appearing phenomenon depends for its being not only on consciousness but the horizon of objects in which it is presented. Moreover, Sartre’s view of consciousness as freedom was carefully qualified by an extensive consideration of the manner in which freedom is situated socially and historically and the manner, therefore, in which the exercise of freedom is conditioned by the
agent’s past and by social and cultural circumstances. Sartre’s later biographical works—as well as many of his literary works—explore the same set of issues, focusing their attention on the individual and how particular individuals are both enabled and conditioned by their social and historical circumstances.

Sartre’s view of consciousness as freedom and his concern with social and political issues led him to alter his views somewhat in his later writings. The role of social and historical conditioning was emphasized to a greater degree in his later works. For instance, in *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* (Critique de la raison dialectique, 1960), Sartre attempted to reconcile his individualistic account of freedom with Marxism by investigating the formation of social wholes and the manner in which they influence individual action.

SCHELER, MAX (1874–1928). Max Scheler, born in Munich, received his doctorate from Jena University in 1887 and habilitated there in 1899. He first met Husserl in 1901, and they discussed their broadened concepts of intuition. A charismatic teacher, Scheler joined the faculty of the University of Munich in 1906, and there became associated with the Munich Circle. Scheler, while sharing the aversion of the members of the Munich Circle to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, was, however, always an independent thinker not easily confined to any “school” of thought or approach. He wrote extensively on the role feeling and emotion play in the experience of value and on ethics. Notable among the works on feelings and emotions are Toward the Phenomenology and Theory of the Feeling of Sympathy and of Love and Hate (*Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass*, 1914), a substantially revised version of which was published as *The Nature of Sympathy* (*Vom Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, 1923). The difference in the two editions arose out of the fact that Scheler’s later philosophy moved away from descriptive phenomenology toward a more speculative metaphysics.

Also significant for phenomenology was the anti-Nietzschean tract titled “Resentment in the Structure of Morals” (“Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen,” 1915), a work that prompted Ernst Troeltsch to call Scheler the “Catholic Nietzsche.” Scheler’s *magnum opus* is undoubtedly his anti-Kantian work in axiological ethics titled *Formalism in Ethics and Nonformal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt at the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism* (Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus, 1913, 1916). Here Scheler develops an account of the a priori emotional apprehension of a hierarchy of values, an apprehension that
precedes the cognition of things as bearers of value as well as all choice of goods, ends, and actions conducing to the realization of those goods and ends.

SCHUTZ, ALFRED (1899–1959). Alfred Schutz (originally Schütz, but changed after he emigrated to the United States), who trained in the law at the University of Vienna, became interested in the social sciences and, in particular, how moral and legal norms affect interpretations of social phenomena. He studied and was influenced by the works of Max Weber, and first developed his ideas in The Phenomenology of the Social World (Die sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, 1932). Schutz sought to broaden and to deepen his approach to social self-understanding, and he found in Husserl's phenomenology an approach that would enable him to do so. Schutz, however, was no mere disciple of Husserl. He criticized Husserl’s view of intersubjectivity and developed a phenomenological sociology that investigated social meanings and social categories. But Schutz’s positions were more firmly rooted in empirical social relations than in the notion of transcendental intersubjectivity. Hence, rather than focusing on the constitution of social meanings by an intersubjective community, Schutz explored how social meanings are experienced in everyday life. This approach is evident as well in Schutz’s last, but unfinished, work Structures of the Life-world (Strukturen der Lebenswelt, 1975), which was brought to completion by Schutz’s student Thomas Luckman. See also SOCIAL WORLD.

SCIENCE (Wissenschaft). A science is a body of knowledge (1) that has a principle of unity; (2) that coherently and systematically organizes judgments and arguments into a logical unity; and (3) that is evident. The sciences can be distinguished in several ways. If they are distinguished according to their principle of unity, the major distinction is between theoretical sciences that are unified by virtue of a homogeneity of explanatory principles and descriptive sciences that are unified by virtue of their studying a single individual or empirical species. If the sciences are distinguished according to their fields of study, the major distinction is that between the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). If they are distinguished according to the attitude in which they are undertaken, the major distinction is that between the natural sciences, the personalistic or cultural disciplines, and the philosophical or phenomenological science. See also CULTURE; PERSONALISTIC ATTITUDE; PHENOMENOLOGY.
SCIENTISM. Scientism is the view, often associated with 19th-century positivism, that the natural sciences are the only genuine form of knowledge and that they provide an exhaustive account of reality. This entails the view that the natural sciences are also effective in areas normally contrasted with natural science, for example, the social or human sciences, the humanities, philosophy, and religion.

SECONDARY PASSIVITY. Passive syntheses operate on two levels: the synthetic formations that are dependent upon association with prior experiences of a single subject, and, since subjectivity reciprocally depends upon intersubjectivity, the synthetic formations involved in the communalization of a subject, that is, in the appropriation by the subject of historical, linguistic, and cultural forms and traditions. The latter is the level of secondary passivity. See also PASSIVE SYNTHESIS; PASSIVITY.

SELF. The term “self” is used in multiple, but related, senses. Chief among these are: 1. The self is pre-reflectively and phenomenally apprehended as the owner of intentional experiences, that is, as the subject of those experiences. In experiencing an object, for example, a subject is aware not only of the intended object of the experience but also of the experience itself as my (the subject’s) experience. In occurrently experiencing the object, in other words, the subject also experiences itself precisely as the subject of the occurrent experience and as the subject of the stream of experiences in which the occurrent experience takes its place. The self, then, is the subject of experiences.

2. The self is this same subject of experiences but reflectively thematized as an object of reflective consciousness, as the ego or “I.”

3. The self is also the substrate of the habitual modes of experiencing the world, of the convictions acquired during the course of that experience, and of the capacities, attitudes, interests, and motivations that generate further experience. It is in this sense of self that the self might be said to have a developed personality or style of experiencing the world. See also EGO; HABITUALITY; PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS; REFLECTION; SELF-AWARENESS; TRANSCENDENTAL EGO.

SELF-AWARENESS. The expression “self-awareness” is typically reserved to denote the pre-reflective, non-thematic, and non-objectifying awareness of an experience as “my” experience having a temporal unity and position in an organized flow of experiences that is also characterized as “mine.” In perceiving an object from a certain perspective, for example, the
**Consciousness** of the object as perceived from that perspective is intertwined with the awareness of “my” perceiving the object. It is the structure of **inner time-consciousness** and the **living present** that makes possible the **pre-reflective consciousness** of the **subject** precisely as the **ego** or “I.” The expression “self-awareness” can also be used to refer to this reflective self-consciousness. *See also* NON-OBJECTIFYING ACT; OBJECTIFYING ACT; THEME.

**SELF-EVIDENCE.** In its logical sense, self-evidence belongs to a **proposition** that is necessarily true and whose **truth** is knowable once the **meaning** of the terms in the proposition is known. A self-evident proposition is one whose denial is self-contradictory. In its phenomenological sense, self-evidence is the same as **evidence**, although the expression “self-evidence” emphasizes that it is the **intended object** itself that is given in the intuitive act recognized as fulfilling an **empty intention**. In this phenomenological sense, then, self-evidence is the **evidence** of the **object** itself. *See also* FULFILLING INTENTION; INTUITION; RECOGNITION.

**SELF-GIVENNESS.** 1. Self-givenness is that particular form of **givenness** of the object wherein the object itself is directly present. In fulfilling contexts, self-givenness is self-evidence. 2. Self-givenness is the givenness of the **self** to itself in **self-awareness**.

**SEMANTIC CATEGORIES.** *See* MEANING-CATEGORIES; PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.

**SEMANTIC ESSENCE.** The semantic **essence** is the unity of an **expressive act-quality** and **act-matter**. Husserl subsequently abandons the notion of semantic essence when he abandons the notion of **meaning** as the instantiation of an **ideal meaning-species** and reinterprets the notion of act-matter as **noematic sense**. The noematic sense of an expressive act, that is, the meaning of an **expression**, is the noematic sense of an underlying **significative intention** taken up as the objective determination of the linguistic **sign**. *See also* SIGNITIVE INTENTION.

**Sensation.** 1. Sensation is the sensing of an **object** as having a determinate sensible property.
2. Sensation, for Husserl, is the real (reell) content presenting that determinate property. This sense of sensation is found in Husserl’s doctrine of hyletic data.

3. Sensation is the organism’s self-awareness of its own bodily condition. Sensations in this sense include the visceral feelings, such as the tightening of the stomach muscles experienced, for example, when angry, as well as the feelings of pain in an injured arm.

4. Sensation is a feeling aroused in the subject by an object and intentionally referred back to the object producing them. These feelings are, generally speaking, feelings of pleasure or pain, although they can be more defined feelings associated with particular emotions. But this sense of “sensation” should be contrasted with the third, for here the pleasure or pain is not referred to a state of the organism’s body but is taken in the object. Hence, these pleasures and pains can also be characterized as likings or dislikings.

SENSATION-CONTENTS. See HYLETIC DATA.

SENSE (Sinn). In revising his theory of meaning in the years between 1901 and 1913, Husserl recognizes that he must pay greater attention to the objective conditions of meaning. Hence, he develops what he calls in 1908 a phenomenological theory of meaning that is importantly different from the theory of meaning in the Logical Investigations. There meaning was thought to be an ideal species instantiated in particular expressive acts. Subsequently, however, Husserl develops a theory of meaning tied to the objective correlate—the noema and, in particular, the noematic sense—of intentional acts. In developing this account, Husserl uses the term “sense” (Sinn)—although, as he says, with an extended meaning—rather than the term “meaning” (Bedeutung) that he now reserves for the meaning of an expression.

In most cases, when Husserl uses the term “sense” he means the noematic sense. The noematic sense, a development of the early concept of act-matter, accounts for the presentation of the object in a determinate manner in the experience. The sense of the object is the object itself in its significance for the experiencing agent or, more simply, the significance of the object. It is, more narrowly, the objective sense, to use another Husserlian expression for the noematic sense of underlying objectifying acts. This noematic sense is distinguishable from the act’s quality and thetic characteristic, for the same sense can arise in different acts and with different belief-modalities. One can, for example, judge that the desk is large, hope that the desk is large, or wish that the desk be large.
Husserl claims that any noematic sense is expressible. The sense is constituted in a significative intention and can be made the objective determinant of a sensible sign. In this way, the sense is constituted as the meaning of that sign and that whereby the sign is referred to the object intended in the significative intention just as apprehended in that intention.

On some occasions, Husserl uses “sense” to refer to the full noema. The thetic characteristic, however, is not expressed in language in the way that the noematic sense is. Insofar as an expression not only expresses its meaning but intimates both the expressive act and the underlying significative act in which the expressed sense has been brought to awareness, the expression provides information about the context in which the expression is to be understood. More specifically, it provides information about the act-quality and the doxic modality of the intimated experience. See also FULFILLING INTENTION; FULFILLING SENSE; INTENDING SENSE; INTENTIONAL OBJECT; MEANING-INTENTION; REFERENCE; REFERENT; SIGNITIVE INTENTION.

SENSELESSNESS. See NONSENSE.

SENSIBLE THING. See PHANTOM.

SENSUOUS CONTENTS. See HYLETIC DATA.

SIGN. A sign refers to something else via the mediation of a physical, sensible substrate. Husserl distinguishes indications from expressions as subspecies of signs. Expressive signs, that is, signs that carry a meaning, in general are not similar to what is expressed or signified. This is in contrast to images or likenesses (for example, a portrait) where there is a similarity of content.

SIGNIFICANCE. This term is generally used, depending upon context, as an equivalent for “sense” or “meaning.” See also SIGNIFICATION; SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION; SIGNITIVE INTENTION.

SIGNIFICATION. This term is generally used as an equivalent for the extended meaning of “sense” insofar as this sense is related to and expressed in an expression. See also SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION; SIGNITIVE INTENTION.

SIGNIFICATIVE INTENTION. A significative intention is an intention that discloses an objective sense—the sense of an object—expressible in an expression. Husserl claims that anything intentionally presented and,
therefore, anything meant in the noematic sense, is expressible. Anything intentionally presented can, in other words, be transformed into the meaning of an expression. The objectifying intention—and any non-expressive intentions founded thereon—is, in the context of the discussion of expressions, called the significative intention; it constitutes the signification that founds the expression and is expressed thereby. This signification is transformed into the determination of a sensuous sign in a signitive intention. See also CONSTITUTION; FOUNDATION; NOEMA; OBJECTIFYING ACT.

SIGNITIVE INTENTION. A signitive intention is an intention that constitutes an expression as having a meaning and referring to an object. This is possible by virtue of the fact that there is an interweaving of expressive act-strata with other acts. Husserl claims that the noematic sense constituted in an objectifying act—and any non-expressive acts founded thereon—can be transformed into the determination of a sensuous sign. In the context of the discussion of expressions, Husserl speaks of the objectifying intention as a significative intention. The noematic sense constituted in the significative intention is, as it were, extracted from the full noema of the significative intention and attached by the signitive intention to a linguistic expression.

An expressive sign emerges in the combination of the two intentions; the sign refers to its meaning by virtue of the signitive intention and refers to its object by virtue of the significative intention. The meaning to which the signitive intention points and the object to which the significative intention refers are in an important sense the same; the meaning just is the object precisely as intended, and the object is the identity given in that meaning and in all the other senses that disclose this object for us in all its significance. The expression thereby refers to the same object experienced in the underlying significative intention and refers to it in the same determinate manner as the underlying experience. The intended object precisely as intended is disclosed by both the underlying act and the expression precisely because the underlying act’s noematic sense has been made into the meaning of the expression. See also NOEMA.

SITUATION (Sachlage). A situation is an unarticulated state of affairs. An object is presented as having internal determinations (properties) and external determinations (relations to other objects) that belong to its objective sense as passively apprehended. The presence of these determinations make up the object’s situation. The situation, according to Husserl, is a founded reality, for it presupposes the givenness of an object that is not itself a situation. An object can underlie different situations.
Any situation can be articulated in acts of judging, and each situation underlies multiple possibilities for articulation. See also JUDGE; JUDGMENT (Satz); JUDGMENT (Urteil); PASSIVE SYNTHESIS; PASSIVITY.

SKEPTICISM. Skepticism is the philosophical view that denies that there is knowledge or the justification of knowledge. Skepticism depends for its meaning on the definition of knowledge. Hence, if the definition of knowledge includes the characteristic of certitude, as in René Descartes and David Hume, skepticism is the denial that certitude is possible. Skepticism can deny that all knowledge is impossible, or it can deny that knowledge is impossible in a particular region or domain. Hume, for example, does not deny that we can have a certain knowledge of a priori relations of ideas, but he does deny that we can have certain knowledge—and hence, any knowledge—of matters of fact. The skeptical viewpoint can yield subjectivism in knowledge—the denial of objective knowledge—or it can yield relativism—the view that all knowledge is relative to the knower or to a species of knowers.

Husserl opposed all varieties of skepticism, in particular, psychologism. He claimed that objective and universal knowledge is possible, and that intuition or evidence justifies that knowledge. See also ANTHROPOLOGISM; SPECIFIC RELATIVISM.

SOCIAL WORLD. The social world, especially important in the work of thinkers like Adolf Reinach and Alfred Schutz, is the world constituted in social acts, for example, communicative expressions that constitute a shared world, performative speech acts that establish social relations between or among subjects, and cooperative activities that constitute a community having a shared end to the attainment of which individual wills are both coordinated and subordinated. These performative speech acts and social relations underlie the institutions that characterize social groups. See also COMMUNITY; INTERSUBJECTIVITY; PERSONALITY OF A HIGHER ORDER.

SOKOLOWSKI, ROBERT (1934–). Robert Sokolowski completed his studies for the doctorate in philosophy at Louvain in 1963 and, except for brief visiting appointments, has taught at the Catholic University of America since then. He is one of the foremost—interpreters of Husserl in the United States. He has published careful studies of central Husserlian concepts, especially the concept of constitution. More important, however, he has developed Husserl’s phenomenology in the areas of ontology, philosophical logic, and the philosophy of language.
SPECIFIC RELATIVISM


SOLIPSISM. Solipsism is the view that a cognizing agent can be acquainted only with his or her own states in isolation from anything else that might exist. Often associated with an egocentric predicament—that is, the view that the subject can have no knowledge of an external world or of other minds, Husserl explicitly rejects the view that his position is solipsistic. For Husserl, the subject has, by virtue of intentionality, an immediate contact with objects not really contained in consciousness and, by virtue of empathy, with other minds.

SOUL (Seele). ‘Soul’ is, for Husserl, a psychological concept. The soul—animal or human—is invariably given in connection with a body (Leib) that it animates and over which it has a certain priority in the unified existent that is the organism. The soul is the unity or bearer of real, psychic, intentional experience, which unity is considered as a natural object existing in the world and from the viewpoint of psychology. The soul, therefore, is not to be considered a (secondary) substantial unity in the manner of an Aristotelian soul; it is not an empirical nature. It is the unified life of the mind of the organism as that life is expressed in the activities and behaviors of the organism. See also EGO; PSYCHOLOGICAL EGO; TRANSCENDENTAL EGO; TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT.

SPECIES. A species is a universal object abstracted from individual objects. The abstraction focuses on shared properties of the individuals, and the resultant universal object is a lower-level generality, subordinate to both the genus and the region. The species is a morphological essence.

SPECIFIC RELATIVISM. Specific relativism claims that truth is relative to a species, that is, that what is true is what seems or is taken to be true by a species of beings. What seems to be true or is taken as true is a function of the empirical nature of the species, that is, its physiological and psychological makeup, such that what seems to be true or is taken as true by any instance of the species is conditioned by this specific physiological and psychological nature. See also ANTHROPOLOGISM.
SPIEGELBERG, HERBERT (1904–1990). Herbert Spiegelberg wrote his
dissertation on law and morality at the University of Munich under the
direction of Alexander Pfänder. He wrote a number of phenomenological
texts, including important investigations in the area of ethics. He is
famous as the first and foremost chronicler of the development of
phenomenological philosophy, writing a two-volume work titled The
Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction.

STATE OF AFFAIRS (Sachverhalt). A state of affairs is the intended
object of a judging act. Hence, the state of affairs is a categorial object
that is the articulated situation. In articulating the situation, a cognizing
agent identifies the categorial forms that structure the objects found in
the situation. In the critical attitude wherein one questions the truth of
the judgment, the reflecting agent focuses attention on the state of affairs
just as supposed. The state of affairs just as supposed is the proposition
in the logical sense, which, from the phenomenological perspective, is
recognized as the noematic sense of the judging act. The state of affairs,
finally, is the referent of the declarative sentence that expresses the
proposition. See also EXPRESSION; JUDGE.

STATIC PHENOMENOLOGY. Static phenomenology is contrasted with
genetic phenomenology. Whereas genetic phenomenology is concerned
with the building up of sense through and over time, static phenomenol-
ogy identifies the sense-structure of fully constituted objects and the
founding relations among the acts or act-moments in which these objects
are constituted. See also CONSTITUTION; FOUNDATION; FOUNDED
MOMENT; FOUNDING MOMENT; GENERATIVE PHENOMENOLO-
GY.

STEIN, EDITH (1891–1942). Edith Stein entered the University of Breslau
in 1911 and began the study of psychology. She was quickly dissatisfied,
however, and became interested instead in Husserl’s phenomenology,
finding in his work an attempt to clarify the concepts and principles
necessary for an account of human experience and behavior. Stein studied
philosophy with Husserl at Göttingen from 1913 to 1916. She moved with
him to Freiburg, where she completed her dissertation on empathy and
became his first assistant.

At Göttingen, Stein was influenced not only by Husserl but by Adolf
Reinach and Max Scheler. All three were Jews who had converted to
Christianity, Husserl and Reinach to Lutheranism, and Scheler to
Catholicism. Husserl’s commitment to objectivity and to the truth of
things, along with the rigor of his methodology, provided Stein with the
essential elements of her own philosophical approach. Scheler’s influence was of a different sort. Stein was impressed by the way he could incorporate Catholic ideas into his discussions. And it was Reinach and his wife who opened Stein to the possibilities of a lived faith. Stein was profoundly influenced by the personal example of the kindness and faith of Adolf and Anna Reinach, especially Anna’s courage after Adolf was killed in combat in 1917 and her conviction regarding redemptive suffering. All these influences both contributed to Stein’s philosophical formation and laid the groundwork for her conversion to Catholicism on New Year’s Day of 1922.

Stein devoted most of her philosophical writings to three themes: empathy and the nature of community, including the state; feminism, especially the nature, role, and education of women; and the attempt to relate phenomenology and Thomism. Undoubtedly, her most important phenomenological work was that done in her dissertation Zum Problem der Einfühlung (On the Problem of Empathy, 1916). She published two other significant, phenomenological works in Husserl’s Yearbook: Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften (Contributions to a Philosophical Grounding of Psychology and the Human Sciences, 1922) and Eine Untersuchung über den Staat (An Investigation Concerning the State, 1925).

Her feminist works grew in part out of her life situation. Stein became involved in feminist politics shortly after her arrival in Göttingen in 1913. She was among the first group of women admitted to the university and was conscious of the need to advance women’s causes. She worked for a political party, even though she could not vote, and also became involved in the German suffrage movement. After resigning her assistantship at Freiburg, she applied for a habilitation in Göttingen but her application failed—in part because she was a woman. Stein appealed to the Prussian Ministry for Science, Art, and Education, and on 21 February 1921, the Ministry issued a landmark ruling that “membership in the female sex may not be seen as an obstacle to habilitation.” Her action cleared the field for women seeking university positions, although it would be 30 years before the first German women actually habilitated, and Stein’s own subsequent applications at Breslau and Freiburg in 1931 were denied.

Stein believes that sexual differentiation extends beyond bodily differences to the psycho-physical unity itself. The animating soul of the woman, insofar as it animates a different bodily structure, is different from the animating soul of a man. While men and women have the same basic human characteristics, they also have characteristics by virtue of which we can distinguish between a male and female nature. However, tasks and occupations that depend upon shared human characteristics—including
citizenship and university teaching—should be open to all. Even those tasks and occupations that are enhanced by the special gifts belonging to each sex should remain open to all, she thought, since members of the one sex may bring a special benefit that will benefit professionals even of the other sex.

Stein was introduced to the work of St. Thomas during her years teaching in a Dominican convent school for young women in Speyer. She translated the *Disputed Questions on Truth*, although the translation rearranged Thomas’s work, dispensing with the *quaestio* format in favor of reorganizing as a treatise the important content in the body of each article with answers to the principal objections annexed at the end of the question. Stein found not only a German expression for Thomas’s work, but a phenomenological one. This generated a fair amount of controversy. Some thought that Stein had infected Thomas with phenomenological jargon, producing an unorthodox Thomism; others thought it a fine way to bring Thomas to the modern world in a modern idiom. Her major work in what we might call a “phenomenological Thomism” is *Endliches und ewiges Sein* (*Finite and Eternal Being*, 1950). This work was prefigured in *Akte und Potenz* (*Act and Potency*), the work she was preparing as an *Habilitationschrift* for her applications to Breslau and Freiburg.

Although Stein had long intended to enter the convent, she became a Discalced Carmelite only after Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany and it was no longer possible for her to work or to publish in Germany because of her Jewish heritage. She entered the Carmel at Köln as a postulant in October 1933. She was admitted into the novitiate and the Carmelite order in April 1934, making her final profession of vows in April 1938. With the encouragement of her superiors, she continued her philosophical work, now centered on the relations between phenomenology and Thomism, until her arrest in the Carmel at Echt in the Netherlands, where she had fled in 1938, in reprisal for the condemnation by the Dutch bishops of the Nazi deportations of Jews. She, along with her natural sister and fellow convert Rosa, was transported to Auschwitz where, immediately upon arrival on 9 August 1942, she was led to the gas chambers and killed. Sister Teresa Benedicta a Cruce, O.C.D., née Edith Stein, was declared a saint of the Catholic Church by Pope John Paul II—also influenced by phenomenology and Scheler and Aquinas—on 11 October 1998.

**STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS.** The stream of consciousness is the unified succession of experiences of a single subject. The unification of experiences is achieved by the structure of the inner time-consciousness.
proper to the **living present** and by the **syntheses** achieved by consciousness. *See also* ACHIEVEMENT.

**STUMPF, CARL (1848–1936).** Stump was a student of Franz Brentano and was a central and crucial figure in the development of modern **psychology**. His work influenced the development of Gestalt psychology, the psychology of group dynamics, and what came to be called “**phenomenological psychology**.” Stumpf adopted Brentano’s descriptive methods, although Stumpf joined them to an experimental program—both thought experiments and physical experiments—that sought to provide an intuitive underpinning for his conclusions. The experiments helped to isolate what was most important in the phenomena under study and to provide insight into the sorts of experimental variations that would continue to be most fruitful.

When Brentano lost his teaching position, he suggested to Husserl that he go to Halle and work under Stumpf. Husserl did so, and submitted his *Habilitationsschrift* in 1887. Husserl and Stumpf were then colleagues at Halle until Husserl departed for Göttingen in 1901. Stumpf’s influence on Husserl was such that Husserl dedicated the *Logical Investigations* to Stumpf.

**SUBJECT.** A subject can be either 1. the subject of **acts**, that is, a conscious experiencing agent; or 2. the subject of **predicates**, that is, a noun or nominal phrase that refers to an **object** (individual or categorial, singular or universal, **real** or **ideal**), and that serves as the logical subject of a **proposition**.

**SUBJECTIVISM.** 1. Subjectivism is an epistemological position that claims that the proper **object** of **knowledge** is inherent to the **subject**. This position is consistent with both representative **realism** and subjective **idealism**. 2. Subjectivism is a form of **relativism** that claims that all knowledge and **truth** are relative to the subject of knowing.

**SUBJECTIVITY.** Subjectivity is the condition or state of **being** or belonging to a **subject** of experiences having **real** and **intentional content**.

**SURROUNDING WORLD** (*Umwelt*). The surrounding world is the subject's environment. The **subject** is self-aware not only of its experience of the **object** to which it is thematically directed but also of a surrounding reality to which the subject has cognitive, affective, and volitional relations. This apperceived surrounding reality encompasses other things in the world, considered not merely as natural or physical things but as
useful things, pleasurable things and activities, cultural objects, as well as social, political and cultural institutions, and so forth. It also encompasses other subjects with whom the subject enters into communicative and interpersonal relations. The personal subject is the center of this surrounding world, a world full of significance that goes far beyond the mere physicality of things. The notion of the surrounding world is a precursor to Husserl’s concept of the life-world. See also APPERCEPTION; SELF-AWARENESS.

SYLLOGISTIC ALGEBRA. The formalization found in algebra makes possible a purely formal mathematical analysis that abstracts from the materially determinate mathematical disciplines such as found in the idealizing disciplines of geometry, mechanics, and acoustics. When applied to the forms of judgment, this formal analysis yields a syllogistic algebra, which, for both Gottfried Leibniz and Husserl, was a stage in the development of a properly conceived mathesis universalis. To say that this formal algebra is syllogistic is to say that the correctness of the derivations realized in this algebra is guaranteed by the correct application of the algebraic operations. See also BOOLE, GEORGE; DE MORGAN, AUGUSTUS; FORMAL MATHEMATICS; FORMAL ONTOLOGY; GENERALIZATION; IDEALIZATION.

SYMBOL. A symbol is a sign considered in its physical dimension. The symbol refers to something other than itself to which our attention is directed by means of the symbol. See also EXPRESSION; INDICATION.

SYMBOLIC. The symbolic involves the mediation of our intentional directedness to an object by a symbol.

SYNCATEGOREMATIC MEANING. Syncategorematic meanings are non-independent meanings, where an independent meaning is understood as the full, entire meaning of a concrete act of meaning. Syncategorematic, then, achieve concreteness only when supplemented by other, complementary meanings in the formation of a concrete meaning, for example, in a judgment. Syncategorematic meanings can achieve no independent fulfillment; they are fulfilled only insofar as the concrete meaning of which they are a moment is fulfilled. See also PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR; WHOLE.

SYNTAX. The forms, codified in grammatical rules, that govern the formation of well-formed expressions and judgments. The syntactical forms of judgments express the categorial forms that unify thought, and
they inform the semantic content—the sense—constituted in the judging experience. See also JUDGE; MEANING-CATEGORIES; PURE LOGICAL GRAMMAR.

SYNTHESIS. Synthesis is the joining together of what is not unified by its own nature or essence. Husserl uses the notion of synthesis in different contexts. In perception (Wahrnehmung), for example, there is the synthetic identification of a singular object of perception. In the experience of another subject, there is an apperceptive pairing in which the subject recognizes the other subject precisely as another subject (rather than an object). In a generalizing abstraction, there is the synthesis of like with like that underlies the apprehension of the individual, ideal species.

The structure of living present with its intentional directedness in retention and protention to other phases of its own life is such that consciousness as a whole is essentially characterized as synthesis. Syntheses can be active or passive. See also ACTIVE SYNTHESIS; APPERCEPTION; GENERALIZATION; PASSIVE GENESIS; PASSIVE SYNTHESIS.

SYNTHESIS OF IDENTIFICATION. See IDENTIFICATION; SYNTHESIS.

SYNTHETIC A PRIORI LAW. Synthetic laws and propositions are defined in contrast with analytic laws and propositions. The contrast is grounded in the fundamental distinction between purely formal categories and material regions. Whereas analytic a priori laws are founded purely on formal categories and are unaffected by all material concepts, synthetic a priori laws are founded on material concepts and the specific nature of the unified moments.

The terms “color” and “extension,” for example, do not include a reference to one another as part of their meaning. Nevertheless, by virtue of its essence color is necessarily and universally, that is, lawfully, related to extension. The necessity of the principle “A color cannot exist without some space that it covers” is evident. Given that “color” does not as part of its meaning include a reference to something else, the necessity of the principle “A color cannot exist without some space that it covers” must be synthetic. So, while color, in virtue of its very content, is unthinkable and impossible without an association with another content, specifically a space that it covers, the notion of ‘color’ does not analytically entail that of ‘space.’ The principle “A color cannot exist without some space that it covers” is, therefore, a synthetic or material a priori truth. Any law that articulates a founding relationship and includes material concepts whose
presence prevents a **formalization** of the law *salva veritate* is a synthetically or materially necessary law. *See also* FOUNDATION; FOUNDED MOMENT; FOUNDING MOMENT.

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**TELEOLOGY.** The view that something is by its nature teleological means that it is directed toward a *telos*, that is, toward an end or goal. This view can be broad in scope, as it is, for example, in Aristotle. For Husserl, however, the notion of teleology is important for his understanding of **consciousness** and **reason**. Consciousness is teleological since an **empty intention** tends toward **fulfillment**. More fundamentally, reason in all its forms is teleological. Its categorial activity is ordered toward the fulfillment of the **judgments** it achieves; reason, in other words, is teleologically ordered insofar as it aims at **evidence**. *See also* CATEGORIAL ACT.

**TEMPORALITY.** The state or condition of being in or of being measured by **time**. The temporality of a thing is characterized in relation to the present as either now, past, or future. The temporality of a thing can also be characterized as either processional or enduring, and the duration of an **experience** or **object** is measured by time.

**TEMPORALIZATION.** Temporalization is the coming to be of **time**, the bringing of time to disclosure. For Husserl, **absolute consciousness** is not itself temporal but, by virtue of the **form** of the **living present**, it is self-temporalizing. In the flow of **consciousness**, what is retained is presented as having elapsed and what is protended is presented as yet to come, whereas the correlate of **primal impression** is the temporal now. *See also* PROTENTION; RETENTION.

**THEMATIZE.** To thematize an **object** is to make it the focus of one’s explicit **attention**. Other objects are co-present to **consciousness**, but just insofar as attention is not directed to them, they are not thematic. Some **experiences** are by their nature thematic, for example, **perception** or **judgment**. Other experiences are by their nature non-thematic, for example, pre-reflective **self-awareness**. What is presented in **retention** (as opposed to **memory**) and **protention** (as opposed to expectation) is also by its nature non-thematic. *See also* PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.
THEME. A theme for consciousness is that upon which it focuses its attention. The thematic center of its concern is presented against a background, against the horizons in which it appears.

THEORETICAL SCIENCE. A theoretical science is one that is unified by a homogeneity of explanatory principles and laws. They exhibit, in other words, a nomological unity. Their principle of unity is internal, and in this regard they are contrasted with descriptive sciences.

THEORY. See THEORETICAL SCIENCE.

THEORY-FORM. The result of a formalizing abstraction applied to theories. This formalization abstracts from the material content of the theories and yields the logical forms and structures that unify theories into logical wholes, which forms and structures are applicable in multiple theories. See also FORMAL LOGIC; FORMAL MATHEMATICS; FORMAL ONTOLOGY; MATHESIS UNIVERSALIS; MULTIPLICITY (Mannigfaltigkeit); PURE LOGIC.

THESIS. A thesis is something held as true in the form of a conviction. The most important instance of a thesis for Husserl is what he calls the “general thesis”—accomplished in a general positing—of the natural attitude, the thesis that the world to which consciousness is intentionally directed is a factually existent whole, that it appears as such, and that it can be known as such. It is just this general thesis that is “bracketed” by the phenomenological reduction such that the reflecting agent attends to the world solely insofar as it presents itself to consciousness and exactly as it presents itself. See also INTENTIONALITY; PRINCIPLE OF PRINCIPLES.

THETIC CHARACTERISTIC. The correlate of the act-quality and the moment that together with the noematic sense makes up the full noema. Perception, for example, involves a belief in the existence of the object perceived just as it is perceived, and by virtue of that belief-modality, the object is perceived as actually existent. In acts having a different quality, however, the doxic modality belonging to the act changes; doubt, for example, no longer believes in the existence of its object but considers it as dubitable and as unlikely or, perhaps, as merely possible. The thetic characteristic of doubt, therefore, is “as dubitable” or “as unlikely” and “as possible.” Thetic characteristics are particularly prominent in judgments and are indicated by the copula. For example, the assertoric judgment asserts the being of the state of affairs as in the sentence “S is p.” When
modalized, however, the judgment becomes, for example, merely probable: “S might be p.”

TIME. Husserl does not investigate time from a metaphysical or scientific point of view. Within the scope of the phenomenological reduction, Husserl focuses his attention on the manner in which objects—including the experiences upon which I reflect—appear with temporal determinations. In other words, Husserl’s primary concern is with the consciousness of time, the consciousness of objects as enduring, as processes or processional, as simultaneous, as successive, and, most fundamentally, as now, past, or future.

In considering the consciousness of time, Husserl distinguishes objective time from phenomenal time. Hence, there can be no single definition or phenomenological account of time, since objective and phenomenal time are differently experienced. Nevertheless, Husserl is clear that the most fundamental form of the experience of time is inner time-consciousness, that is, the pre-reflective consciousness of the phenomenal time belonging to the stream of consciousness itself, a consciousness that is intimately bound up with self-awareness. Moreover, Husserl is also clear that the awareness of inner time founds the experience of objective time. See also FOUNDATION; FOUNDED MOMENT; FOUNDING MOMENT.

TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS. The consciousness of time is directed either to phenomenal time or to objective time. The most fundamental form of time-consciousness is the inner time-consciousness appropriate to the living present. See also MOMENTARY PHASE.

TIME-CONSTITUTION. The disclosure in time-consciousness of time and the temporal determinations of objects and our experiences thereof. See also LIVING PRESENT; MOMENTARY PHASE.

TRANSCENDENCE. 1. A going beyond, for example, the transcendence of consciousness lies in the fact that in being intentionally directed to an object, consciousness goes beyond itself.

2. Something that lies beyond. For example, the transcendence of the object consists in its being beyond consciousness, that is, in its not being a really (reell) inherent part of consciousness. See also TRANSCENDENT.

TRANSCENDENT. In its ordinary, natural-attitude meaning, “transcendent” refers to one object’s lying beyond another, to a condition, in other
words, of non-containment. This is also Husserl’s usage, at least for natural-attitude contexts. The shift of attitude completed upon the performance of the phenomenological reduction, however, introduces a new meaning. What transcends consciousness is not really \textit{really} inherent in consciousness. This is indicated phenomenologically in the fact that the transcendent object is given in profiles or adumbrations. So, for example, in the case of visual perception (Wahrnehmung), one thinks in the natural attitude that the perceived object transcends the perceptual experience since the object is a substantial and spatial individual distinct from and externally related to the subject. In the phenomenological attitude, however, one recognizes that the perceived object, which is essentially related to the perception as its intentional object, is given in spatial profiles in a manner other than that in which the experiencing subject is present to itself. The object cannot be given in any momentary phase of consciousness; it overflows any momentary phase of consciousness, and consequently, the object is experienced as a transcendent object. The object is transcendent to consciousness even though it stands in an essential (intentional) relation to it. See also \textit{Immanence}.

\textbf{TRANSCENDENTAL.} In its broadest meaning, the term “transcendental” refers to something applicable to all beings regardless of their kind. Medieval philosophers use the term “transcendentals” to refer to the properties that belong to any being just insofar as it is a being and that are “convertible” with being. In this sense, the transcendentals are unity, truth, and goodness (and, sometimes, beauty). The term changed its meaning radically, however, in the modern period and, in particular, in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. For Kant, “transcendental” refers to the “subjective” conditions that belong to the possibility of experiencing any object whatsoever, and transcendental philosophy is the \textit{a priori} knowledge of those conditions. The scope of the term continues to encompass all objects, but for the medievals the transcendentals were objective features of the object, whereas for Kant the transcendental is the set of a priori (necessary and universal) conditions for the subject’s experiencing an object at all. The subject in whom these conditions are realized is not the empirical or psychological subject as existing in the world; rather, the subject is the transcendental subject who experiences the world and its objects as always already there before the worldly subject thinks and acts. Kant’s transcendental philosophy in its identification of those “transcendental” categories of the understanding that govern all objective \textit{experience} is, then, a critique of the possibility of experience as such.

Husserl, by and large, takes over this Kantian meaning, but he also modifies it in important ways. For Husserl, the “transcendental” does not
refer primarily to the subjective conditions for the possibility of any experience whatever but to the universal structures of any possible experience (or experience of a certain type). For Husserl, moreover, the transcendental is a field of research, a “being” properly characterized as “consciousness of the world (just as experienced).” The transcendental, in other words, is characterized by the intentional relation between consciousness and world and is, first and foremost, the field of sense (Sinn). This is the field that is opened for investigation by the phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s phenomenology is the attempt to identify the essential structures of this intentional relation, with respect both to consciousness and the world just as experienced, that is, as significant for subjects. In so doing, Husserl identifies the “subjective” structures of possible experience, but he also identifies the objective structures embedded in things as experienced, structures by virtue of which those things are or can be significant for a subject experiencing them. In this sense, the transcendental, for Husserl, also points to the subject—in particular, what he calls the transcendental subject—as an agent that intentionally engages the world and discloses its significance.

The terms “phenomenological” and “transcendental” are often used in very closely related ways. For example, Husserl refers to the phenomenological reduction also as the transcendental reduction. There is, however, a nuanced difference between the expressions. The reduction turns the philosopher’s attention to the correlation between consciousness and the world as experienced, but this correlation can be examined from two perspectives. If the philosopher focuses on the world as experienced (by a subject), then the term “phenomenological” captures this focus; the philosopher is focused primarily on the world as appearing, as phenomenon. If, on the other hand, the philosopher focuses on consciousness (of the world), then the term “transcendental” captures this focus; the philosopher is focused primarily on consciousness and its performances and achievements in disclosing the world. The philosopher, in other words, is focused upon consciousness in its constitutive agency. See also TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS; TRANSCENDENTAL EGO; TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM; TRANSCENDENTAL INTER-SUBJECTIVITY; TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY; TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY.

TRANSCENDENTAL ATTITUDE. The transcendental attitude is the philosophical attitude adopted by performing the transcendental reduction. It is that reflective attitude in which one attends to consciousness as the subjectivity that discloses the world. In the transcendental attitude, therefore, attention is directed to the intentional correlation between
CONSCIOUSNESS and its **objects**. Properly conceived, the transcendental attitude is identical to the **phenomenological attitude**.

**TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE.** Phenomenological reflection seeks to uncover the essential structures of our experience and the subjective performances in which **consciousness** discloses the **significance** of **objects**. Husserl claims that the **intentional object** provides the “clue” for these phenomenological analyses. By examining the structures of the object as experienced and by considering the **horizons** in which it appears and the other kinds of experience in which it might appear, the reflecting philosopher gains an insight into the layers of **sense** belonging to the object and into the synthetic performances of consciousness in bringing the object to **appearance** in just that manner. See also **SYNTHESIS**.

**TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS.** Transcendental consciousness—**consciousness** as the agent disclosive of the **world** and intentionally united with that world or, more simple, the **whole** that is “consciousness of the world”—is for **phenomenology** the **absolute concretum**. There is nothing that can be meaningfully posited outside this **concretum**.

**TRANSCENDENTAL CONSTITUTION.** See **CONSTITUTION**.

**TRANSCENDENTAL EGO.** The transcendental ego is **transcendental consciousness** in its subjective dimension and as reflected upon. The transcendental ego is the **intentional** center of all conscious life and, hence, of all objectifying **experiences**, all affects, all **valuations**, and all **volitions** and actions. Husserl’s transcendental ego differs from Immanuel Kant’s insofar as it is not a formal identity accompanying all experiences; instead, for Husserl the transcendental ego is a self-transforming identity over **time**. It is an identity by virtue of its self-unification in the **living present** and **inner time-consciousness**, and it is self-transforming insofar as it acquires new convictions and new **habitualities**. In this way, the transcendental ego is self-constituting, and it also discloses itself as a **psychological ego** in the **world**. Husserl sometimes uses “transcendental ego” in a wide sense equivalent to “transcendental consciousness.” See also **EGOLOGY; OBJECTIFYING ACT; PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS; SELF-AWARENESS**.

**TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM.** Transcendental idealism claims that **objects** are dependent upon **consciousness**. The position must be distinguished from any form of metaphysical idealism that claims that the **existence** of objects depends upon consciousness, for example, the
subjective idealism that claims that objects exist as an inhering part of consciousness. Transcendental idealism claims instead that objects, precisely insofar as they are objects of experience and as experienced, depend upon consciousness for their sense. Moreover, since sense is not an empirical concept, this dependence cannot be causal for sense is not a natural object of the sort that enters into causal relations. Finally, transcendental idealism does not claim that the sense of an object depends solely upon consciousness, but only that the structures of intentional consciousness (both subjective and intersubjective) condition the sense of things for the subjects experiencing them. Given Husserl’s view that natural-attitude experience is governed by a realistic presumption, one can say that the phenomenological analysis of that experience reveals that transcendental idealism is the truth of the natural attitude. See also INTENTIONALITY; REALISM.

TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY. The community of transcendental subjects who together constitute the world as a world “for us.” The possibility of different subjects experiencing the world from different perspectives is a necessary condition for the experience of an object as presenting itself as an identity in a manifold of presentations and is, therefore, a necessary condition also for the possibility of objective experience and knowledge and the scientific grasp of the nature of things. This further entails that the experience of another (transcendental) subject (at least as a possible subject) is a founding moment for the experience of an object, since nothing gains the sense of “object” or “objectivity” apart from its being experienceable by a multiplicity of subjects, and the sense of a subject is derived from the experience of actual subjects other than the self. The experience of another subject, therefore, is a foundation for the experience of any objects whatsoever. See also EMPATHY; INTERSUBJECTIVITY.

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. The phenomenological reflection upon and investigation of the subjective achievements at work in the constitution of the categorial formations and fundamental concepts proper to the mathesis universalis. In other words, transcendental logic is the phenomenological analysis of the intentionalities that are at work in the formation of the judgments and categories operative in formal logic and formal ontology. These analyses include the analysis of the pre-predicative experiences underlying acts of judging, including the passive synthenses and passive genesis involved in the formation of those judgments. See also CATEGORIAL FORM; CATEGORY; INTENTIONALITY.
TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT. The subject of acts as reflected upon philosophically within the scope of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, as the disclosive agent that brings the world to givenness, and as constituting as well the psychological subject. The transcendental subject is not properly conceived as a second subject separate from the empirical or psychological subject. The transcendental subject instead is that moment of subjectivity that accounts for its disclosure of the sense of objects and of the world and for the apperception of oneself as an empirical subject in the world. This subject, unlike the empirical subject, is not experienced in the world. It is prior to the world as that which in its disclosive agency makes the experience of the world possible.
TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY. The condition or state of being or belonging to a transcendental subject. In addition to this more precise sense that refers to subjectivity, Husserl sometimes uses this expression to refer to transcendental consciousness as the absolute concretum.

TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION. This expression captures the full sense of Husserl’s methodological technique that turns the reflecting philosopher’s attention to transcendental consciousness, that is, toward transcendental subjectivity as constitutive of the world as experienced and to that world as phenomenon, just as it is experienced. This reduction is also called most frequently, albeit with different emphases, the “phenomenological reduction” (q.v., for the fullest discussion) as well as the “transcendental reduction.”

TRUTH. 1. Adequatio rei et intellectus; the correctness of a judgment—more precisely, of a proposition—that is recognized in the fulfillment of an empty judgment such that the proposition coincides, or is congruent with, the intuited state of affairs. While this definition evokes standard correspondence theory of truths, Husserl’s position should not be so understood. The experience of truth, for Husserl, involves experiencing the identity of the sense of the empty judgment and the sense of the fulfilled judgment. It is not the correspondence of two things, a propositional entity in the mind and an actual state of affairs. It is the identical state of affairs intended in different ways.

2. Underlying this sense of truth as adequation (adequatio), then, is the sense of truth as evidence, the intuitive grasp of things themselves. Insofar as recognizing the adequacy (Adäquation) of a proposition to the state of affairs emptily judged involves an intuitive and evidential grasp of the state of affairs itself, this notion of truth as evidence is the more fundamental. See also CONGRUENCE; EMPTY INTENTION; FULFILLING INTENTION; FULFILLING SENSE; INTUITION.

TWARDOWSKI, KASIMIR (1866–1938). Along with Husserl, a student of Franz Brentano who also rejected the latter’s psychologism. Kasimir Twardowski wrote an important work titled Zur Lehre von Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (On the Theory of the Content and Object of Presentations, 1894), which Husserl reviewed in 1896. Twardowski’s distinction between an act, its content, and its object played a crucial role in the development of Husserl’s views on intentionality. See also BOLZANO, BERNARD; MEINONG, ALEXIUS.
UNITY. The unity of anything is for Husserl a function of the founding relationships that obtain among its parts. Unity, in other words, is not a property of things added to them over and above the unified parts. Unity is achieved by virtue of the fact that certain moments demand supplementation by other moments, and the realization of these relationships in the existent object is sufficient to unify the object. See also CATEGORICAL FORM; FOUNDATION; FOUNDED MOMENT; FOUNDING MOMENT; SYNTHESIS.

UNIVERSAL OBJECT. A universal object is the "idea" of an individual object, that is, the separable content belonging to an individual object. This separable content becomes an object of awareness by virtue of an abstraction from an individual or series of individuals. A universal object such as a species that is instantiated in particulars must be distinguished from an ideal individual such as a geometric figure that is approximated in sensible particulars. See also GENERALIZATION; IDEALIZATION.

VAGUE EXPRESSION. Vague expressions are those having no single meaning that is the same in all their applications. Such expressions refer to objects conceived with a lack of clarity and distinctness. Expressions referring to morphological essences are essentially vague in this manner since there are borderline cases in which the distinction between essences is not sharp and to which the application of the concept is, consequently, not clear. See also EXACT EXPRESSIONS; EXACTNESS; VAGUENESS.

VAGUENESS. A condition of unclarity and indistinctness, in which the indistinctness is more fundamental. Vagueness is found wherever the parts of something are not sufficiently articulated or distinguished. This can happen in various contexts. The meaning of a term or expression might not be sufficiently distinguished from the meaning of other expressions, or the parts of a proposition might not be actively articulated by the one judging. Insofar as the object is indistinctly given, it cannot be brought to a clear intuition. See also CLARITY; DISTINCTNESS; EXACT EXPRESSIONS; EXACTNESS; VAGUE EXPRESSION.
VALUATION. 1. The act of valuing an object or state of affairs; 2. the value or worth attributed to the object in valuing it. See also VALUE APPERCEPTION.

VALUE. 1. The activity of apprehending an object or state of affairs as valuable, that is, taking something to be pleasing or painful, likeable or dislikable, good or bad; 2. the object apprehended in a value apperception. See also VALUATION.

VALUE APPERCEPTION (Wertnehmung). Taking something as valuable. Husserl uses the term Wertnehmung analogously to Wahrnehmung (perception). In perception and the belief-modality that belongs to it, the subject takes the object to exist in a determinate manner and believes that taking to be true. Hence, the subject takes $S$ as $p$ as true. Similarly, in a value apperception, the subject takes—and believes—$S$ to be valuable; the subject takes $Sp$ as $v$. This formalized way of stating the objects of perception and value apperception reveals the important founding relation between them. Husserl claims both that values (that is, valued objects) are constituted in feeling-acts or emotions and that this feeling-act (and the value sense it constitutes) are founded on a presentation (and the cognitive sense it constitutes). In the example, therefore, there is a underlying presentation that constitutes the sense ‘$S$ as $p$’ and founded upon this is the value apperception constituting the sense ‘$Sp$ as $v$.’ The value attribute is founded on the descriptive property available to a pure cognition, but the value attribute itself is not available to pure cognition. It is disclosed by a feeling or emotion. The value apperception is a unified act; it does not arise separately from the objectifying presentation. The founding relationship, however, is one-sided such that the objectifying presentation can occur separately from the feeling or emotion that constitutes the value apperception. See also CONSTITUTION; FOUNDATION; FOUNDING MOMENT; FOUNDING MOMENT; OBJECTIFYING ACT.

VALUE ATTRIBUTE. The goodness (or badness) of a valued (or disvalued) object. The attribute will be specified according to the type of value involved (aesthetic, utilitarian, moral), the underlying descriptive features of the object that make the object valuable, and the kind of feeling or emotion involved in the valuation of the object. See also VALUE APPERCEPTION; VALUE JUDGMENT.

VALUE JUDGMENT. The explicit articulation of the value attribute of an object as belonging to the object. The value judgment is founded upon
VOLITION

the value apperception of the object. See also FOUNDATION; FOUND-ED MOMENT; FOUNDING MOMENT; VALUE.

VALUE PROPERTY. Identical to the value attribute, although the language of “property” can be misleading since the logic of attributive uses and predicative uses of adjectives differs. Predicative uses of adjectives are appropriate for descriptive properties, whereas attributive uses refer to attributes founded on underlying descriptive properties. See also VALUE.

VAN BREDA, HERMAN LEO (1911–1974). A Franciscan friar who, after completing his Licentiate in philosophy at the Higher Institute of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Leuven, visited Freiburg approximately four months after Husserl’s death. Van Breda intended to research Husserl’s later manuscripts in Freiburg. Finding an enormous number of unpublished manuscripts and concerned, along with Malvine Husserl and Eugen Fink, that the manuscripts were in danger of being destroyed by the Nazis, van Breda arranged, with the assistance of the Belgian government, to have the documents transported—smuggled, in fact—to Leuven in diplomatic pouches. Van Breda established the Husserl Archives at the Institute, and then completed his doctoral dissertation, receiving the degree in 1941. He taught at Leuven and served as Director of the Archives until his death.

VARIATION. See EIDETIC VARIATION.

VIETA, FRANCISCUS (1540–1603). The Frenchman François Viète, who signed his written works Franciscus Vieta. He developed a method of formalization that allows one to speak of form as applicable to any object whatsoever. He was a central figure in the development of a purely formal algebraic notation. Vieta’s work was, according to Husserl, a major step in the development of a mathesis universalis.

VOLITION. The act of willing an action in the attainment of an end. Willing, like other intentional experiences, can be empty or full. An empty willing that remains unfulfilled, however, is in a sense not a willing at all, since one cannot really be said to will an act if the act is not performed. What can render a volition legitimately empty is a set of external conditions that prevent the agent from undertaking the act. An empty volition might also occur when the proper time for the performance of the willed action has not yet arrived.
The fulfilled volition is the action itself. There are intermediate stages of fulfillment that are possible. For example, an agent can desire an end, the attainment of which can only be reached in stages and over an extended period of time. If one decides, for example, to lose weight, say 20 pounds, the loss of the first two pounds fulfills in part that intention. In this case, the empty intention or the partly empty-partly fulfilled intention takes on the form of resolve. Resolve can also involve willing impossible ends, say, world peace, but the resolve can be partially fulfilled in those actions that contribute to world peace even if they do not fully realize it.

VON HILDEBRAND, DIETRICH (1889–1977). Having begun his studies at the University of Munich under Theodor Lipps, von Hildebrand became associated with the group of students and philosophers who made up the Munich Circle, especially Max Scheler. Von Hildebrand studied at Göttingen from 1909 to 1911 with Husserl and Adolf Reinach. He completed his dissertation in 1912 under Husserl, but he was probably more indebted for his philosophical outlook to Reinach. Von Hildebrand’s major works are in ethics and social philosophy, and he was concerned to articulate a view of religious values that had been formed by his deep commitment to Catholicism to which he had converted in 1914. An active opponent of Nazism, he was forced to flee Germany to Austria and then to France. At each stop, he was forced to flee again as the Nazi conquest widened. He finally went to the United States in 1940, where he taught at Fordham University in New York City from 1941 to 1960.

WEIERSTRASS, KARL (1815–1897). Weierstrass was appointed to the chair in mathematics at the University of Berlin in 1857. Husserl studied there with Weierstrass from 1878–1881 and again, after completing his dissertation at Vienna, for part of 1883. Weierstrass was concerned with the foundations of mathematics and sought to ground mathematics axiomatically. To that end, Weierstrass developed mathematical definitions of some central mathematical concepts, such as continuity, limit, and derivative.

WHOLE. A whole is defined in terms of its moments and their founding relations. More precisely, a whole is a set of parts or contents united by a single, although possibly complex, foundation without the help of additional, non-essential parts or contents. Hence, every part or content
comprised in a proper whole is foundationally connected—mediately or immediately, reciprocally or one-sidedly—with every other part or content comprised by that same whole. The whole is the lawful, interconnected unity of founding and founded moments. There is no additional moment of unity over and above this interconnected unity of moments.

The unity arises out of the non-independence of the parts, out of their need for supplementation by specific contents in conformity with law. Such contents are by their very nature intimately united with one another. The mere necessity of coexistence—the demand by one moment for supplementation by another—is sufficient to produce the unity of a whole. The whole is just the interconnected unity of founding and founded moments, and its unity is just the lawful interconnections of moments.

Conversely, where it makes no sense to speak of the separate existence of any part within a whole, there is no need for an additional principle that might account for the unity of the parts comprised by that whole. There is no separate moment of unity added to the interrelated moments, no constituent part to be identified as the unifying moment, except in wholes not satisfying Husserl’s strict definition, that is, except in wholes that can be divided into pieces, in which case the form of unity corresponds to a unity of reference in the intention bringing the various contents into a whole.

The truly unifying factors of wholes in Husserl’s precise sense are the relations of foundation themselves. The unity of such a whole is a categorial predicate insofar as it is grounded in an ideal law defining the necessary interrelationships among particular contents.

WILD, JOHN (1902–1972). John Wild, while not strictly a phenomenologist, was nevertheless influenced by phenomenological thinking. He rejected Husserl’s idealism, and instead he drew upon more the existential themes he found in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, although he was also greatly attracted to Husserl’s notion of the life-world. In 1962 Wild founded the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), the largest international professional society devoted to the study of phenomenology and its successors that together make up what is commonly—albeit unclearly—called “continental philosophy.”

WILL. See VOLITION.

WORLD. 1. From the perspective of the natural attitude, the world is the sum of all objects. 2. From the phenomenological perspective, the world is the correlate of consciousness, and in that light, it is the overall context in which all objects have their sense. The world, then, is the ultimate
horizon in which the sense of things is located and contextualized. As such, the notion of world, including the notions of intersubjectivity, language, history, and culture, play an important role in genetic phenomenology.

WORLDVIEW (Weltanschauung). A perspectival—that is, historical and cultural—apprehension of the world. In Husserl’s view, a worldview does not rise to the level of a philosophical position, and he criticizes worldview philosophies in “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science.” Because it is a historically and culturally conditioned view of the world, it is, even while not identical with historicism, infected thereby and is a form of relativism. Because it situates itself in a particular perspective within the world, it does not attain the transcendental viewpoint proper to philosophy. See also DILTHEY, WILHELM.

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YEARBOOK FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH (Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung). An annual founded in 1913 by Husserl, who had for several years wanted an organ for publishing phenomenology, and edited by him along with some associates from the Munich Circle, specifically Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, Moritz Geiger, and Alexander Pfänder. The journal published a number of very important phenomenological works, beginning with Husserl’s Ideas I in 1913. That first volume also included the first part of Pfänder’s work on the sentiments, Geiger’s work on aesthetic enjoyment, the first part of Scheler’s Formalism, and Reinach’s work on the foundations of civil law. The second part of Scheler’s Formalism was published in the Yearbook in 1916. Edith Stein’s work on the foundations of psychology was published in 1922, and her work on the state was published in 1925. The 1923 edition included Oskar Becker’s important work on the phenomenological grounding of geometry and its application in physics. The 1927 edition also included, famously, Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). Husserl’s lectures on inner time-consciousness were published in 1928, and Formal and Transcendental Logie in 1929 along with a Festschrift devoted to Husserl and including works by Becker, Heidegger (“On the Essence of Ground”), Gerhart Husserl, Roman Ingarden, Fritz Kaufmann, Alexandre Koyré, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and Edith Stein. The last edition was published in 1930.
Selected Bibliography

This bibliography is but a small selection of the many works written by or about Husserl. It is organized as follows:

I. Primary Materials
   A. Husserliana
      1. Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke
      2. Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Dokumente
      3. Husserliana Materialen
      4. Edmund Husserl Collected Works
   B. Other Works by Husserl
   C. Other English Translations of Husserl’s Work

II. Secondary Materials
   A. General—Phenomenology
   B. General—Husserl
   C. Logic, Mathematics, and Science
   D. Phenomenological Method
   E. Intentionality
   F. The Transcendental Ego, Subjectivity, and Intersubjectivity
   G. Temporality and History
   H. Space and the Body
   I. Social, Moral, and Political Philosophy

III. Bibliographies and Indices

   The division of secondary sources by subject matter is necessarily somewhat arbitrary; many other principles of classification could have been used, and many works—indeed, most works—do not fit neatly into one or another category. This is especially true given Husserl’s propensity to write repeated introductions to phenomenology and the tendency of many commentators to respond to the full range of Husserl’s thinking. Moreover, certain themes, especially those of the phenomenological reduction, intentionality, temporality, and the self and self-awareness are so interconnected in Husserl’s thinking as almost to defy separate treatment. Where English translations of non-English secondary sources are available, they are given at the end of the entry for the original work.
Husserl’s works are divided between those that are published with the *Husserliana* series and those that are not. *Husserliana* comprises four sub-series. The first—and central—one is *Gesammelte Werke*, the critical editions of Husserl’s writings. There are currently 38 volumes in the series, some with multiple parts. The second is *Dokumente*, which does not actually publish Husserl’s writings but publishes instead titles related to understanding Husserl’s life and work. The third, titled *Materialien*, publishes research writings and manuscripts from Husserl’s *Nachlass* that are not included in *Gesammelte Werke*. They are not organized in the way the critical editions are; they do not include supplementary texts as do the critical editions; and they do not have the same critical apparatus. Nevertheless, they do make available important texts. The fourth, *Collected Works*, is a set of English translations based on the volumes in the *Gesammelte Werke*.

There are many works on phenomenology in general in which Husserl, naturally, plays an important role, and there are many works in which the relations between Husserl and other phenomenologists or philosophers influenced by phenomenology are explored. Among the general works on phenomenology, there are two important histories of the movement. The classic is Herbert Spiegelberg’s comprehensive *The Phenomenological Movement* (1959), which has been updated and is now in its third edition (1982). Also noteworthy is Dermot Moran’s more recent *Introduction to Phenomenology* (2000).

Two short introductions to Husserl’s phenomenology are available. One, Robert Sokolowski’s (1999) *Introduction to Phenomenology*, approaches phenomenology thematically, largely following Husserl, but with some admixture of the Heidegger of the 1920s. Dan Zahavi’s (2003) *Husserl’s Phenomenology*, on the other hand, is directed more explicitly to Husserl and traces his development through various stages of his career. Longer introductions worthy of note are Sokolowski’s (1974) *Husserlian Meditations* and Donn Welton’s (2000) *The Other Husserl*.

The most notable, general collections of articles are those edited by Marvin Farber (*Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, 1940), Roy Elveton (*The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings*, 1970), Edo Pivé (*Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding*, 1975), Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick (*Husserl. Expositions and Appraisals*, 1977), Robert Sokolowski (*Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition*, 1988), J. N. Mohanty and William McKenna (*Husserl’s Phenomenology*, 1989), Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith (*The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, 1995), and Donn Welton (*The New Husserl*, 2003). Bibliographic details for each of these are provided below, although the separate articles in each volume (and in
all the collections mentioned in this essay) have not been listed for reasons of space.

More recently, Routledge has published two vast compilations, each comprising five volumes. These reprint some of the most important articles in phenomenology and on Husserl. The more general one, edited by Dermot Moran and Lester Embree (2004), is titled *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*. The collection dealing exclusively with Husserl, edited by Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton, and Gina Zavota (2005), is titled *Edmund Husserl: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*.

A number of works listed aid in understanding Husserl’s thought in relation to previous and subsequent thinkers. Especially noteworthy here is Iso Kern’s (1964) *Husserl und Kant*, which explores Husserl’s relation to both Kant and the neo-Kantians. The neo-Kantians exerted an influence not only on Husserl but also on Heidegger, and of crucial importance for understanding Husserl’s relation to Heidegger in the light of this neo-Kantian background is Steven Crowell’s (2001) *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*. The differences and relations between Husserl and Heidegger are further explored in Ernst Tugendhat’s (1967) *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* and Burt Hopkins’s (1993) *Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger*. A good introduction to Husserl’s relation to the early moderns and the analytic tradition rooted in them is Richard Cobb-Stevens’s (1990) *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*. Husserl’s relation to Gottlob Frege in particular has been explored by Dagfinn Føllesdal (*Husserl und Frege*, 1958), by Mohanty (*Husserl and Frege*, 1982), and by John J. Drummond (“Frege and Husserl,” 1985).

Methodological considerations pervade Husserl’s work, and, consequently, they pervade commentaries on Husserl, even when those commentaries are not primarily concerned with methodological issues. Among those that are, however, special note should be made of Fred Kersten’s (1989) *Phenomenological Method*, Antonio Aquirre’s (1970) *Genetische Phänomenologie und Reduktion*, Sebastian Luft’s (2002) *Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*, the aforementioned monographs by Hopkins (1993) and Welton (2000), and Kern’s (1962) and Drummond’s (1975) articles on the so-called ways to the reduction; an English translation of Kern (1962) is included in Elliston and McCormick (1977). The opening chapters of Sokolowski’s *Husserlian Meditations* offer valuable methodological guidance, as do two additional papers by Hopkins (1991, 1997). And Cobb-Stevens (1990, 1992) has written illuminating work on eidetic and categorical intuition.

There are numerous collections of articles on Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. An early one (*Readings on Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations*) was edited by Mohanty (1977). The years 2000 and 2001 marked the
centenary of the publication of the *Investigations*, and this anniversary was celebrated with a number of collections examining the *Investigations*. Included among them are the collections edited by Dan Zahavi and Frederik Stjernfelt (*One Hundred Years of Phenomenology*, 2003), Denis Fisette (*Husserl’s Logical Investigations Reconsidered*, 2003), Daniel Dahlstrom (*Husserl’s Logical Investigations*, 2005), and Kwok-ying Lau and John Drummond (*Husserl’s Logical Investigations in the New Century: Western and Chinese Perspectives*, 2007). Husserl’s other major logical work *Formal and Transcendental Logic* has been the subject of two extended commentaries: Suzanne Bachelard’s (1957) *La logique de Husserl* and Dieter Lohmar’s (2000) *Edmund Husserl’s Formale und transzendentale Logik*.

Husserl’s discussions of intentionality, meaning or sense, temporality, and the self and ego are systematically intertwined, and treatments of any one necessarily touch upon at least some of the others. Important treatments of Husserl’s theory of meaning can be found in Mohanty’s (1964) *Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning*, James Edie’s (1976) *Speaking and Meaning*, Ernst Orth’s (1967) *Bedeutung, Sinn, Gegenstand*, Sokolowski’s *Husserlian Meditations* and *Presence and Absence* (1978), and Welton’s (1983) *The Origins of Meaning* and *The Other Husserl*.

There has been much controversy over the interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality and, in particular, the doctrine of the *noema*. Aron Gurwitsch was among the first of Husserl’s followers to focus attention specifically upon the *noema* as a theme (see, for example, “Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality in Historical Perspective,” 1967). Gurwitsch’s view was criticized by Hubert Dreyfus (“The Perceptual Noema,” 1972), but his criticism simply assumed the interpretation of the *noema* forwarded by Dagfinn Follesdal (“Husserl’s Notion of Noema,” 1969) and developed (in a slightly different direction) by Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith (*Husserl and Intentionality*, 1982). That interpretation, in turn, was criticized—and the Gurwitsch interpretation defended—by Richard Holmes (“An Explication of Husserl’s Theory of the Noema,” 1975), Sokolowski (“Intentional Analysis and the Noema,” 1984), and Lenore Langsdorf (“The Noema as Intentional Entity,” 1984). There have been attempts to reconcile the varying interpretations; chief among the ieronic interpreters are Mohanty (*Husserl and Frege*), Welton (*The Origins of Meaning*), and Mary Jeanne Larrabee (“The Noema in Husserl’s Phenomenology,” 1986). Drummond (*Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism*, 1990) has denied that the interpretations can be reconciled and, although coming closer to the Gurwitsch interpretation, he has criticized both views.

Treatments of intentionality lead to discussions of the temporality of consciousness and of inner time-consciousness. On these topics, pioneer-
ing work has been done by Rudolf Boehm (in the introduction to *Husserliana X*), Klaus Held (*Lebendige Gegenwart*, 1966), John Brough (“The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl’s Early Writings on Time-consciousness,” 1972), and Bernet (introduction to *Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (1893–1917), 1985).


The most recent, most comprehensive, and most user-friendly bibliography is Stephen Spileers (1999) *Edmund Husserl. Bibliography*.

### I. Primary Materials

#### A. Husserliana

1. **Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke**
   (Critical editions of Husserl’s major works and lecture courses; in progress)

   - **Vol. 4:** *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Un-


2. *Husserlana: Edmund Husserl Dokumente*
   (Documents related to Husserl’s career and work; in progress)


- Band I: *Die Brentanoschule.*
- Band II: *Die Münchener Phänomenologen.*
- Band III: *Die Göttinger Schule.*
- Band IV: *Die Freiburger Schüler.*
- Band V: *Die Neukantianer*
- Band VI: *Philosophenbriefe.*
- Band VII: *Wissenschaftlerkorrespondenz.*
- Band VIII: *Institutionelle Schreiben.*
- Band IX: *Familienbriefe.*
- Band X: *Einführung und Register.*


### 3. Husserliana Materialen

(Non-critical editions of Husserl’s lecture courses; still in progress)


### 4. Edmund Husserl Collected Works
(English translations of Husserl supervised by the Husserl Archives; in progress)


**B. Other Works by Husserl**

*(in order of publication)*

*Beiträge zur Variationsrechnung (Dissertation).* Wien: Universität Wien, 1882.


“Lettre de M. le professeur Husserl: An den Präsidenten des VIII. internationalen Philosophiekongresses, Herrn Prof. Rädls in Prag.” In Actes du


C. Other English Translations of Husserl’s Works
(in order of publication)


II. Secondary Materials

A. General—Phenomenology


Theunissen, Michael. “Intentionaler Gegenstand und ontologische Differenz. Ansätze zur Fragestellung Heideggers in der Phänomenologie


### B. General—Husserl


———. *Introduction à la phénoménologie de Husserl*. Grenoble: J. Millon, 1992; *An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology*. Ed.


### C. Logic, Mathematics, and Science


D. Phenomenological Method


E. Intentionality


Spiegelberg, Herbert. “Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Hochscholastik, bei Brentano und Husserl.” Philosophische Hefte 5 (1936): 75–91; “‘Intention’ and ‘Intentionality’ in the Scholastics, Brentano and


F. The Transcendental Ego, Subjectivity, and Intersubjectivity


G. Temporality and History


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**H. Space and the Body**


Holenstein, Elmar. “Der Nullpunkt der Orientierung. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit der herkömmlichen phänomenologischen These der ego-


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**I. Social, Moral, and Political Philosophy**


III. Bibliographies and Indices

About the Author

John J. Drummond (B.A., Ph.D., Georgetown University) is the Robert Southwell, S.J. Distinguished Professor of the Humanities and Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University in New York City. He is the author of *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object*, and he has edited or co-edited five collections of essays on Husserl and phenomenology: *Phenomenology of the Noema; The Truthful and the Good: Essays in Honor of Robert Sokolowski; Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy; Husserl’s Logical Investigations in the New Century: Western and Chinese Perspectives*; and a special edition of the *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* devoted to Husserl. His more than 60 articles are devoted to discussions of Husserl; Aristotle; the theories of pure logical grammar and of logic; the general theory of intentionality; the particular theory of moral intentionality (valuation and volition); the emotions; perception; space; the self; and the nature of community, especially moral and political communities. He is currently developing a book manuscript on moral intentionality. He served as general editor of the book series *Contributions to Phenomenology* from 1995 through 2006. He continues on the editorial board of that series and also on the editorial boards of three other book series. He has served as a contributing editor to *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, and he will become co-editor of the *Yearbook* in 2008. He is also a member of the editorial boards of *Husserl Studies* and *Recherches husserliennes*. He has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and of the Executive Council of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. He serves on several advisory boards and is a member of the boards of directors of the Fordham Center for Ethics Education and the Fordham University Press.